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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Introduction
1.1.1 Main research topic
This thesis is concerned with managerial investment incentives and voluntary disclosure, and
how they work together. I study a setting where the manager makes three decisions; operating,
investment and reporting decisions. The reporting decision is in this thesis represented by a
voluntary disclosure decision; the manager can decide whether or not to disclose information
about the investment decision he has already taken. How will the managers reporting deci-
sion inuence his incentives to invest? I look at the usefulness of the stock price in inducing
investment when the manager controls the information that the stock market receives, and I
relate this to accruals and how accruals can create investment incentives. I also study how the
managers control over the disclosure decision inuences the ownerspayo¤ and the contract
that they will o¤er the manager. I develop an agency model to analyze these questions.
1.1.2 Developments in accounting theory
Today the informational approach to nancial reporting and nancial accounting research is
well established. The central theme in the informational approach is that nancial accounting
data should provide information that is useful to nancial statement users. The importance
of the information approach is emphasized in the FASBs Statement of Financial Accounting
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Concepts No. 1 (1978), paragraph 37, which states that:
"Financial reporting should provide information that is useful to present and potential
investors and creditors and other users in assessing the amounts, timing, and uncertainty of
prospective cash receipts."
The informational approach has not always been prevalent in accounting. Prior to the 1960s,
the focus in accounting was on measurement; the measurement of the di¤erent parts of the
nancial statement such as earnings, asset and liabilites, and their specic elements (Beaver
(2000)). To illustrate; in 1941 the Committee on Terminology of the American Institute of
Certied Public Accountants (AICPA) dened accounting in terms of "recording, classifying
and summarizing in a signicant manner and in terms of money, transactions and events, which
are in part, at least of nancial character, and interpreting the results thereof". This was a
transaction-based focus, with an emphasis on historical cost measurement.
Beaver (1998) called the transition to the informational approach in the 1960s an account-
ing revolution. At this time, not only the focus, but also the methods and tools in accounting
research changed. In the 1960s, accounting researchers started to use information economics in
their research. Information economics introduced analytical models that could be used to ad-
dress accounting issues and also emphasized the informational approach1. Early contributions
include Feltham (1968) and Demski and Feltham (1970).
There are still measurement issues in the informational approach, though. One example is
fair value measurement. Fair value is said to contain more relevant information, since it reects,
or should reect, current market values. But fair value is also a measurement issue; it is one of
several alterantive ways to measure the value of an asset in the nancial statement.
1.1.3 Agency theory in accounting
Agency theory is part of information economics and has become widely used in accounting
research. Lambert (2001) gives an extensive overview of agency theory in accounting (mostly
management accounting), and he states that "The primary feature of agency theory that has
made it attractive to accounting researchers is that it allows us to explicitly incorporate conicts
1 Following Ball and Browns (1968) empirical study of the association between accounting numbers and
changes in share price, also a new stream of empirical research emerged (Nichols and Wahlen (2004)) at around
this time.
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of interest, incentive problems, and mechanisms for controlling incentive problems into our
models. This is important because much of the motivation for accounting and auditing has to
do with the control of incentive problems".
Principal features of agency models are conicts of interest, asymmetric information and
uncertainty. Jensen and Meckling (1976) see the company as a nexus of contracts and show
that agency theory can be used to study the conicts that can arise between di¤erent parties
(for instance beteween equity holders and debt holders, and between managers and owners).
In my model, I use a principal-agent setting where the manager is the agent, and owners are
principals, and I study the conict of interest between these two parties.
Asymmetric information describes a situation where one of two (or more) parties has infor-
mation that the other party does not have. For instance, the manager can possess information
that owners do not have, about the company or about his own actions. Asymmetric informa-
tion can take two forms; hidden action or hidden information. Hidden action (or moral hazard)
occurs when the agent takes an action that the principal does not observe, while hidden infor-
mation describes a situation where the agent has private information, either before or after the
contract between them is signed. I will mainly focus on hidden action in my model.
Figure 1.1 is from Lambert (2001) and describes a typical time-line for a principal-agent
model. First the parties agree on a contract s, then the agent chooses an action a that creates
an uncertain outcome x. After this, a performance measure y is observed. The agent is
compensated based on the performance measure according to the contract, and nally, the
principal keeps the net outcome.
Figure 1.1. The timeline in a principal-agent model (Lambert (2001)).
According to Lambert (2001), there are two basic questions in accounting that are addressed
using agency theory: "(i) How do features of information, accounting and compensation systems
a¤ect (reduce or make worse) incentive problems, and (ii) how does the existence of incentive
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problems a¤ect the design and structure of information, accounting, and compensation sys-
tems?".
Holmström (1979) develops an agency model that analyzes the by now well-known risk-
incentive trade-o¤ in optimal incentive contracting. The basic principal-agent model has been
extended in numerous directions that are relevant to accounting. Some of these include: mul-
tiple periods (Rogerson (1985), Christensen and Feltham (2005) Chapters 25-28, Dutta and
Reichelstein (2002, 2003, 2005 a,b), multiple actions (Holmström and Milgrom (1991), Baker
(1992), Feltham and Xie (1994)), misreporting (manipulation) by the agent (Fischer and Verrec-
chia (2004), Goldman and Slezak (2006)), and the e¢ ciency of di¤erent performance measures
such as accounting numbers and stock price (Kim and Suh (1993), Paul (1992), Bushman and
Indjejikian (1993)).
1.2 Accrual accounting
1.2.1 Basic concepts in accrual accounting
The purpose of the rest of this and the next section is to give an overview of the role of accrual
accounting in nancial reporting. Accrual accounting is a method that measures the perfor-
mance of a company by recognizing events, such as transactions, when these events occur,
regardless of when cash ows occur (FASB 1985, SFAC No 6, paragraphs 139, 145). Accrual
accounting alters the timing of cash ow recognition in order to mitigate timing and matching
problems (Dechow (1994)). Earnings is the typical performance measure in accrual account-
ing. Earnings is a summary measure, and with accrual accounting there is a certain level of
aggregation involved.
As mentioned earlier, the objective of nancial reporting is to provide information about a
companys performance (FASB 1978, SFAC No 1, paragraph 42). This objective can be divided
into two di¤erent sub-objectives:
1) to facilitate decision making. For instance, investors need nancial information to valuate
the company in order to make optimal investment decisions in a portfolio context.
2) to facilitate stewardship. The company enters into contracts where the terms of the
contracts depend on accounting numbers. For instance, the managers incentive compensation
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may depend on accounting earnings.
I will also refer to these objectives as valuation and contracting, respectively.
There are potentially several alternatives to using accrual accounting. One is cash report-
ing2. In cash accounting, a companys operations are recorded in the accounting system when
cash is paid to or from the company. The time of recognition is when cash changes hands.
Though simple, cash accounting has some disadvantages. Cash accounting results in matching
problems, since it measures cash ows and not activities/events. Accrual accounting di¤ers
from cash accounting because it focuses on matching. Matching is the process where costs
are aligned with the revenue they are related to3. Matching requires cash outlays (costs) to
be expensed in the period that the associated revenue is recognized (Dechow (1994), see also
Christensen and Demski (2003) pp.307-309). Paton and Littleton (1940) state in their book
"An introduction to corporate accounting standards" that The ideal is to match costs incurred
with the e¤ects attributable to or signicantly related to such costsand that The revenue of
a particular period should be charged with the costs which are reasonably associated with the
product represented by such revenues. Matching is an essential part of accrual accounting.
Another alternative to accrual accounting could be for the management of the company
to reveal all their available information, disaggregated. This could be both nancial and non-
nancial information. Then every user would have to nd what information is relevant for
their use and structure this information for their own purposes. However, if it is costly to
disclose information, then disclosing all information could be very costly. Using summary mea-
sures would then be a preferable alternative. If users of nancial information have information
processing costs, that would also make aggregation e¢ cient. Beaver (1998) suggests that ac-
crual accounting is a cost e¤ective compromise between cash ow reporting and this extensive
full reporting. FASB states in their Conceptual Framework that accrual accounting provides
better information than cash ows about the rms cash ow-generating ability (FASB (1978)).
According to Paton and Littleton (1940) matching of cost and revenues should occur in
the period when revenue is recognized. Revenue recognition then leads the matching process.
2The term cash accounting can be used both about accounting where only net cash ow is reported, and
about an accounting system where all gross cash ows are reported. I will later discuss how incentives can di¤er
in these two settings.
3Matching can also be achieved the other way around, by aligning revenues to the costs that they are related
to, in the period that the costs occur. I will discuss this in a later section.
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Recognition is dened as the process of formally recording or incorporating an item into the
nancial statement (SFAC No 5, paragraph 6). SFAS No 6 describes revenue recognition as
the "essence of using accruals to measure performance of entities". According to Paton and
Littleton (1940) matching can only occur after revenue has been recognized in a particular
period. Generally, revenue should be recognized when it is earned, or realized or realizable,
according to SFAC No 5, paragraph 83. The time when revenue is recognized is important be-
cause it determines when new information is recorded (Marton and Wagenhofer (2010)). Early
recognition allows "softer" information which is more manipulable, and later recognition often
implies "harder" information which is less manipulable (Glover et al. (2005)). Antle and Dem-
ski (1989) analyze early versus late revenue recognition and nd that a revenue recognition rule
that is optimal for stewardship is generally not optimal for consumption smoothing purposes.
Asset valuation will have important implications for revenue recognition. Consider historical
cost and fair value4 as valuation rules for a capital asset (see Christensen and Demski (2003),
p. 308, and Dutta and Zhang (2002)). With historical cost valuation, the sales revenue from
the asset is recorded when goods are sold, and the assets investment cost is spread over the
assets operating lifetime. With fair value, however, the market price of the asset is the basis
for valuation, and market price will ideally reect expected future cash ows (revenue from the
investment). In this case, the change in market value in one period is recognized as income in
this period, and an increase in expected future cash ows will be recognized as revenue in the
current period. Income will typically be recognized earlier with fair value than with historical
cost. An accrual accounting system based on historical cost will therefore lead to di¤erent tim-
ing of accruals5 than fair value. Dutta and Zhang (2002) argue that for incentive purposes fair
value will not be optimal because it is based on the managers expected actions in the future,
and rewarding future actions in the current period is not optimal.
Accrual accounting means that this periods cash ows are divided between those that a¤ect
this periods earnings and those that are moved to future periods through the balance sheet.
The cash outows, for instance, are separated in two; costs that are subtracted from current
4 I will discuss fair value more in Section 1.2.3.
5To be more precise, this regards both accruals and deferrals. Accruals are concerned with recognizing for
instance a revenue (cost) item today when the related cash ow comes (is paid out) in the future. Deferrals
are concerned with current cash ows that are recognized as revenue (costs) in later periods. To keep notation
simple, I will use the term accruals for both of these procedures.
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revenue, and costs that are moved to future periods via the balance sheet. An investment
acquisition is recorded partly as current periods depreciation on the income statement, and
the rest as an asset on the balance sheet. Production costs are allocated between expenses
that are associated with this periods revenue on the income statement, and those that are
related to future revenue on the balance sheet as inventory. Paton and Littleton (1940) state
that an important task of the accounting process is this separation between current and future
periods: "The fundamental problem of accounting, therefore, is the division of the stream of
costs incurred between the present and the future in the process of measuring periodic income"
(p. 67). Paton and Littleton see assets as future expenses. The balance sheet is the tool to
move costs to future periods, and these costs will reduce income in future periods instead of
the current period.
While cash accounting provides information about cash that has been paid in to and out
of the company, accruals reect managements expectations about the companys future cash
ows (Beaver, 1998). For instance, the value of receivables in the nancial statement contains
managements expectations about uncollectables. The accounting value of inventory reects
managements information about what is the lowest of cost and market (LCM) value when the
LCM principle is used for inventory valuation. Assets and liabilites such as these on the balance
sheet tell us something about the expected future cash ows that these assets and liabilites will
create. Managers have more information about the companys state than the outside world,
and accruals is one way that managers can disclose this information6. Moving from cash
accounting to accrual accounting makes accounting data more forward-looking (Glover, Ijiri,
Levine, Liang (2005)).
1.2.2 Managerial discretion
The manager often has some discretion in estimating and reporting accruals. There are two
opposing views on the managers discretion; the signalling (or informational) view and the
opportunism view (see for instance Beaver (1998), p. 84 for a discussion of this, or Louis and
6The information content in accruals and earnings is shown to be signicant. For instance, earnings and
accruals are signicant in predicting future cash ows and stock returns (Dechow (1994), Barth et al. (2001),
Subramanyam (1996)), and Dechow et al. (1998) nd that earnings and accruals are better predictors of future
cash ows than current cash ows.
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Robinson (2005) and Badertscher, Collins and Lys (2010) for empirical analyses).
Signalling
When the manager uses his reporting discretion to convey his private information, this is often
referred to as signalling. According to the signalling view, discretion can be used to increase the
informational content of the report when the report reects the managers private information.
This will increase the informational content of earnings. Christensen and Demski (2003) study
extensively how the manager can use accruals to convey information.
Opportunism
In the opportunistic view, accruals can be used in a manipulative way, to manage earnings
in a way that maximizes the managers own interests, or the companys interests. This is
earnings management. A caution should be noted here regarding the use of the term earnings
management. Some authors use this term very broadly, to cover many or all types of managerial
discretion in reporting, such as signalling, opportunism and the managers withholding of
information (voluntary disclosure). Others use it more narrowly, to describe the opportunism
side of managerial discretion. As a consequence, a broader use of the term makes it easier to
include the potential positive and useful aspects of earnings management. The model that I
will present in later chapters, deals with voluntary disclosures, and I will mostly refer to this
as managerial reporting discretion, rather than earnings management, though from a broad
perspective this could also be seen as a form of earnings management.
Reasons for such opportunism could be that the manager wants to smooth earnings over
time, boost short-term earnings to meet expectations or analyststargets, to increase the price
of equity before IPOs, or that the manager wants to manage earnings to maximize his com-
pensation (see for instance Watts and Zimmerman (1986) or Healy and Wahlen (1999)). Since
cash ows are uncertain and it is di¢ cult for outsiders to know exactly on what information
the manager bases his estimates, the manager has some exibility in his reporting without
risking being punished ex post. Earnings management is about selecting the timing of accruals
to mislead stakeholders or inuence contractual outcomes (see for instance Healy and Wahlen
(1999)).
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There is a large empirical literature on earnings management, among others Healy (1985),
Healy and Wahlen (1999), and Aboody and Kaznik (2009). The problem with nding out
whether earnings have been managed, is that unmanaged earnings are not observable, and the
ability of existing models to nd a proxy for unmanaged earnings is far from perfect (Dechow,
Hutton, Kim, and Sloan (2011)). Dechow, Ge, and Scrand (2010) discuss the di¤erent measures
of earnings management that have been used in empirical studies. There is however, much
evidence that some rms manage earnings (Healy and Wahlen (1999)).
Though earnings management is often viewed as a negative thing, it may still be e¢ cient to
allow earnings management. Allowing earnings management may reduce the cost of incentives
and may actually increase the information in earnings (Sankar and Subramanyam (2001)),
for instance when earnings management is informative about the managers productive e¤orts
(Demski (1998), Demski and Christensen (2003), Arya, Glover, Sunder (2003)) or when the
manager wants to smooth consumption and earnings. It may also reduce costly real earnings
management (dened as taking suboptimal real decisions to increase current earnings) when
the manager can use both accounting earnings management and real earnings management
to manage earnings (Ewert and Wagenhofer, 2005). Demski and Frimor (1999) study a two-
period model with renegotiation and nd that no communication (which they term performance
measure garbling, manipulation or earnings management) is optimal. The reason in their
model is that disclosure may negatively a¤ect the agent at the renegotiation stage, and the
agent will by disclosing give away some of his bargaining advantage at the renegotiation stage.
Since the principal must cover the agency costs ex ante, it is optimal to limit communication.
See also Christensen, Frimor and Sabac (2011) for a model with renegotiation where earnings
management may be e¢ cient.
Dechow and Skinner (2000) state that "No earnings management is clearly not an optimal
solution. Some earnings management is expected and should exist in capital markets. This is
necessary because of the fundamental need for judgement and estimates to implement accrual
accounting - the rst-order e¤ect of allowing these judgements and estimates is to produce an
earnings number that provides a "better" measure of economic performance than cash ows.
Eliminating all exibility would in turn eliminate the usefulness of earnings as a measure of
economic performance". It follows that full elimination of discretion and earnings management
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is not desirable.
Information that is to be recognized in the income statement or on the balance sheet should
be relevant and reliable (SFAC No.5, Paragraph 65). Using estimates and managerial discre-
tion in producing the accounting report calls for regulation on how the manager calculates
earnings, in order for earnings to be informative and reliable. With no restrictions or costs
regarding earnings management, the manager will use his discretion to a maximum and pro-
duce a uninformative report (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). In the nancial statement, the
income statement is accompanied by information in footnotes. One argument for using notes
to disclose information is that this is a way to disclose information that can be characterized
as relevant, but that does not reach the required reliability requirements that are used in the
income statement. Schipper (2007) discusses this distinction between disclosure in the nancial
statement as opposed to in notes.
1.2.3 Fair value
Historical cost is one way of measuring the value of an asset in the nancial report. Historical
cost is based on the original cost when the company bought the asset. Fair value is another
measure. Fair value of an asset is dened by FASB as the price that would be received to sell
an asset in an orderly transaction between market participants, while IASB uses the denition
"Fair value is the amount for which an asset could be exchanged by knowledgeable, willing
parties in an arms length transaction" (FASB (2006), IASB (2009)). Usually, fair value will be
equal to historical cost at the time of aquisition, but later these values will generally di¤er.
Fair vale is a market-based measure. If there exists a complete and perfect market for the
asset, then fair value is the market price of the asset. For instance, tradable securities such as
liquid stocks that are traded on a stock exchange, have a stock price that is easily observable
and can be used as a fair value measure.
For many assets, however, a perfect and complete market does not exist, and for these
assets a fair value is not easily observable. For instance, for a rm-specic machine there is
often no immediate market and market price to use as a measure. Then estimates have to be
used, and estimates are subject to uncertainty, subjectivity, manipulation and estimation errors.
Estimation errors can be both intentional (from earnings management) and unintentional (from
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uncertainty) and reduce the quality of earnings as a performance measure (Dechow and Dichev
(2002)).
Both relevance and reliability are desirable characteristics of nancial information. Fair
value accounting can have implications for both these aspects. Proponents of fair value ac-
counting claim that fair value gives relevant and timely information that is useful to decision
makers. Barth (2006) states that fair values are relevant because "they reect present economic
conditions, i.e. the condition under which the users will make their decisions". Landsman (2007)
provides empirical evidence that fair value information is relevant to investors. Fair value is
seen as timely since it reects current market conditions. On the other hand, using fair value
estimates can make verication more di¢ cult and lead to more subjective measures. Accruals
based on fair value stand in contrast to the accruals that Paton and Littleton (1940) describe,
which are based on transactions, objectivity, and historical cost value. Using estimates based on
the managers unveriable information can lead to more manipulation (Watts (2003)). Chris-
tensen (2010) comments on the increasing use of fair value that "Fair value accounting relies
even more on the private information of management, and enhances the possibilities for earn-
ings management and leaves auditing less e¢ cient". The reliability of the information could be
reduced.
Laux and Leuz (2009) and Emerson et al. (2010) provide overviews of the fair value debate,
and Barth and Landsman (1995) discuss measurement issues.
1.3 Modelling of accruals
1.3.1 Modelling accruals analytically
Typical examples of accruals are depreciation and change in inventory. In this section I will
discuss these. Consider a company that generates operating cash ow of (at + "t) in each
period; think of this as short-term e¤ort and uncertainty regarding the cash ow from e¤ort.
The company considers buying a machine (a capital investment) that will cost  b in the rst
11
CHAPTER 1 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
period but will generate cash ow xt from period 2 to period n. The net cash ows c will be
c1 =  b+ (a1 + "1)
ct = (at + "t) + xt for 2  t  n:
Assume that the investment is protable, implying

 b+
nP
t=2
xt

> 0; with no discounting. If
the company makes this investment, then the cash ow in period 1 will be very low (probably
negative) because of the investment cost. A net income report based on cash accounting will
show low performance in period 1, while the net income for later periods will be high because
they carry none of the investment cost. The low net income occurs in period 1 despite the
fact that the company has made a protable investment and has produced operating income.
With cash accounting, the net income measure is not very informative about the performance
(achievements) in this example with a capital investment. An investor who only observes the
aggregate cash ows in period 1 (net income, with cash accounting) will get a negative view of
the companys performance, even though the company has taken actions that will increase the
cash ow generating ability of the company. The investor cannot distinguish between a low net
income that comes from the company making the investment (which would be good news) or
from low e¤ort or bad luck (bad news).
How would performance be measured with accrual accounting? Using the concept of as-
signing costs to revenues (from Paton and Littleton), the company will now distribute the
investment cost over the periods in which the investment creates revenue (periods 2 to n),
through depreciation (which is an accrual). There are several ways to do this, through various
forms of increasing, decreasing or straight-line depreciation methods. The point is that through
deprecation the investment cost is matched to the revenue it generates, in the periods when
the revenue occurs. Period 1 net income will now be equal to (a1 + "1) while net income It
for periods 2 to n will be: It = ct   depreciationt = at + "t + xt   depreciationt. The accrual
process separates the e¤ort and investment activities in the rst period. A low net income in
period 1 now must come from low cash ows from operating e¤ort.
In order to do the accrual process in this example, the accounting system must be able
to distinguish between cash ows from operations and from investment. If investment cost is
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going to be distributed to future periods, the accountant must know the size of the investment
b. If for instance only aggregate cash ow ct is observable, then this is not possible (I will
later discuss di¤erent alternatives in this scenario). When the accounting system can classify
cash ows as coming from either e¤ort or investment, then the investment can be capitalized
and depreciated.
With accrual accounting, net income will be higher in period 1 and lower in later periods,
compared to cash accounting. In this example, it is hard to argue against the claim that accrual
accounting provides a better measure of company performance than cash accounting.
Another example is inventory recognition. Consider a company that produces goods for
sale each period. A higher number of goods produced increases the production cost. With cash
accounting, the production cost includes all cash ouows that have paid for the manufacturing of
goods, no matter what has happened to the goods after production (sold or stored as inventory).
With accrual accounting, the value of goods produced but not yet sold are assigned to the
balance sheet as inventory. Assume that the company expects higher demand next period
and increases production in the current period to meet this demand (good news). A cash
accounting report would only show increased production costs this period (ambiguous news).
Accrual accounting would not charge this periods income with the cost of goods produced
but not yet sold, and would not punish this periods income for higher expected demand next
period. Accrual accounting would give a more accurate picture of activities in each of the two
periods.
1.3.2 Existing models of accruals and performance evaluation
Recall the earlier discussion about the two uses of accounting information; valuation and con-
tracting. Information may be used di¤erently in valuation and contracting. Gjesdal (1981)
shows that the ranking between di¤erent information systems is di¤erent for valuation than
for contracting purposes. Paul (1992) shows that the weights on information are di¤erent in
valuation and in contracting.
This thesis is mainly concerned with contracting rather than valuation, so I will mostly focus
on the use of accounting information in a contracting setting7. According to the stewardship
7Later I will introduce a model where stock price is part of the incentive contract, and then valuation uses of
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view, accruals (and accrual accounting) are used to create performance measures that induce
the manager to make decisions that are value-maximizing for the owner.
The discussion and previous example regarding depreciation show that accruals play an im-
portant part in measuring performance. Cash ows and earnings based on accrual accounting
can give very di¤erent pictures about the companys periodic protability. When there is a
conict of interest between owners and the manager, it is important (for stewardship purposes)
that the performance measure not only reects the companys protability during the period,
but also that it gives the manager incentives to make optimal decisions. When accounting in-
come is used in the managers incentive compensation, accruals become the basis for managerial
incentives.
Considerable research has been done on the use of performance measures based on accrual
accounting versus performance measures based on cash ows. The central theme in much of
this literature is how to create optimal investment incentives with accruals. Both accruals and
investments are multi-period by nature, and it is therefore natural to analyze investments when
studying accruals. In contrast to the simple model of investment and depreciation above, these
models present principal-agent conicts where the agent (typically the manager) has private
information, and there is a conict of interest between the principal (the owners) and the agent.
The models therefore become more complex than accrual models with no managerial incentive
issues.
The models are multi-period, with an initial investment cost, and cash inows from invest-
ment that occur over many periods. One strand of this literature considers a setting where the
manager has a shorter time horizon or has a di¤erent (higher) discount rate than the owner.
He may therefore be reluctant to invest, because the benets of the investment come far in the
future, or he may choose an investment with cash ows that arrive soon rather than another
investment with higher NPV that has cash ows in later periods. Waiting to compensate the
manager until cash ows are realized may not solve the incentive problem when the manager
has a di¤erent discount rate than the owner or has private information, and it may not even be
feasible if the manager leaves the company before all cash ows are realized. Another line of
models describe a setting where the manager makes both e¤ort and investment decisions, and
information will also be relevant.
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the cash ow from the managers e¤ort and investment decisions cannot be separated. When
only aggregate cash ows are available for contracting, e¤ort and investment problems become
intertwined. This creates problems of giving the manager incentives to make both optimal e¤ort
and investment decisions.
In general, the models describe how (some form of) accruals do better than cash ows in
incentive contracting when there is an investment problem.
I will divide my discussion of this literature into two parts; the rst is where the agent has
private information about the productivity of the investment, and the second where the agent
has private information about the amount he invests.
Private information about productivity
Rogerson (1997), Reichelstein (1997, 2000) and Dutta and Reichelstein (DR) (2002, 2005a)
present models where the manager has private information about the investments productivity.
However, invested amount is observable. Since the principal does not know the investments
productivity, she does not know what the optimal invested amount is and delegates this decision
to the manager. In addition, the manager can have a di¤erent discount rate than the principal,
and his discount rate may be his private information. This makes his investment preferences
di¤erent from the owners, and if cash ow is used as a performance measure the manager will
make investment decisions that are sub-optimal for owners.
Most of these models focus on the concept of goal congruence. By nding a goal congruent
performance measure, the owners ensure that the manager makes investment decisions that
maximize net present value (though not taking into account the managers compensation),
irrespective of the managers discount rate.
The observable investment cost is allocated over the operating life of the investment through
depreciation. By distributing the investment cost over the periods when income from investment
occurs, matching is achieved. How this allocation over periods should occur, is not obvious,
however.
Rogerson (1997) analyzes how accruals can be used to give the manager optimal investment
incentives. In his model, the manager makes a one-shot decision about how much to invest
in a project. The manager has private information about the productivity of the investment,
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but the company (or its accountant) has information about the time pattern of the cash ows
that the investment creates. Rogerson shows that when the managers compensation is weakly
increasing in income, and the investment cost is allocated to period-t income according to the
Relative marginal benets allocation rule, the manager will choose an e¢ cient investment level.
The relative marginal benets allocation rule determines a charge at in period t according to
the following function:
at =
tPT
i=1
i
(1+r)i
where t represents the cash ows from the project in period t, relative to other periods (the
cash ow prole). Cash ow from investment is xt = t   where  is a constant scale factor
and t varies between periods. The parameter T is the projects life, and r is the principals
interest rate.
This charge can be implemented through an appropriate depreciation charge (the relative
benets depreciation), and an interest charge on the book value of the investment8. Residual
income (RI) is income less an interest charge on capital, and the optimal performance measure
in Rogerson (1997) is a special case of residual income, where the relative benets depreciation
schedule is used to calculate depreciation and the resulting income. The depreciation will con-
tain project-specic information about the time pattern of cash ow from investment. Rogerson
shows that the manager will make optimal investment decisions with a performance measure
based on this depreciation rule regardless of his discount rate. This is benecial to the principal
because she does not know the agents discount rate. The principal can use this allocation rule
to ensure that the agent makes investment decisions that are optimal for her (the principal).
Reichelstein (1997) generalizes the result in Rogerson (1997) to a setting where there is a
sequence of overlapping investment decisions. The purpose of using depreciation and allocation
is to match the investment cost (incurred at time 0) with the revenue it generates in the
periods that constitute the investments useful life. Reichelstein (2000) and DR (2002) extend
the models to explicitly include moral hazard problems (e¤ort) and demonstrate how RI and
relative marginal depreciation is cost-e¤ective relative to cash-based performance measures
8The depreciation will be dt =
tPT
i=1
i
(1+r)i
 r 
h
1 Pt 1j=1 dji and the capital charge will be r h1 Pt 1j=1 dji.
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(Reichelstein 2000) and derive the optimal incentive contract with both moral hazard and
asymmetric information (DR, 2002).
Private information about how much the manager invests
The second case is where the investment cost is not (perfectly) observable, but there is no asym-
metric information regarding investment productivity. Dutta and Reichelstein (2003, 2005b)
study this issue. The agent makes both e¤ort and investment decisions, and only the aggregate
cash ows from these decisions are observable. When investment cost is not observable, it is
not possible to use an allocation or depreciation rule based on investment cost, and it becomes
di¢ cult to give optimal incentives to both e¤ort and investment decisions at the same time.
In these models there is a forward-looking signal about investment payo¤ that is used either
directly (DR, 2003) or through a stock price (DR, 2005b). The signal and the stock price are
used to separate the investment problem from the e¤ort problem. In DR (2003) the signal equals
the expected future cash ow from investment, plus noise. The signal is valuable to contracting
if the e¤ort problem is not stationary, and if there is not full commitment. If the e¤ort problem
is non-stationary, the optimal incentive weight on cash ows from e¤ort incentive purposes will
be di¤erent each period, and this causes the manager to invest to much or too little relative
to rst best. The forward-looking signal is then useful in giving investment incentives. If the
e¤ort problem is stationary, it is optimal to set the same cash bonus each period, and the agent
will in this case invest the optimal amount. There is therefore no need for the forward-looking
signal to create investment incentives.
In DR (2005b) the signal contains all information about future cash ows from the invest-
ment; this includes the uncertain part of these cash ows. The stock market observes this signal
and includes it in the stock price. The signal is always valuable for contracting through the
stock price. First, stock price gives the manager investment incentives, as stock price depends
on the invested amount. When the manager is rewarded based on stock price, a higher invest-
ment increases his expected stock-based compensation. Second, using stock price in incentives,
even when cash ows can be used in contracts, is valuable since it protects the manager from
some of the investment risk. Both cash ows and stock price contain investment risk. Including
stock price as well as cash ows in the contract, makes it possible to lter away some of this
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investment risk from the managers compensation and reduce the managers total risk (in a
similar way that is done in relative performance evaluation).
Though these models do not model accruals explicitly, they are closely related to the accruals
litterature in the sense that the forward-looking signal and the stock price can be used as an
accrual that matches the revenue from the investment, to the investment cost (see DR 2005b,
ft. 8). The future income from the investment is moved forward in time in order to create
optimal investment incentives, by using forward-looking information in the incentive contract.
Accruals can here be seen as a forecast about the future. By including the stock price (or
signal) in the compensation, the principal includes a forecast about future payo¤s. The stock
price (or signal) plays the role of an accrual in this setting. They reect the forward-looking
information (about future cash ows) in the same way as an accrual. Recall the discussion
about fair value accounting above. The stock price in DR (2005b) reects the market price
of the claim to the investment cash ows and satises the denition of a fair value measure.
Consequently, the stock price reects the fair value of the investment.
Wagenhofer (2003) reaches a similar conclusion as Dutta and Reichelstein about the use
of matching for managerial incentives. He studies a model where unobservable investment is
personally costly to the manager, and where only short-term contracts are available. In his
model, he nds an optimal depreciation rate and nds that accruals with this deprecation
rate is more e¢ cient than cash ows for incentive purposes. So in contrast to DR (2003) and
DR (2005b) investment cost is moved to future periods through depreciation. This is possible
because the principal observes imperfect information ex post about the managers investment
decision, and he uses this information to depreciate the investment cost. The model is similar
to DR (2003) and DR (2005b) in that investment cost is not perfectly observable, but it is
also similar to Rogerson (1997) and Reichelstein (1997) in that this model uses depreciation (a
deferral) instead of moving revenue forward (an accrual).
The models in this literature show the usefulness of using accruals for incentive reasons, by
distributing investment cost to the periods the revenue occurs, or by moving revenue to the
period the investment occurs. Both types of accrual can do better than cash ows in creating
investment incentives.
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1.4 Investment incentives and voluntary disclosure
In this section I will give a very short description of the model I will study in Chapters 2
and 3, and I will discuss how accruals are related to this model. First, however, I will discuss
disclosure, since this is a central aspect of my model and makes my model di¤erent from the
accruals models presented earlier.
I separate between mandatory and voluntary disclosure. Mandatory disclosure refers to a
setting where information must be disclosed, by law or other type of regulation. Voluntary
disclosure describes a setting where a company has private information and where the company
(or its manager) decides whether to disclose this information. Whether or not certain types of
disclosures should be voluntary or mandatory is a topic of debate in the literature. Arguments
for more regulation and mandatory disclosure are that this will increase information to the
stock market and reduce the companiescost of capital (Leuz and Verrecchia (2000), Verrecchia
(2001)), that one rms disclosure may have positive externalities on other rms (Dye (1990)),
and that there are economies of scale in information production, and more mandatory discloures
may reduce investorscostly information production (Beyer et al. (2010)). On the other hand,
there are arguments for letting the companies and their managers decide themselves whether
to disclose information. First, disclosure cay be costly (Verrecchia (1983)), and mandatory
disclosure will therefore impose costs on the companies. Second, making some disclosures
mandatory may alter the e¤ect of other types of disclosed information, and may actually reduce
the informativeness of the stock price about the managers action, thereby making the stock
price less useful for stewardship purposes (Dye (1985), Dye (2001)). In addition, using regulation
to make disclosures mandatory may t some but not all companies since companies are di¤erent,
and it reduces the companiesability to assess the benets and costs of disclosure and make
qualied disclosure decisions themselves.
Regulation does not only cover mandatory vs voluntary disclosure, but also to whom infor-
mation is given, when it is disclosed. Disclosures may be selective, in the sense that only certain
participants in the stock market are given information. In the US, the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) does, among its other tasks, oversee this aspect of the capital markets. The
mandate for the SEC is to create a level playing eld for all investors in the market. This
means that everybody should have equal access to information and that the information that
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is disclosed is reliable. For instance, the SEC adopted "Regulation Fair Disclosure" in 2000.
The intention of this policy was to stop selective disclosure to a select group of analysts, and
this is one way to achieve equal access to information9. As a result, the managers discretion
in disclosing information to stock market participants is reduced.
In my model, the manangers voluntary disclosure decision is related to the earnings man-
agement literature, which I discussed earlier. Managers can use accruals to manage earnings.
But they can also use voluntary disclosures to control the information that the market receives.
In the traditional earnings management literature, there is mandatory disclosure and possible
manipulation of the disclosed information. I look at a setting where there is voluntary disclo-
sure, but the report, if disclosed, has to be truthful. Both are examples of how the manager
can use discretion to inuence the information in the stock market.
1.4.1 Voluntary disclosure
The unraveling result (Grossman and Hart (1980), Grossman (1981), Milgrom (1981)) states
that if the seller of a good can costlessly disclose the quality of the good, then he will always
do so if such disclosure is costless10. The reason is that the buyer of the good will downwardly
revise his estimate of the quality of the good, down to the lowest possible level of quality if the
information is not disclosed. This means that a company that is publicly traded will always
disclose its information to the stock market.
In practice, however, not all information is disclosed. Verrecchia (1983) studies one such
case. In his model, the manager (or the company) observes a signal about the value of the
company, and he can choose whether or not to disclose the signal he observes. The result
is a partial disclosure equilibrium, where the manager discloses if the the signal is above a
treshold. The reason that not all information is disclosed in equilibrium is that disclosure in
his model is costly. If there is no disclosure, the stock market does not know whether this is
because performance is very low, or if performance is just low enough so that having to bear the
disclosure cost is not justied. The stock price with no disclosure will be strictly higher than
9For discussions about the Regulation Fair Disclosure, see for instance Arya, Glover and Mittendorf (2005),
Gomes, Gorton and Madureira (2007), and Gadarowski and Sinha (2010).
10There are also other reasons, beside a disclosure cost, why a seller or acompany may not always fully disclose
its information. An overview is given in Beyer, Cohen, Lys and Walther (2010), section 3.
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what the stock price would be with the lowest possible performance revealed. The disclosure
cost creates a credible reason for the company not to disclose. The result is that the manager
discloses good news and withholds bad news. See also Dye (1986) and Verrecchia (1990) for
related models, and Verrecchia (2001) and Dye (2001) for overviews of the disclosure literature.
There are two aspects of the existing literature on voluntary disclosure that I will discuss
in relation to my model; agency conicts between the manager and the owners, and real e¤ects
of voluntary disclosure. These themes are closely related.
Most existing models of voluntary disclosure look only at the managers disclosure incentives
and not at the e¤ort and investment incentives. As both Beyer et al (2010) and Berger (2011)
note, an incentive system is designed not only to motivate the manager to disclose information,
but also to induce e¢ cient e¤ort and investment decisions by the manager. Therefore, looking
at all these issues together could be very useful. In my model, the manager makes both e¤ort
and investment decisions, and a disclosure decision. I analyze how these decisions will inuence
each other.
In addition, most existing models study pure exchange economies. This means that the
models analyze how and when information about performance is disclosed (or not disclosed),
but they do not analyze how the performance was created. Disclosure or no disclosure then
has no impact on production decisions (such as e¤ort and investment) because production is
not modelled (exceptions are Kanodia (2006) and Beyer and Guttman (2011) who discuss real
e¤ects of disclosure). Berger (2011) claims that models of voluntary disclosure would benet
from incorporating these incentive issues and real e¤ects: "Instead, the literature seems to have
reached a point where incorporating real e¤ects on production and investment choices needs
to occur to provide substantial new insights into the causes and consequences of managers
disclosure choices" (Berger (2011), p. 206). My model is concerned with both disclosure and
production and focuses on the interaction between these decisions.
1.4.2 A short description of my model
My model is based on a simplied version of DR (2005b). There are two important di¤erences,
though. One is that in my model there are only two periods, and the manager works in the
company only in the rst period. The second is that in my model, the manager can decide
21
CHAPTER 1 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
whether or not to disclose the signal he receives. Voluntary disclosure and its implications on
incentives are the focus of my analysis.
The manager makes one investment decision and one e¤ort decision (so there is no e¤ort
in period 2), both at the beginning of the rst period. Aggregate cash ow from both e¤ort
and investment is available for contracting. The investment cost alone is not contractible.
Depreciation based on investment cost is therefore not feasible. Matching of the investment
cost to revenue through depreciations, as in Paton and Littleton (1940), is not an option. This
assumption of no disaggregation may seem an extreme assumption. For instance, much of the
discussion in Paton and Littleton (1949) uses disaggregation to implement accrual accounting.
However, for certain costs, aggregation may be a realistic assumption. R&D is one example.
Investments in human resouces could be another example where investment costs are di¢ cult
to separate from cash ows from operations.
Cash ows from investment occur in period 2, after the manager has left the company, so
the manager can not be compensated based on realized investment cash ow. If the manager
is compensated based only on cash ows in period 1, he will reduce his compensation for every
dollar he invests. Since the incoming cash ow from the investment does not occur until period
2, he will not receive any of the rewards. He will therefore not invest at all. The principal must
match (some of) the future revenue from the investment to the investment cost in period 1 in
the managers compensation, if she is going to give the manager any incentive to invest.
At the end of the rst period, the manager privately observes a perfect signal about the
future cash ows from the investment. He decides whether to disclose this or not. The disclosure
decision is assumed not to be contractible. A stock price is formed in the stock market based
on all available information, and the manager is compensated based on cash ow and this stock
price. If the signal is disclosed, then, the stock price at time 1 will contain information about
future cash ows at time 2. I look at how the managers control of information inuences his
e¤ort and investment decisions.
1.4.3 Accruals and my model
If the manager in my model discloses his signal, the signal and disclosure can be used for match-
ing purposes. The manager will then (through his stock-based compensation) be compensated
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for the perod-2 cash ows even though they have not yet materialized. The future income from
the investment is matched to the investment cost, and this creates investment incentives for the
manager.
In this case, revenue and costs are matched in the period when the costs occur. Normally,
revenue takes the lead. Inventory, for instance, is expensed in the period the goods are sold.
Paton and Littleton (1940) argue that costs should be charged to the period when the associated
revenue occurs. This is also in line with the depreciation schedules suggested in Rogerson (1997)
and Reichelstein (1997), where investment costs are allocated to the periods when the benets
from the investment occur (through the Relative benets allocation rule). In my case, that
would mean charging the whole investment cost in period 2, because all the revenue is realized
in period 2. This is infeasible because the investment cost is not observable (only aggregately
with cash ows from operations). In my model, revenues are matched to the period the cost
occurs instead.
In the model, the manager controls the disclosure decision, while the stock market forms
a stock price in an automatic way. The manager knows, when making the disclosure decision,
what the resulting stock price will be. Interpreting the stock price as an accrual, the manager
controls the accrual and makes the accrual decision that maximizes his utility. This is in line
with the opportunistic view on earnings manipulation and accruals discussed earlier. When
disclosing, however, the manager increases the information to the market. The accrual both
adds information and is under the managers discretion.
In my model, the manager can hide bad information, but if he discloses, he can not misreport,
and the disclosure will always be truthful. This is in line with most of the literature on voluntary
disclosure11. This means that the only way of managing earnings in my setting, is to decide
whether to hide information. If the manager could costlessly and limitlessly manage earnings
by misreporting, he would do so as much as he could to maximize his period-1 compensation.
This would make the information he discloses uninformative.
To sum up, in my model the manager controls information that eventually will be the basis
for his compensation in a way similar to a manager who is compensated based on accounting
11The models in Kwon, Newman, and Zang (2009) and Einhorn and Ziv (2011) are exceptions, with both
voluntary disclosure and costly misreporting.
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earnings and has some discretion in setting the accruals that will be part of earnings. In both
settings the manager, by his reporting choice, inuences his own performance measure. I study
how the e¤ectiveness of the performance measure is inuenced by the managers reporting
discretion.
1.4.4 Outline of the rest of the thesis
The rest of the thesis is outlined as follows. In Chapter 2 I develop the model that I briey
described in Section 1.4.2. I show that when the manager controls the disclosure decision, this
inuences the power of the stock bonus in inducing investment. In the model in Chapter 2,
a higher stock bonus is needed to induce a given investment level with voluntary disclosure
than with full disclosure. In this model, the risk is independent of the amount the manager
invests. In Chapter 3, I relax this assumption, and analyze a model where the total investment
risk is increasing in the invested amount. In this chapter, I show (numerically) that the stock
bonus may be more e¤ective in inducing investment with voluntary disclosure than with full
disclosure. Chapter 4 contains a discussion and conclusion.
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Chapter 2
Investment, disclosure, and
managerial incentives
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter I study how a managers decision to voluntary disclose information a¤ects his
e¤ort and investment incentives. The manager can choose to inform the market about the
future payo¤s from the investment he has made. The prospect of later controlling information
about investment outcome a¤ects his initital investment decision. In general, the manager is
less responsive to stock-based incentives than he would be in a world of full discosure in this
model.
A company gives its manager stock-based compensation to reduce a moral hazard problem
of investment. The manager privately learns about investment outcome, and can choose either
to disclose or withhold this information. I show that the manager will be less responsive to
stock-based incentives in this case of voluntary disclosure than when the information is always
revealed (full disclosure). The reason is that the manager can hide bad outcomes, and the
prospect of hiding information weakens his incentives to invest. With voluntary disclosure, a
given stock-based bonus will to a lesser degree solve incentive problems because the manager
also controls the information on which he is evaluated. For given bonus parameters, the manager
will invest less with voluntary disclosure than with full disclosure. On the other hand, voluntary
disclosure also reduces the managers risk and the companys expected disclosure costs.
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I use an agency model where the contract includes both stock price and cash ows as per-
formance measures, using a simplied version of Dutta and Reichelstein (2005) as a benchmark.
The manager makes e¤ort and investment decisions, which jointly determine future cash ows.
E¤ort is personally costly to the manager, but investment is not, as the investment cost is
paid with company cash ows. The cash ow from e¤ort and the cost of investing are aggre-
gately observable, but the companys reporting system is unable to distinguish beween the two.
The principal introduces a cash-based bonus to overcome the managers moral hazard problem
for e¤ort. This bonus will also give the manager an incentive to underinvest in the project,
since investment costs will reduce company cash ows and the managers compensation in the
rst period. Using stock price as an additional performance measure is a way to mitigate this
underinvestment problem.
The manager privately learns the true value of future payo¤s from investment. He can
choose whether to disclose this information to the stock market. I assume that the future realized
payo¤s from the investment are not available for contracting. However, if the manager chooses
to reveal his private information, future investment payo¤s will be perfectly incorporated into
the current stock price. This forward-looking quality of stock price makes it useful in inducing
investment. Assuming disclosure is costly to the company, the disclosure equilibrium that
results is similar to the one in Verrecchia (1983), and only good news will be revealed. If
payo¤s are bad, information about them will not be disclosed by the manager. The stock price
will not perfectly reveal the true value of these low payo¤s, but the non-disclosure in itself will
signal bad news, and the stock price will be set correspondingly low by the market. In this
way, the manager reaps the full value of the benets of high payo¤s, but is protected from
very bad outcomes through his own voluntary disclosure decision. With voluntary disclosure,
the manager can avoid being punished when these bad outcomes occur. The managers risk is
reduced, but so are his incentives to invest.
Several earlier studies have analyzed the use of stock price as a managerial performance
measure1. However, in these models the information the manager releases to the stock market
may be noisy, but he will always disclose the information with certainty. In the model I present
1See for instance Paul (1992), Bushman and Indjejikian (1993a, 1993b), Feltham and Wu (2000), and Dutta
and Reichelstein (2005).
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in this chapter, on the other hand, the manager can choose whether to disclose information to
the stock market, and I show how this decision changes the informativeness of the stock price
and consequently the initial incentive problem.
There is also an extensive literature on company disclosures2 (see for instance Verrecchia
(2001), Dye (2001) and Beyer, Cohen, Lys, and Walther (2010) for overviews). In my model,
there is a cost of disclosure, and the manager reveals good news but withholds bad news3.
However, the disclosure literature typically assumes there is no conict of interest between the
manager hired to run the company, and the companys owners. In my model I seek to study the
possible interaction between this conict of interest and the disclosure decision that is taken by
the manager. The model shows how the incentive problems inside the company change when
the disclosure decision itself is part of the agency problem.
Nagar (1999) studies a managers voluntary disclosure decision in a career concerns model,
and nds that a risk averse manager only discloses his signal if it is above a treshold value4.
Other studies have examined situations where the manager always discloses his signal, but he
can misreport5. An exception is Einhorn and Ziv (2011) who study voluntary disclosure with
possible misreporting, but their model do not have production decisions or a conict of interest
between the manager and owners. In my model the manager can choose whether to disclose,
but his report is always truthful.
The main contribution of the model in this chapter is to show how the managers control
over a disclosure decision will reduce the strength of his incentives, and how it changes incentive
problems inside the company. I introduce moral hazard into a rms voluntary disclosure frame-
work, or put di¤erently, I introduce voluntary disclosure into a setting with managerial moral
hazard and performance-based incentives. I show how disclosure and investment incentives
2The most relevant strand of this literature in relation to the current paper discusses the emergence of a
partial disclosure equilibrium (see Verrecchia (1983), Dye (1986), Jung and Kwon (1988), Suijs (2007), and
Eithorn (2007)). The reasons why full disclosure does not occur in these models are the existence of disclosure
costs, uncertainty about whether the manager actually possesses private information, uncertaity about investor
response, and private information about the managers reporting objective.
3A disclosure equilibrium where only good news is revealed is supported by empirical work by Berger and
Hann (2007) and Kothari, Shu and Wysocki (2009).
4Nagar, Nanda and Wysocki (2003) study the link between managerial disclosures and stock-based incentives
empirically, and nd a positive relationship between stock-based compensation and disclosures. They conclude
that stock-based compensation mitigates a risk averse managers unwillingness to disclose information.
5Examples of this line of work are Dye (1983, 1985), Christensen and Feltham (2000), Bar-Gill and Bebchuk
(2003), Natarajan (2004), Goldman and Slezak (2006), and Crocker and Slemrod (2007).
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interact in a managers decision problem.
The chapter proceeds as follows. In Section 2.2 I present the basic elements of the model.
In Section 2.3 I describe the disclosure equilibrium and in Section 2.4 the managers investment
decision. I discuss the principals problem in Sections 2.5 and 2.6. In Section 2.7 I present some
comparative statics analysis, while Section 2.8 contains the Conclusion.
2.2 Model
In this section I will present the model. The timeline in Figure 2.1 gives a description of what
happens in the two periods.
Time 0 Time 2Time 1
Contract signed
Agent chooses:
-effort
-investment level
Agent observessignal
Cash flow from investmentCash flow from effort
Disclosure decision
Market sets stock price
Agent is compensated based on cash
flow and stock price
Figure 2.1. Timeline.
I use the basic setup of the model in Dutta and Reichelstein (2005), with e¤ort, investment
and stock price compensation. The agent is hired to run the company, and I assume he works
there only one period. He makes decisions in the rst period, and e¤ects of these decisions
occur in both period 1 and 2. I assume that the agent can only be compensated in period 1.
One possible explanation is that cash ow e¤ects of his decisions materialize a long time after
the decisions are made, and the agent may no longer be working in the company at this future
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time. This means that the total value of the company, as measured by the cash ows in period
1 and 2, cannot be contracted on.
In period 1, the agent invests b 2 b; b and exerts e¤ort a 2 [0; a] : Cash ow from investment
does not occur until later (period 2). E¤ort produces cash ow in period 1. This cash ow
is uncertain, and I call the noise parameter ": The agent incurs a personal cost e(a) from
exerting e¤ort, where e() is monotonically increasing, twice di¤erentiable, and strictly convex,
and e(0) = 0. In period 1, only the aggregate cash ows from e¤ort and invested amount are
observable to owners and the market.
After making the investment decision, but before any payments have occurred (I call this
time 1 ), the agent perfectly learns the value of investment payo¤s and chooses whether to
disclose this information. If he discloses the signal, the company will incur a cost  (this
cost reduces cash ows in period 2). This could be a cost of verifying information or loss of
competitive position (see Dye (1985,1986) for a discussion of di¤erent types of disclosure costs).
Also, I assume that the agent must be truthful if he discloses (no lying, no misreporting), and
that the disclosure decision itself is not contractible. I dene the disclosure decision as d 2 f0; 1g
where d = 0 denotes no disclosure, and d = 1 denotes disclosure. A superscript in variables
will reect d:
Investment b yields expected income m(b) in the second period. Uncertainty is reected in
the parameter . The cash ow from investment is a positive function of the amount of capital
invested, with decreasing marginal productivity: The function m(b) is assumed to be non-
negative in the relevant range, strictly concave and twice di¤erentiable, and satises m0(b) > 1
when b!b and m0(b)! 0 when b! b. In addition to making the investment decision in period
1, the agent must also exert operating e¤ort in period 1.
The observable aggregate cash ows in period 1 and 2, c1 and c2, are given by:
c1 = a+ "  b (2.1)
c2 = m(b) +   d   (2.2)
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The noise term " is assumed to be normally distributed:
"  N(0; 2) (2.3)
I assume that uncertainty regarding investment payo¤ is independent of " and is uniformly
distributed over the interval [ ; ] :
  U( ; ) (2.4)
The expected value of  is zero and the variance 2 is equal to
var()  2 =
1
12
(2)2 =
1
3
2 (2.5)
I restrict attention to compensation schemes that are linear in the two performance mea-
sures, rst-period cash ows and stock price. The contract s assigns the weight u to the stock
price P and  to the cash ow c1. Fixed compensation is given by .
s = + c1 + uP (2.6)
= + (a+ "  b) + uP
There is no discounting. The principal is assumed to be risk-neutral and to care only about
total net cash ows in the two periods. Her expected utility at time 0 can then be expressed as
EUP0 = E (c1   s+ c2) (2.7)
I assume that the agents preferences can be expressed in mean-variance terms. The agents
certainty equivalent CE at time 0 is given by:
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CE0 = E(s)  e(a)  1
2
  var(s) (2.8)
where  is a measure of risk aversion.
A subscript 0 on CE refers to the fact that the expectations and variances are taken with
respect to the information at time 0. I assume that the agents outside option would give him
a CE of zero at time 0.
I assume throughout that all parties have rational expectations; the agent, the principal
and the stock market. For instance this means that the actions the principal and the market
expect the manager to take are the same as the actions the manager actually takes, regarding
both e¤ort, investment and disclosure. It also means that the agent rationally anticipates this
rationality from the principal and market, and he can correctly infer their conjectured values
of the di¤erent choice variables.
2.3 Information, stock price and disclosure equilibrium
This section describes the agents payo¤ if he does or does not release the signal about future
payo¤, and it caracterizes the disclosure equilibrium. The section ends with a presentation of
a numerical example that I will use throughout the chapter.
To solve the dynamics of this model, I use backward induction.
2.3.1 Period 2
In period 2, cash ow is realized from the period-1 investment. Since there is no cash left
after this (assuming net cash ows are paid out to owners at time 1 and 2), and stock price is
calculated on an ex-dividend basis, the stock price at the end of period 2 is equal to zero.
2.3.2 Period 1: Time 1 
The agent receives the signal f at the end of period 1. It is assumed to give a perfect prediction
of future investment payo¤s:
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f = m(b) +  (2.9)
Before observing f , but after choosing b, the agent knows that the distribution of f is
uniform with a mean equal to m(b) and support [m(b)  ;m(b) + ] :
f  U [m(b)  ;m(b) + ] (2.10)
Since the principal and the stock market do not know the real value of b, they use the
conjectured value in their distribution of f . The principal and the market believes the agent
invested b^, and their distribution of f is given by f^ :
f^  U
h
m(b^)  ;m(b^) + 
i
(2.11)
where b^ is their conjectured value of b.
The disclosure decision will inuence the stock price, compensation and the agents utility.
To see whether the agent will choose to disclose his private information, I will calculate the
agents certainty equivalent at the time he makes the disclosure decision both with and without
disclosure and compare them.
The agent discloses the signal
If the agent discloses the signal, the market will take the signal at face value and incorporate it
into the stock price. The stock price at the end of period 1 is assumed to be the expected net
value of future net cash ows6
P = E [c2; d = 1] (2.12)
6 In the general setup of this model, it is possible that expected future cash ows are negative. To keep stock
price a positive value, I assume that there exist assets in place (not modelled here) so that the value of the
company is always positive. I thus disregard limited liability and bankruptcy issues.
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which gives (superscript 1 on P reects d = 1) :
P 1 = f    (2.13)
The stock price reects future investment cash ows perfectly, net of the disclosure cost.
The agents expected compensation is now:
E1  [s j f; d = 1] (2.14)
= + (a  b) + uP 1
= + (a  b) + u (f   )
The variance of compensation at time 1  is given by
var1 (s) = 
22 (2.15)
Note that the uncertainty regarding investment payo¤ () is now resolved, and only uncer-
tainty about " remains. I can now nd the agents certainty equivalent at time 1 : Since the
signal is disclosed, the company incurs the disclosure cost .
CE1
1 
= E(s)  e(a)  1
2
  var(s)
= + (a  b) + u(f   ) (2.16)
 e(a)  1
2
22
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The agent does not disclose the signal
I rst nd the value of the stock price. First, I assume that the agent only discloses the signal
if it is above a threshold value, and I will subsequently prove that this will be the case in a
sequentially rational equilibrium. In this case, the market adjusts its expectations about future
cash ows downwards accordingly. The stock price will now reect a distribution of f that
is truncated above from the threshold value of f . Call the actual cut-o¤ value fCO and the
markets conjecture of this value f^CO. I have:
P 0 = E1  [m(b) +  j d = 0] (2.17)
= E1 
h
m(b) +  j f < f^CO
i
(2.18)
The market will use its conjectured value of b; b^; in forming the stock price. Since the distrib-
ution of  is truncated, the support of f^ is no longer
h
m(b^)  ;m(b^) + 
i
, but
h
m(b^)  ; f^CO
i
using the information available to the market. The mean of this truncated uniform variable is
given by:
E(f^ j f^ < f^CO) = 1
2
(m(b^)  + f^CO) (2.19)
and the variance is:
var(f^ j f^ < f^CO) = 1
12
h
f^CO   (m(b^)  )
i2
(2.20)
The no-disclosure stock price is therefore:
P 0 = E(f^ j f^ < f^CO) (2.21)
=
1
2
(m(b^)  + f^CO)
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The agents compensation is based on the stock price, and the expected value of his com-
pensation is:
E1  [s j f; d = 0] (2.22)
= + (a  b) + uP 0 (2.23)
= + (a  b) + u

1
2
(m(b^)  + f^CO)

The variance can be calculated in the same way as in the disclosure case:
V ar1 (s) = 
22 (2.24)
For the agent, the uncertainty regarding f and P is resolved at this point in time, with or
without disclosure. The agents total certainty equivalent depends on the mean and variance
of his compensation, in addition to his cost of e¤ort:
CE0
1 
= E(s)  e(a)  1
2
  var(s)
= +  (a  b) + u1
2
(m(b^)  + f^CO)  e(a)  1
2
22 (2.25)
The disclosure decision
The disclosure equilibrium is illustrated in Figure 2.2. The agent will choose to disclose the
signal if his certainty equivalent with disclosure is higher than without disclosure:
CE1
1 
 CE0
1 
(2.26)
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Comparing the certainty equivalents, this comes down to the following7: Disclose if the
following condition holds:
f  1
2
(m(b^)  + f^CO) +  (2.27)
Agent’s stock-based compensation
km 2)ˆ(:offcut +-- bm Signal
No disclosure
Disclosure
Figure 2.2. Disclosure equilibrium.
The right-hand side denes the agents cut-o¤ value fCO: In a rational expectations equilib-
rium, the markets conjectures about the managers cut-o¤ will always be equal to the cut-o¤
the manager chooses, meaning that these values will be equal:
f^CO = fCO (2.28)
The cut-o¤ value must then be given as
7An underlying condition for this to hold is that u > 0: For now, I assume that this holds, and optimality is
shown later.
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fCO  1
2
(m(b^)  + f^CO) +  = f^CO (2.29)
giving
f^CO = fCO = m(b^)  + 2 (2.30)
See Verrecchia (1983, 1990) for related disclosure equilibria. Since I assume equality of f^CO
and fCO from rational expectations, I will use the equality in (2.28) in the rest of the chapter,
and will only use the notation fCO for this value. The no-disclosure stock price becomes:
P 0 =
1
2
(m(b^)  + m(b^)  + 2)
= m(b^)  +  (2.31)
2.3.3 Example: Presentation
I will now present a numerical example. The example will be used to illustrate the main aspects
of the model, throughout the paper.
I assume the production function takes the following form:
m(b) = 2b  1
2
b2 (2.32)
The relevant investment range is given by b = 0 and b = 2.
E¤ort cost is assumed to be quadratic:
e(a) =
2
5
a2 (2.33)
The parameter  which represents the agents risk-aversion, is set to 12 : The risk parameters
are  = 125 and  =
6
5 , which makes the variances
var() = 2 =
1
3
2 =
144
75
= 1:92 (2.34)
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2 =
36
25
= 1:44 (2.35)
The disclosure cost is set to 14 . I further assume that the agents outside option can be
represented by a certainty equivalent of zero.
2.3.4 Example: The disclosure decision:
The disclosure stock price equals the signal net of the disclosure cost.
P 1 = f   k = f   1
4
(2.36)
The no-disclosure stock price is the expected value of f , given that f is below the (conjec-
tured) cuto¤ f^CO.
P 0 =
1
2
(m(b^)  + f^CO) (2.37)
=
1
2

2b^  1
2
b^2   12
5
+ f^CO

The manager will disclose when the disclosure stock price is higher than the no-disclosure stock
price.
P 1 > P 0 (2.38)
f   1
4
>
1
2

2b^  1
2
b^2   12
5
+ f^CO

The cut-o¤ is the value of f where this is an equality:
fCO  1
2

2b^  1
2
b^2   12
5
+ f^CO

+
1
4
(2.39)
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The equilibrium occurs when fCO = f^CO
fCO =
1
2

2b^  1
2
b^2   12
5
+ fCO

+
1
4
(2.40)
fCO = 2b^  1
2
b^2   19
10
(2.41)
Figure 2.3 shows the equilibrium (using b^ = 0:84702) .
-1 0 1 2
-1
0
1
2
f
uP
Figure 2.3. Stock-based compensation uP as a function of the signal f .
The kinked line is the agents e¤ective compensation, with the optimal disclosure decision.
Although the contract in itself is linear, the compensation with voluntary disclosure turns out
to be piecewise linear and convex. This is the e¤ect of the voluntary disclosure decision. In this
model, the convexity is a result of the voluntary disclosure setting, not necessarily from optimal
contracting. With voluntary disclosure and linear contracts, the resulting compensation is in
some ways similar to option contracts, as seen in Figures 2.2 and 2.3; piecewise linear and
convex. The setting is di¤erent from an option contract, but the e¤ects and results are related
to and in some ways similar to option compensation8. I restrict my attention to linear contracts,
8Hemmer, Kim and Verrecchia (2000), Feltham and Wu (2001), and Flor, Frimor and Munk (2011) study the
optimality of convex contracts, but without the voluntary disclosure setting.
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but an interesting extension of this model could be to consider how a setting with a (piece-wise
linear) convex contract (and full disclosure) would be di¤erent from or similar to this one.
2.4 Time 0. The investment decision
In this section I will describe the managers investment decision at time 0. Before I do so for
the voluntary disclosure setting, I will describe the investment decision in some other cases. I
start with the rst best setting, and then move on to the full disclosure setting and the situation
where there is no signal to disclose (the no signal case). I then present the investment decision
with voluntary disclosure and illustrate this with the numerical example.
2.4.1 First best investment and e¤ort levels (FB)
Initially, it may be instructive to describe the rst best level of investment and e¤ort, denoted
bFB and aFB. I nd bFB by maximizing the net value of the investment, depending on b, and
nding the rst-order condition. To nd rst best, I maximize
a  e(a)  b+m(b) (2.42)
The rst order condition for investment is
 1 +m0(bFB) = 0 (2.43)
or
m0(bFB) = 1 (2.44)
Similarly for e¤ort, the rst order condition is:
1  e0(a) = 0 (2.45)
e0(aFB) = 1 (2.46)
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2.4.2 Full disclosure (F)
As a benchmark case, I look at the case where the agent always discloses the signal; either the
disclosure decision is contractible or the principal controls the decision and always prefers to
disclose.
The agents certainty equivalent is
CE0 = + E (c1)  e(a) + u [m(b)  ]  1
2
(22 + u22) (2.47)
where the stock price variance is given by
varPF = 2 =
1
3
2 (2.48)
The rst-order condition for investment determines the chosen investment level:
@CE0
@b
=   + um0(b) = 0 (2.49)
I call the level of b that satises this FOC bF .
2.4.3 No signal and no possible disclosure (N)
I will here discuss the setting where there is no signal, and the signal f in the model cannot
be used. In this case there is no signal to disclose and no information will be revealed to the
market at time 1 . This is di¤erent from the case where the manager voluntarily decides not
to disclose in the sense that in this new case, the fact that the market does not receive a signal
does not signal bad news. The stock price will be based on the markets conjectures only, and
contains no new information. The stock price will be xed at
PN = m(b^) (2.50)
The agents certainty equivalent will be:
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CE0 = + (a  b) + uPN   e(a)  1
2
22 (2.51)
It is clear from di¤erentiating this with respect to b; that the agent will not receive any of
the benets from the investment, but will have to bear part of the cost:
@CE0
@b
=   (2.52)
The investment decision is based on the agents cash ow based compensation only. I call
this level of investment bN ; and the agent will obviously invest as little as possible, as long as
 > 0:
bN = b (2.53)
On the other hand, as will be discussed later, in this case it is possible that it is optimal to
set  = 0. Then the agent receives only xed compensation, and no bonus of any kind, and he
is indi¤erent to how much is invested. I assume that when indi¤erent, the agent chooses what
is optimal for the principal (the most e¢ cient level), and he invests the rst best amount, bFB.
It is then no point in giving the manager any stock-based compensation. So when  = 0; it
follows that u = 0.
The agents FOC for e¤ort is:
@CE0
@a
=    e0(a) = 0 (2.54)
 = e0(a) (2.55)
When  > 0; then a > 0: When  = 0; then a = 0; since the agent in this case has no
incentives to spend any costly e¤ort.
In sum, there are two cases to consider when there is no signal. I call these Case 1 and Case
2 in Table 2.1. The stock bonus will never be positive (u = 0) when there is no signal since
the stock price has no information value. Which one of these two solutions will be preferred,
depends on the relative benets (and costs) of e¤ort versus investment.
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Table 2.1. Possible solutions. The no signal cases are Case 1 and Case 2.
2.4.4 Voluntary disclosure (V)
In order to nd the agents preferred investment level with voluntary disclosure I rst nd the
agents certainty equivalent, which depends on the agents expectations about what will happen
at time 1 , 1 and 2. The agent knows that he will make an optimal disclosure decision at time
1  . So I allow the investment decision to depend potentially on his expected future disclosure
strategy, and then later nd out if this is the case (it is).
The probability of disclosure
At time 0, the agent inuences the probability that f is above fCO when he chooses the
investment level. Higher investment moves the distribution of f upwards and increases the
probability of disclosure at time 1 .
Recall that the distribution of f is: f  U [m(b)  ;m(b) + ]. The probability that f
is below the cut-o¤ value fCO is the cumulative probability (fCO) from the lower bound of
the distribution [m(b)  ] up to fCO, see Figure 2.4.
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Figure 2.4. The distribution of f; and the probability of disclosure (1 ).
I then have9:
(fCO) =
fCOZ
m(b) 
1
2
df
=
fCO   (m(b)  )
2
=
m(b^) m(b)
2
+


(2.56)
The term (fCO) is the probability of no disclosure, and (1 (fCO)) is the probability of
disclosure.
The agents certainty equivalent and investment decision
The agents CE at time 0 is:
9 If f
CO (m(b) )
2
 0; then (fCO) = 0: If fCO (m(b) )
2
 1; then (fCO) = 1: If (fCO) = 0 the agent
always discloses the signal, and if (fCO) = 1, the agent never discloses.
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CE0 = + (a  b)  e(a)  1
2
22 (2.57)
+u

(1 (fCO))  1
2

m(b) +m(b^)

+(fCO) 

m(b^) +   

 1
2
u2  1
4
(1 (fCO))(1
3
+ (fCO))  (m(b) m(b^) + 2  2)2
For a full calculation of the expression for the agents certainty equivalent and di¤erentiation
of this with respect to b; see Appendix 2.A.1. When the agent makes the investment decision,
he takes the markets conjectures b^ as given, since he cannot inuence this. This means that
his optimal choice of investment is calculated keeping the markets expectations constant.
From the agents rst-order condition (in Appendix 2.A.2), I show that:
i) An increase in investment increases the probability of disclosure:
ii) An increase in investment also directly inuences the disclosure stock price. The disclo-
sure stock price increases because of higher future cash ows from the investment
iii) An increase in investment changes the variance of the agents compensation
iv) Increased investment reduces rst-period cash ow based bonus compensation
More specically, I nd that the agents FOC for investment is given by10:
@CE0
@b
=   +m0(b)uZ = 0 (2.58)
where Z = Z(b; b^; ; ; u; ) is dened as
10For the agents FOC to give an optimum, it is required that the second derivative is negative in the relevant
range. A discussion of conditions that have to be met to satisfy this requirement is presented in Appendix 2.A.5.
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Z 
 
m(b) m(b^)  2+ 2
2
!
(2.59)
 1
2
u
8>>>><>>>>:
1
4
 
(fCO)  13
  hm(b) m(b^) + 2  2i2
+12(1 (fCO))(13 +(fCO)) 
h
m(b) m(b^) + 2  2
i
9>>>>=>>>>;
Z reects the net e¤ect of stock price and disclosure on the agents choice of investment. I
call the level of investment that satises the agents FOC bV . Using the fact that b^ = b in a
rational expectations equilibrium, I show in the appendix that Z reduces to:
Z = (1 )  u (1 )2 (2.60)
and  becomes
 =


Since  is a probability with a value between zero and one, it is clear that in equilibrium
Z < 1. Z measures, net of u and m0(b), the e¤ect of increasing investment on the agents
utility from stock-based compensation. The rst term (1 ), shows the increase in expected
compensation from increasing investment. The expected increase in cash ow is reected in
stock price only in case of disclosure, which occurs with probability (1 ). The second term
reects the increase in risk imposed on the agent when he increases investment. Whenever 
is di¤erent from one or zero (whenever there is uncertainty up front about the disclosure of the
signal) an increase in investment increases the agents risk. With higher risk aversion , the
lower is the value of Z, and the smaller is the agents net increase in utility from increasing
investment. A manager with a higher degree of risk aversion will invest less than a manager
will lower risk aversion for a given contract.
The term (uZ) in (2.58), which is what gives the manager incentives to invest, is concave
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in u (see Appendix 2.A.4 for details): This occurs when stock bonus u is
umax =
1
2(1 ) (2.61)
and uZ reaches the value of uZ = 14 . Setting a value of u higher than this value will not
increase the managers incentives to invest. When u is concave, the same incentive e¤ect from
uZ can be reached by two di¤erent levels of u; but the principal will always choose the lower
of these two values since the principals cost in terms of risk premium increases in u: I note
that a specic value of umax only exists when  > 0. So if the agent were risk neutral, such a
maximum would not exist.
Investment incentives with voluntary and full disclosure
For a given stock bonus, investment is lower with voluntary disclosure than with full disclosure
(see Appendix 2.A.6 for details). I compare the rst order conditions in (2.49) for full disclosure
with (2.58) and (2.60) for voluntary disclosure. I nd that (2.49) is equivalent to (2.58) with
Z = 1. Combined with the above discussion, I have that
Z(b; b^; ; ; u; )) < 1 and bV < bF (2.62)
When incentives are held xed, there are two reasons why the agent will choose a lower
investment with voluntary disclosure than with full disclosure (two reasons why Z in (2.60)
is di¤erent from 1). The rst is that with full disclosure the agents compensation increases
with the fraction (bonus) u for every increase in investment payo¤s, while the same number
with voluntary disclosure is (1   (fCO))u  u: The term (1   (fCO)) is the probability of
disclosure, and this is lower than 1. If the manager does not disclose the signal, he will not
get any rewards from investing, and the prospect of this reduces his incentives to invest. I will
discuss this further in Section 2.6.3.
The second reason is that the agents marginal change in risk is di¤erent in the two cases.
The risk premiums are
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RPF = (22 + u22) (2.63)
RP V = u2  1
4
(1 (fCO))(1
3
+ (fCO))  (m(b) m(b^) + 2  2)2 (2.64)
The derivatives with respect to b are:
@RPF
@b
= 0 (2.65)
In equilibrium (when b^ = b) :
@RPV
@b
= u2 (1 )2m0(b)  0 (2.66)
With full disclosure, the risk the manager has to bear does not depend on the amount
invested, (2.63) is constant in b. On the other hand, when there is voluntary disclosure, the
managers risk premium depends on b, because both  and m(b) in (2.64) depend on b: With
voluntary disclosure the manager increases his risk when increasing investment. From (2.60),
it is clear that the risk term decreases Z . While stock price risk with voluntary disclosure is
never higher than stock price risk in the full disclosure setting, it is the marginal increase in
risk that determines the managers incentives, and this is higher with voluntary disclosure than
with full disclosure. With voluntary disclosure, increasing investment increases the managers
probability of ending up in the risky part of the e¤ective compensation in Figure 2.2, where
compensation depends on the risky investment. This also decreases the managers incentives
to invest below the full disclosure level.
To summarize: Investment will be lower with voluntary disclosure compared to full disclo-
sure, given the same contract. This means that if there is underinvestment with full disclosure,
this problem will be even more severe with voluntary disclosure. Disclosure and investment
decisions are not independent in the agents optimization problem, and must be considered
together. The fact that the manager in many cases controls the information ow to the market,
56
CHAPTER 2 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
while being compensated based on the stock price which incorporates this information, compli-
cates incentive issues. Later, in Section 2.6, I will discuss the principals optimization problem,
and I will then use some of the results from this section.
2.4.5 Example: The agents rst order conditions:
For a given investment level b, the distribution of the signal f is uniformly distributed:
f  U

2b  1
2
b2   12
5
; 2b  1
2
b2 +
12
5

The probability of non-disclosure  is
(fCO) =
m(b^) m(b)
2
+


=
2b^  12 b^2  
 
2b  12b2

2  125
+
1
4
12
5
=
2b^  12 b^2  
 
2b  12b2

24
5
+
5
48
(2.67)
The agents CE is:
CE0 = + (a  b)  2
5
a2   1
2
 1
2
2  36
25
+u
0BB@ (1 (f
CO))  12

2b  12b2 + 2b^  12 b^2

+(fCO) 

2b^  12 b^2 + 14   125

1CCA
 1
2
1
2
u2  1
4
(1 (fCO))(1
3
+ (fCO)) (2.68)


2b  1
2
b2  

2b^  1
2
b^2

+ 2  12
5
  2  1
4
2
where (fCO) is given by (2.67).
I di¤erentiate wrt b :
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@CE0
@b
=   + u
0BB@  
@
@b  12

2b  12b2 + 2b^  12 b^2

+(1 (fCO))  12 (2  b) + @@b

2b^  12 b^2 + 14   125

1CCA
  1
16
u2
0BBBBBBBBBB@
  @@b  (13 +(fCO) + (1 (fCO))  @@b 


2b  12b2  

2b^  12 b^2

+ 2  125   2  14
2
+(1 (fCO))(13 +(fCO))
2

2b  12b2  

2b^  12 b^2

+ 2  125   2  14

 (b  2)
1CCCCCCCCCCA
(2.69)
where
@
@b
=  (2  b)24
5
(2.70)
I rewrite and get:
@CE0
@b
=   + u (2  b) 124
5

2b  1
2
b2  

2b^  1
2
b^2

+
43
10

 1
4
u2
0BBBBBBBBBB@

1
48
5

  ((fCO)  13)


2b  12b2  

2b^  12 b^2

+ 4310
2
+12(1 (fCO))(13 +(fCO))


2b  12b2  

2b^  12 b^2

+ 4310

1CCCCCCCCCCA
 (2  b) (2.71)
I nd the agents rst order condition in equilibrium, where b^ = b:
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@CE0
@b
(2.72)
=   + u (2  b) 124
5

43
10

 1
4
u2
0BBBB@

1
48
5

    13   43102
+12(1 )(13 +) 
 
43
10

1CCCCA  (2  b) = 0
and from (2.67) and b^ = b, I nd that:
(fCO) =
5
48
(2.73)
I rearrange the rst order condition and get:
  + u (2  b) 43
48
  u2  (2  b) 1849
18 432
= 0 (2.74)
I will later analyze this rst order condition in more detail.
2.5 The principals problem: No signal solutions, corner solu-
tions, and the full disclosure case
The previous comparison of investment with voluntary and full disclosure is contingent on all
other things being equal. More specically, the contract was held constant, with the same
bonus coe¢ cients  and u in both cases. In this and the following section I will study the
optimal contract. In this section I present the principals problem in the no signal case and full
disclosure case. I also nd the rst best solution in the numerical example, and use the example
to solve the principals problem in the full disclosure case. Finally I present the possible corner
solutions in the numerical example.
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2.5.1 The no signal case and corner solutions
Recall the two possible cases from Table 2.1 (Case 1 and Case 2). These are the two cases to
consider when there is no signal. When there is no signal, the principal will choose either Case
1 or Case 2, and she will choose the one wich gives her the highest expected payo¤.
But even if this signal exists, and the stock price incorporates its value into the stock price,
the principal can choose not to use the stock price in the incentive contract. She will choose to
do so (only) if the interior solution with u > 0 gives lower expected payo¤ than the highest of
Case 1 and Case 2.
I will here describe the characteristics for Case 1 and Case 2 and nd conditions for when
the principal will choose one over the other.
Case 1
In Case 1, u = 0, and investment is at the lowest possible value b and  and e¤ort are positive.
I call the investment level with no signal bN , so bN = b in this case.
The principal maximizes
WN  a  b+m(b)  e(a)  1
2
22 (2.75)
subject to
 = e0(a) (2.76)
The bonus parameter u has no incentive e¤ects and will only contribute to the xed com-
pensation. The sum of u and  will be set so that the agents participation constraint is
satised.
I substitute for  in the maximand, then di¤erentiate w.r.t. a :
@WN
@a
= 1  e0(a)  e0(a)e00(a)2 = 0 (2.77)
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Dening aN1 as the optimal e¤ort level the principal wants to induce here, Case 1 e¤ort is
given by:
e0(aN1 ) =
1
1 + e00(aN1 )2
(2.78)
To achieve the level of e¤ort aN1 that satises this equality, the principal sets the corre-
sponding N1  e0(aN1 ) from (2.76). From (2.78) it is clear that aN1 > 0:
Case 2
In Case 2, u = 0 and  = 0:
When  = 0, the agent will not spend any e¤ort, so a = 0, and consequently there will be
no cash ows from e¤ort. When both u and  are equal to zero, however, the manager will be
indi¤erent between all levels of investment, and I assume that he chooses the level that is best
for the principal, which is b = bFB:
To summarize (subscripts denote case 1 or 2):
Case 1 : uN1 = 0; 
N
1 > 0; b
N
1 = b; a
N
1 > 0 (2.79)
Case 2 : uN2 = 0; 
N
2 = 0; b
N
2 = b
FB; aN2 = 0 (2.80)
Which of these cases will be optimal for the principal, depends on the relative importance
of e¤ort and investment in his expected payo¤s. She will choose case 1 if
WN (uN1 ; 
N
1 ; b
N
1 ; a
N
1 ) WN (uN2 ; N2 ; bN2 ; aN2 ) (2.81)
and otherwise case 2. (2.81) can be rewritten as:
aN1   b+m(b)  e(aN1 )  
1
2
22   bFB +m(bFB) (2.82)
In the no signal case, the principal will choose the best of Case 1 aand Case 2. If there
exists a signal, the principal will only choose Case 1 or Case 2 if one of these gives a higher
expected payo¤ than the interior solution (where u > 0 and  > 0).
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2.5.2 Full disclosure
Recall that the managers incentive constraint for investment is given by (2.49) Thus, if there
is full disclosure, the principals optimization problem will be:
E0 [(c1   s) + c2] (2.83)
subject to
CE0  0 (2.84)
 = e0(a) (2.85)
 = um0(b) (2.86)
The principal maximizes her net cash ows, subject to the agents participation constraint,
and his two incentive constraints for e¤ort and investment. I substitute for the participation
constraint, and the maximization problem becomes:
maxWF  a  b+m(b)  e(a)  1
2

 
22 + u2  2
   (2.87)
subject to the two incentive constraints.
Dutta and Reichelstein (2005)11 show in a similar setting that investment will be below rst
best. This is because it is costly, in terms of risk being imposed on the agent, to give investment
incentives.
11Contrary to this paper, Dutta and Reichelstein (2005) assume normally distributed noise , they have interim
participation constraints between periods, and they use a more general t-period model. They also have an asset
value in their incentive contract.
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I rst rearrange (2.86):
u =

m0(b)
(2.88)
The principal chooses which levels of a and b to induce by maximizing WF
WF = a  b+m(b)  e(a)    1
2
(22 + u2  2)
= a  b+m(b)  e(a)    1
2
(22 +


m0(b)
2
 2) (2.89)
I di¤erentiate with respect to b and get the principals rst-order condition for investment:
 1 +m0(b) + 

2
[m0(b)]2

| {z }
u2
m00(b)
m0(b)| {z }
sensitivity
 1
3
2|{z}
varPF
= 0 (2.90)
Since  1 +m0(bFB) = 0 denes the rst best level of investment bFB, and the sensitivity
term in (2.90) is negative (and m0(b) > 1), the level of investment with full disclosure will be
below the rst best; bF < bFB
I note that the FOC for e¤ort is given by:
@WF
@a
= 1  e0(a)  e0(a)e00(a)
 
2 +

1
m0(b)
2
 2
!
= 0 (2.91)
or equivalently
e0(aF ) =
1
1 + e00(aF )

2 +
h
1
m0(b)
i2  2 (2.92)
The term aF is dened as the value of a that satises this equation. I have assumed e(a) is
convex, and e00(a) > 0. First best e¤ort aFB is given by e0(aFB) = 1; and with full disclosure
e¤ort aF will be below rst best; aF < aFB: I can compare the e¤ort level in (2.78) which is
the no disclosure, lowest investment case, with the full disclosure e¤ort level in (2.92). The
denominator in (2.92) is higher than in (2.78) because of the last term in the brackets in (2.92).
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When the denominator is higher, the fraction is smaller, and e0(aN1 ) is smaller in (2.92) than
in (2.78). I have assumed that e0(a) is increasing, so this means that e¤ort is lower with full
disclosure than in the no signal, lowest investment case (Case 1):
aF < aN1
With full disclosure, there is a positive level of investment, as well as e¤ort, in the optimum.
The incentive constraint in (2.88) shows that increasing e¤ort (and therefore ) increases the
necessary stock bonus u, and stock bonus imposes risk on the agent. This causes a trade-o¤
between inducing e¤ort and investment. Inducing e¤ort is more costly to the principal when she
also wants to induce investment. Therefore, optimal e¤ort level is lower in the full disclosure
case than in the no signal, lowest investment case.
2.5.3 Example: First best solution, full disclosure solution and possible cor-
ner solutions
Before presenting the principals problem and the optimal (interior) solution, I will present the
rst best solutions, possible corner solutions and the full disclosure solution.
First best solution
I nd the rst best level of e¤ort and investment.
max
b
( b+m(b)) =  b+ 2b  1
2
b2 (2.93)
max
a
(a  e(a)) = a  2
5
a2 (2.94)
I di¤erentiate and set equal to zero
 1 + 2  b = 0
bFB = 1 (2.95)
64
CHAPTER 2 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1  4
5
a = 0
4
5
a = 1
aFB =
5
4
(2.96)
The principals expected payo¤ is:
WFB =  bFB + 2bFB   1
2
 
bFB
2
+ aFB   2
5
 
aFB
2
(2.97)
=  1 + 2  1
2
+
5
4
  2
5

5
4
2
(2.98)
=
9
8
(2.99)
Full disclosure solution
With full disclosure, the disclosure cost is always realized. The agent maximizes
maxCE0 = + (a  b)  2
5
a2   1
2
 1
2
2  36
25
(2.100)
+u (f   )
 1
2
1
2
u2  144
75
I di¤erentiate:
@CE0
@b
=     u  (2  b) = 0
u =

2  b (2.101)
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@CE0
@a
=    4
5
a = 0
 =
4
5
a (2.102)
The principal maximizes
max
a;b
WF = a  b+ 2b  1
2
b2   2
5
a2   1
4
  1
4
0@4
5
a
2 36
25
+
 
4
5a
2  b
!2
144
75
1A (2.103)
I di¤erentiate with respect to a and b and get two rst order conditions:
1  b 
 
4
5a
(2  b)
!2
1
2  b
24
25
= 0
1  4
5
a  2
25
a

144
25
+
192
25
1
(2  b)2

= 0
The optimal e¤ort and investment levels with full disclosure are:
a = 0:576 40
b = 0:861 63
The principals expected payo¤ equals WF = 0:52863 in this case. The payo¤ in this
solution, which is an interior solution, is higher than the payo¤ in the corner solutions shown
below, so the principal prefers the interior solution.
Corner solutions
Case 1:  > 0; u = 0 In this corner solution, the principal induces e¤ort, but no investment.
The problem turns into the well-known e¤ort-problem.
The principal maximizes
max

a  2
5
a2   1
2
 1
2
2
36
25

(2.104)
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s.t.
a 2 argmax

  a  2
5
a2   1
2
 1
2
2
36
25

(2.105)
The agents FOC is:
   4
5
a = 0 (2.106)
 =
4
5
a (2.107)
The principals unconstrained optimization problem becomes:
max

a  2
5
a2   1
2
 1
2
2
36
25

= a  2
5
a2   1
2
 1
2

4
5
a
2 36
25
= a  2
5
a2  

4
5
a
2 36
100
= a  394
625
a2 (2.108)
I di¤erentiate and get the optimal e¤ort level:
1  788
625
a = 0
a =
625
788
= 0:793147 (2.109)
The principals expected payo¤ is :
W = a  394
625
a2
=
625
788
  394
625

625
788
2
=
625
1576
= 0:396 57 (2.110)
Case 2:  = 0; u = 0 With at compensation, the agent will excert no e¤ort. He has no
incentives to under-(or over-)invest. I assume when indi¤erent he chooses the rst best level
of investment. He will also have no incentives to disclose the signal. Expected payo¤ to the
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principal in this case is
W V =  bFB +m(bFB) (2.111)
=  1 + 2  1
2
 12
=
1
2
This corner solution gives the principal a higher expected payo¤ than the former where
 > 0 and u = 0. The best interior solution should then be compared to that corner solution
to see whether an interior or corner solution is optimal. In both of these cases, there is no
disclosure. The corner solution in Case 2 (with W = 0:5) does quite well compared to the full
disclosure solution (W = 0:52863), but is inferior to it. Even with no e¤ort, the companys
payo¤ are quite high, and this is because investment is relatively important compared to e¤ort
in this example.
2.6 The principals problem: Voluntary disclosure
In section 2.4.4 I studied the agents optimization problem with voluntary disclosure and found
the agents rst order condition for investment. In this section I study the principals problem
with voluntary disclosure. I start by presenting the principals optimization problem and I then
compare the full disclosure and voluntary solutions in the general model. I then present the
optimal solution in the numerical example and compare the optimal solutions for voluntary and
full disclosure.
I solve the principals maximization problem by nding the levels of e¤ort and investment
that the principal wants to induce. I then use the agents two incentive constraints to nd the
contract parameters that are needed to induce these specic e¤ort and investment levels.
Before I present the maximization problem, I will make a few comments. When the agent
makes his investment decision, he takes the markets conjecture b^ as given, because he cannot
inuence this value. The principal, on the other hand, inuences both b and b^ through her
choice of bonus parameters. A rational principal will assume that the market is rational (I
assume all parties have rational expectations) and can infer the agents choice of b; given the
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bonus parameters. For the principal, then, the conjectured value b^ and the real value b will
be the same. This simplies several of the factors in the principals optimization problem,
including ; var(P ) and Z. The probability  from (2.56) is now given by12
 =


(2.112)
I note that the principal does not inuence this probability through her choice of contract
parameters. Since b^ = b in equilibrium, inducing the agent to change b will change the markets
conjecture b^ in exactly the same magnitude. The higher the disclosure cost  (a priori uncer-
tainty ), the smaller (higher) the probability of disclosure (1   ) is. Similarly, with b^ = b,
the variance of the stock price is given by
varP V = (1 )3(1
3
+ )2 (2.113)
2.6.1 Maximization problem
I now turn to the maximization problem. The principal maximizes her expected cash ows net
of the managers compensation subject to three constraints:
E0 [(c1   s) + c2] (2.114)
subject to
CE0  0 (2.115)
 = e0(a) (2.116)
12Since this is a probability, it only makes sense to have  2 [0; 1] implying 

2 [0; 1]. I only look at settings
where this is true. If 

> 1, then there will never be disclosure, because the disclosure costs are too high.
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  + uZ(u)m0(b) = 0
Here Z(b) is given by (2.60). The rst constraint is the agents participation constraint, and
the next two are the agents rst-order conditions for optimal e¤ort choice and investment.
After using Z(b) from (2.60), I can rewrite the rst-order condition for investment as:
  + u( 1 )  u(1 )2m0(b) = 0 (2.117)
2.6.2 The agents required stock bonus
I solve this second-order equation and nd the bonus u; and I use the fact that  =   = :
u =
 1
q
1  4m0(b)
 2(1 ) > 0 (2.118)
This is the bonus u that the principal must pay the agent in order to achieve a given level of
investment b:
u =
1 
q
1  4m0(b)
2(1 ) (2.119)
In the last equation, I assume that when choosing among two values of u that induce the
same investment level, the principal chooses the smallest one, as u increases the risk premium
the principal must pay to the agent. The square root in (2.119) is non-negative (by denition)
and less than one, making the numerator positive. The denominator is also positive, and
therefore u > 0:
I di¤erentiate (2.119) and nd@u
V
@b :
@uV
@b
=   m
00(b)
[m0(b)]2
 
(1 ) 

1  4
m0(b)
  1
2
(2.120)
I do the same for the full disclosure case:
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@uF
@b
=   m
00(b)
[m0(b)]2
  (2.121)
Comparing the two, I nd that
@uV
@b
>
@uF
@b
The inverse must also be true:
@b
@uV
<
@b
@uF
(2.122)
A marginal increase in bonus implies a smaller increase in investment with voluntary
disclosure than with full disclosure.
I rewrite (2.119), to nd an expression that is easier to analyze. I multiply by

1 +

1  4m0(b)
 1
2

in both the numerator and denominator13. I get:
uV =

1 

1  4m0(b)
 1
2

2(1 ) 

1 +

1  4m0(b)
 1
2


1 +

1  4m0(b)
 1
2

=

1 

1  4
m0(b)

 1
2(1 ) 
 
1 +

1  4
m0(b)
 1
2
! 1
=
4
m0(b)
 1
2(1 ) 
 
1 +

1  4
m0(b)
 1
2
! 1
uV =
2
(1 ) 

m0(b)

 
1 +

1  4
m0(b)
 1
2
! 1
(2.123)
There exists a maximum level of investment that the principal can induce. This level, which
13This calculation is similar in nature to what Feltham and Wu (2001) do in their Proof of Lemma 2.
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I call bmax, is given by:
1  4
m0(bmax)
= 0
+
m0(bmax) = 4 (2.124)
The value of bmax is decreasing in both the agents risk-aversion, the disclosure cost, and
the rst period cash ow bonus coe¢ cient.
2.6.3 Some remarks on voluntary disclosure vs full disclosure
Before I move on to solve the principals mazimization problem, I will make a few remarks
about the di¤erences between the situation with full disclosure and voluntary disclosure. These
concern the strength of using stock-based incentive, the change in the variance, and the expected
disclosure cost.
Remark 1. Voluntary disclosure changes the strength of stock-based incentives. Specically,
to induce any given level of investment, the stock bonus must be higher with voluntary disclosure
than with full disclosure:
uV (b) > uF (b) (2.125)
for any given b 2 b; b : Recall that the full disclosure bonus is uF = m0(b) . I use this in
(2.123) and rewrite:
uV = uF
2
(1 ) 

1 +
 
1  4uF  12 1 (2.126)
The last factor here, which I dene as ; has a value between 12 and one:
 

1 +
 
1  4uF  12 1 2 1
2
; 1

(2.127)
The term 2  therefore has a value 2 [1; 2]. The value of 1(1 ) has a value between one
and innity. This proves that
uV > uF (2.128)
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This holds for all values of b. It must then be true that to achieve any given level of
b, the stock bonus u must be higher with voluntary disclosure than with full disclosure. This
demonstrates that the stock price gives stronger incentives to invest when there is full disclosure
compared with voluntary disclosure.
Remark 2. Comparison of stock price variances in (2.48) for full disclosure and (2.113) for
voluntary disclosure makes it clear that stock price variance, for a given contract, is weakly
lower with voluntary disclosure than with full disclosure:
(1 )3(1
3
+ )2  1
3
2
The term (1 )3(13 +) has a value 2

0; 13

when  2 [0; 1], so:
varP V  varPF (2.129)
The two variances are equal only when  = 0, that is when the manager always chooses to
disclose even with voluntary disclsoure. The lower the probability of disclosure is, the lower is
varP V , both in absolute terms and relative to varPF . With voluntary disclosure, the e¤ective
compensation contains a at part, with no variance, and total variance is lower. For a given u,
the risk premium is lower with voluntary disclosure.
Remark 3: The principal pays the disclosure cost only with probability (1   ) if there
is voluntary disclosure, but with probability 1 if there is full disclosure. This means that the
expected disclosure cost is lower with voluntary disclosure.
2.6.4 Solving the principals maximization problem
Going back to the principals optimization problem, I substitute for the participation constraint
in the principals expected payo¤. The maximand W V becomes
W V  a  b+m(b)  e(a)  (1 ) (2.130)
 1
2


22 + u2(1 )3(1
3
+ )2

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I use the rst order conditions for e¤ort and investment in (2.116) and (2.119) to rephrase
(2.130):
W V = a  b+m(b)  e(a)  (1 ) (2.131)
 1
2

264e0(a)2 2 +
241 
q
1  4e0(a)m0(b)
2(1 )
352 (1 )3(1
3
+ )2
375
I di¤erentiate W V with respect to b and set the derivative equal to zero. I then have the
rst-order condition for the principals optimal investment level (Appendix 2.A.7):
@
@b
=  1 +m 0(b) +   (1 )3(1
3
+ )2| {z }
2
3

241 
q
1  4m0(b)
2(1 )
35
| {z }
<1
 1
(1 )| {z } 
1

1  4
m0(b)
  1
2
| {z }
>1
 
[m0(b)]2
m00(b)| {z }
<0
= 0 (2.132)
I denote the solution to (2.132) by bV :
Similarly, aV  solves the rst order condition for e¤ort.
@
@a
= 1  e0(a)  e00(a)
8>>><>>>:
e0(a)2
+
241 1  4e0(a)m0(b)  12
2(1 )
35  1(1 ) 1  4e0(a)m0(b)   12 1m0(b)V ar(P V )
9>>>=>>>; = 0
(2.133)
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2.6.5 Characteristics of the optimal solution
These two rst order conditions characterize the optimal interior solution14. The last term in
both rst order conditions will be negative. Recall the rst best solutions in (2.44) and (2.46).
Comparing these with the FOCs above, it is clear that both investment and e¤ort levels are
weakly below the rst best. Adding the negative term in (2.132), means that m0(b) needs to
increase in order to satisfy the equation, and since m00(b) < 0 ; this can only be achieved by
reducing b. By similar reasoning, e¤ort also has to be lower in (2.133) than in the rst best
case. In sum:
bV   bFB (2.134)
aV   aFB (2.135)
2.6.6 Di¤erences between voluntary and full disclosure
To summarize, there are three factors that make the voluntary disclosure case di¤erent from
the full disclosure case in the principals problem. The rst factor is the incentive e¤ect, which
describes the reduced strength of stock-based incentives, uV (b) > uF (b). To induce a given level
of e¤ort, stock bonus needs to be higher with voluntary disclosure than with full disclosure.
The second is the reduced variance e¤ect, which means that the stock price has less variance
under voluntary disclosure. The third is the reduced expected disclosure cost e¤ect.
2.6.7 Example: The principals maximization problem
Recall from (2.74) that the agents rst order condition for investment is:
  + u (2  b) 43
48
  u2  (2  b) 1849
18 432
= 0 (2.136)
14Here I will discuss the interior solutions, where  6= 0 and u 6= 0. Corner solutions have been discussed
earlier.
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I solve for u:
u =
 
1

1  1
2
 
2  b
 1
2
!
192
43
(2.137)
Since u increases the agents risk premium, the principal will always choose the lower of the
two values; and I can write this as
u =
192
43
  192
43
r
1  1
2
 
2  b (2.138)
I can also solve for b in (2.74):
b = 2  

u

43
48
  1849
18432
u
 1
(2.139)
The relationship between u and b in (2.139) is illustrated in Figure 2.5 and Figure 2.6.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
u
b
Figure 2.5. The level of investment b induced by stock bonus u. The value of  is set at
 = 0:42271. The black line is voluntary disclosure. The green line is full disclosure. The red
line is voluntary disclosure with risk neutrality ( = 0).
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Figure 2.6. A closer look at the relationship between bonus and induced investment.
The curve that represents b as a function of u for voluntary disclosure is concave and reaches
a maximum at u = 4:4651(which is umax; see (2:61)) where b = 1: 788 6. I di¤erentiate (2.139):
@b
@u
= 0:42271

u

43
48
  1849
18432
u
 243
48
  2  1849
18432
u

(2.140)
The second order derivative is
@2b
@2u
=  0:84542

u

43
48
  1849
18432
u
 2

"
u

43
48
  1849
18432
u
 143
48
  2  1849
18432
u
2
+

1849
18432
#
(2.141)
This is negative, conrming that the curve is concave. For the case where there is voluntary
disclosure, but the agent is risk neutral which I denote  = 0, the function b as a function of u
in Figure 2.5 and 2.6 is:
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b=0 = 2  
u
 1
1  (2.142)
= 2  0:42271
u
 48
43
where I have used (2.72) with  = 0 and rearranged.
For full disclosure, the function is:
bF = 2  
u
(2.143)
= 2  0:42271
u
(2.144)
I have used (2.101) and rearranged. When u ! 1, the curves for risk neutral voluntary
disclosure and full disclosure both move towards b = 2 since lim b
u!1 = 2 in both (2.142) and
(2.143). For full disclosure and voluntary disclosure with risk neutrality, the slope of the curve
is :
@b
@u
j =0 =   1
1   u
 2
= 0:42271  48
43
 u 2 (2.145)
@b
@uF
=   u 2
= 0:42271  u 2 (2.146)
The di¤erence here is the factor 4843 which is
1
1  > 1. The curve is steeper for risk neutral
voluntary disclosure (red line) than for full disclosure (green line), but they do not cross15.
If the principal does not want to induce any investment, she can set u = 0. The curves cross
the x-axis at di¤erent values of u. I set b = 0 and nd that
15 If they did cross, they could not both have lim b
u!1
= 2 and @b
@u
j=0> @b@uF .
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uV j b=0 = 1
2(1 )
"
1 
s
1  4
m0(0)
#
=
1
2  12  14  4348
241 
s
1  4 
1
2  14  0:42271
2
35
=
192
43

1 p1  0:105 68
= 0:242 52 (2.147)
u=0 j b=0 = 
m0(0)
 1
1 
=

2
 1
1 
=
0:42271
2
 48
43
= 0:235 93 (2.148)
uF j b=0 = 
m0(0)
=

2
=
0:42271
2
= 0:211 36 (2.149)
In this example:
uV jb=0> u=0 jb=0> uF jb=0 (2.150)
To induce b > 0, bonus must be higher than uV jb=0= 0:24252. For the agent, a marginal
increase in b decreases cash ow bonus with  times the investment increase. So stock bonus u
must at least cover this loss to induce investment, in addition to covering the agents increase in
risk. When b = 0, the marginal productivity of investment is equal to 2 (m0(0) = 2). Therefore,
the stock bonus u needs only be half of  for the agent not to lose money. In addition, stock
bonus must cover the marginal increase in risk that follows from an increase in investment (since
an increase in investment increases the probability of ending up in the risky disclosure part of
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the compensation). If the principal wants to induce investment just above zero, say b = 0:05,
the necessary stock bonus is u = 0:248 92.
The rst order condition for e¤ort is:
 =
4
5
a (2.151)
With b^ = b, the probability of no disclosure is  =  =
5
48 = 0:104: Stock price variance is
given by (2.113), and with b^ = b this reduces to
varP V =
556 549
307 200
 1: 811 7 (2.152)
The principal maximizes her payo¤ net of the disclosure cost and the agents compensation,
subject to the agents two incentive constraints. After subsituting for the agents participation
constraint and incentive constraints, I restate the problem as an unconstrained optimization
problem:
max
a;b
W V = a  b+ 2b  1
2
b2   2
5
a2   43
192
 1
4
0@4
5
a
2 36
25
+
 
192
43
  192
43
r
1  1
2
 
2  b
!2
556 549
307 200
1A (2.153)
I di¤erentiate W V with respect to a and b, set this equal to zero and solve the two equations
together. The optimal levels of a and b are:
a = 0:52839 (2.154)
b = 0:84702 (2.155)
Recall that the rst best levels of investment and e¤ort are b = 1 and a = 54 ; so both
investment and e¤ort are below the rst best levels. I use these values of a and b in (2.151) and
(2.138) to nd the optimal bonus parameters:
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 = 0:42271 (2.156)
u = 0:42996 (2.157)
The xed component of the compensation is the value of  that satises the agents par-
ticipation constraint. Using the values of u;  and b from the optimal solution, and assuming
rational expectations so that b^ = 0:84702, I can recalculate the agents CE. I solve for the  that
makes the CE equal to zero and nd that the xed component of compensation is  =  0:0834:
The optimal contract now looks like
s =  0:0834 + 0:42271  c1 + 0:42996  P (2.158)
Graphically, the agents certainty equivalent with the optimal contract can be represented as
in Figure 2.7. To illustrate this in a two-dimensional graph, the e¤ort level is set at the optimum
from above, a = 0:52839: The agents maximum certainty equivalent is at the investment level
that the principal intended to induce: b = 0:84702; and it then reaches its maximum level of
zero, which is just enough to make the agent willing to accept the contract.
In order to study the role of the markets expectations about b in inuencing the actual
chosen value of b, I show graphically in Figure 2.8 the agents choice of b as a function of the
markets expectation b^ (the curved line). The straight line is the values where b^ = b, satisfying
the rational expectations equlibrium. This occurs when b = 0:84702; which again conrms that
this is the equilibrium value.
Figure 2.9 shows how the principals net payo¤ depends on the investment level (for e¤ort
xed at a = 0:52839). The maximum expected wealth for the principal isW V = 0:533.
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0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2.0
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b
CE
Figure 2.7. The agents certainty equivalent CE and his choice of investment level b. The
agent maximizes his certainty equivalent (in the optimal contract) by choosing investment
level b = 0:84702.
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Figure 2.8. The agents choice of investment b as a function of the markets expectations
about his investment choice b^. The equlibrium value of investment is b = 0:84702.
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Figure 2.9. The principals expected payo¤W V as a function of investment b. The principal
maximizes her expected payo¤ by choosing a contract that induces investment level
b = 0:84702.
Comparing voluntary disclosure and full disclosure
Table 2.2 presents the optimal parameters with voluntary disclosure, and also compares volun-
tary disclosure with full disclosure.
Table 2.2. Voluntary (V) and full (F) disclosure. Optimal solution and optimal parameters.
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Table 2.2 shows that both e¤ort and investment are lower with voluntary disclosure than with
full disclosure. The lower level of e¤ort is achieved with a lower value of cash bonus . The stock
bonus u, on the other hand, is higher with voluntary disclosure. This means that even if stock
bonus is higher, a lower investment is induced. This has to do with the reduced e¤ectiveness of
using stock-based compensation discussed previously. Because there is a 10.4% probability of
no disclosure in which case stock price does not depend on investment, the managers incentives
to invest are weaker with voluntary disclosure. The at part of the compensation (see Figure
2.2) is also why stock price variance decreases from 1:92 to 1:81.
In the example, the principal is better o¤with voluntary disclosure than with full disclosure.
A result like this has two potential explanations; the principal can save on disclosure cost and/or
that the risk premium related to stock based compensation is lower. To analyze which of these
explanations is valid here, I decompose this di¤erence in expected wealth in Table 2.3.
The principals expected wealth is 0:53300 with voluntary disclosure and 0:52863 with full
disclosure, meaning expected payo¤ is 0:00437 higher with voluntary disclosure. The di¤erence
in expected disclosure cost is 0:02604 (see Table 2.3). This is higher than the change in expected
wealth, and this means that in this case it is the di¤erence in expected disclosure cost that makes
the principal better o¤ with voluntary disclosure.
Table 2.3. The principals expected wealth, and the components of expected wealth with
voluntary (V) and full (F) disclosure.
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In this example, it is optimal to reduce e¤ort more than investment when moving from full to
voluntary disclosure. E¤ort is reduced by 0.4801 while investment is reduced by 0.1461. This
is why the reduction is cash ow from reducing e¤ort (Table 2.3) is higher than for investment
(-0.0268 as opposed to -0.00212).
Risk premium is lower with voluntary disclosure than with full disclosure, 0:14806 compared
to 0:1553. To further analyze this, I divide total risk premium RP into two components RP ()
and RP (u)
RP =
1
2

 
2V ar(c1) + u
2V arP

=
1
2
2V ar(c1) +
1
2
u2V arP
 RP () +RP (u) (2.159)
By decomposing the risk premium into risk premium from cash bonus (RP () above) and
risk premium from stock bonus (RP (u)), I show which factors cause the di¤erence in risk
premium in the voluntary and full disclosure settings. This is illustrated in Table 2.4.
Table 2.4. Decomposing the risk premium (RP) into two parts; risk premium from cash bonus
and risk premium from stock bonus.
The total di¤erence may seem quite small (-0.00725), but this is the net e¤ect of the changes
in these two risk premiums. V ar(c1) is the same in the two cases, but since e¤ort and  are
scaled down with voluntary disclosure, the risk premium related to cash ow is lower with
voluntary disclosure than with full disclosure. So some of the reduced cash ows from e¤ort is
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balanced by reduced risk premium; lower RP (). Risk premium from using stock bonus, RP (u),
is higher with voluntary disclosure than with full disclosure. Even if stock price variance V arP
is lower with voluntary disclosure, the stock bonus is higher, and the net e¤ect is a higher risk
premium. Remember that the resulting investment is lower, so a lower level of investment costs
more in terms of risk premium with voluntary disclosure than a higher investment with full
disclosure.
Risk premium from using stock bonus, RP (u); is higher with voluntary than with full
disclosure, and this means that it is more expensive to use u to induce investment with voluntary
disclosure. However, the agents rst order condition in (2.74) or (2.139) shows that the agent
will increase investment either when u is increased or when  is decreased. In this example, it is
optimal for the principal to reduce ; even if this reduces payo¤ from e¤ort . When stock bonus
becomes less e¤ective and more expensive to use, the principal balances e¤ort and investment
incentives by reducing both induced e¤ort and investment, but the cash ow e¤ect is higher for
e¤ort than for investment (as seen in Table 2.3).
In sum, voluntary disclosure has lower expected disclosure cost E() ; reduced total risk
premium RP , and weaker incentives. This gives lower output (e¤ort and investment).
2.7 Comparative statics
In this section I present comparative statics analyses. I study how the agents incentives change
when the parameters ;  and  change, and I also look at how the principals problem changes
when  and  change. Recall that the agents rst order condition for investment is
uV =
2
(1 ) 

m0(b)

 
1 +

1  4
m0(b)
 1
2
! 1
(2.160)
where (1 ) =

1  

is the probability of disclosure, and m(b) is the production function
for investment.
As noted earlier, the full disclosure bonus is
uF =

m0(b)
(2.161)
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I use this in the expression above:
uV = uF
2
(1 ) 

1 +
 
1  4uF  12 1 (2.162)
2.7.1 Changes in the disclosure cost
How does stock bonus depend on the disclosure cost ?
The required stock bonus depends on the disclosure cost . When  ! 0, the disclosure
cost becomes insignicant, and the setting moves towards full disclosure, and the bonus moves
towards uF :
uV j!0= 
m0(b)
= uF (2.163)
As  increases, it moves towards one of two upper limits. The two possible limits are max 
1
4u 
m0(b)
and . The rst value, max comes from the feasability constraint, and can be seen from
(2.162). It is parallell to the bmax found in (2.124), but the constraint is here dened in terms
of  rather than b. It is the maximum value that  can have when it is possible to induce a
given b. The higher the investment b is, the lower the value of max:
The second value is dened by the probability of disclosure; 1   = 1   : Since this is a
probability, it has to be between 0 and 1, implying that   . When  increases above this
value, there is no disclosure. Moving towards no disclosure, the stock bonus loses its incentive
e¤ect and the manager will not be willing to invest.
To see how the stock bonus changes when the disclosure cost increases in a general way, I
di¤erentiate u:
@u
@
= 2uF
0B@ 1  1(1 )2 

1 +
 
1  4uF  12 1
+ 1(1 ) 

1 +
 
1  4uF  12 2   1  4uF   12  2uF
1CA (2.164)
= 2uF
1
(1 ) 

1 +
 
1  4uF  12 1  
1

 1
(1 ) +

1 +
 
1  4uF  12 1   1  4uF   12  2uF!
= uV
 
1

 1
(1 ) +

1 +
 
1  4uF  12 1   1  4uF   12  2uF! > 0
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The stock bonus increases when the disclosure cost increases. When the disclosure cost in-
creases, the cut-o¤ level of disclosure increases, and there is less disclosure. With less disclosure,
the incentive e¤ect of the stock bonus decreases. To induce a given investment level, the stock
bonus has to increase. For a given u the inverse result is that when  increaes, the induced
investment decreases: @b@ < 0 (calculations are in Appendix 2.A.8).
Example I use the numerical values from the example I have used earlier (see Table 2.5 for
a summary of assumptions and results).
Variable Value
a 0:52839
 0:42271
b 0:84702
u 0:42996
 0:25
 2:4
 1:2
 0:5
Table 2.5.
I then x all variables at the values indicated in the table, except u and , and I nd the
required stock bonus for di¤erent values of . Figure 2.10 illustrates the relationship between
u and .
When ! 0, the stock bonus is 0:366 62:
uV j!0= uF = 0:366 62 (2.165)
This value of uF ( and uV ) is the full disclosure bonus needed to induce an investment level
of b = 0:84702; which is the optimal investment in the voluntary disclosure case. The derivative
at this point is:
@u
@
j!0= uF

1

+ uF

= 0:366 62

1
2:4
+ 0:5  0:366 62

= 0:219 96 (2.166)
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The highest value that  can have when it is possible to induce an investment level of b = 0:84702
is given by max :
1  4uFmax  0 (2.167)
I rearrange and use the numerical values
max =
1
4uF
=
1
4  12  0:366 62
= 1: 363 8 (2.168)
If the disclosure cost is higher than 1: 363 8, it is not possible to induce b = 0:84702. As 
moves toward this value, the bonus moves toward 1: 698 3, which is the maximum value of u in
the gure.
uV j!max= 1: 698 3 (2.169)
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Figure 2.10. The relationship between stock bonus u and the disclosure cost , for a given
investment level.  = 2:4 and max = 1: 363 8:
In this example max <  = 2:4; so the binding upper limit is max = 1: 363 8. If, on the
other hand,  were lower, say  = 1, the result would be di¤erent. In this case  < max and
 would be the binding upper limit on . Figure 2.11 illustrates this. As  approaches  = 1,
the bonus loses all its incentive power.
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Figure 2.11. The relationship between stock bonus u and the disclosure cost , when  = 1
and max = 1: 363 8:
It is worth noting that the principal will prefer a corner solution to this interior solution
when  is above a certain level.
How does the principals problem depend on the disclosure cost?
To see how the level of the disclosure cost inuences the principals problem, I have calculated
optimal solutions for di¤erent levels of : These are presented in Table 2.6. I start with a low
value of  (  = 0:0001), then increase  to 0:05; then study increments of  of 0:05, going up
to  = 0:5.
A few comments are in order. Table 2.6 shows that in this example a corner solution becomes
optimal when the disclosure cost is above a certain level. From   0:3, it is optimal to have
a = 0 (corner solution). In this case, it is optimal to set  = 0 and have a = 0, because the
rst best investment can then be achieved with no bonus, no risk premium, and no disclosure
cost. The benet from setting  = 0 is that the agent has no incentive to underinvest. Even
with u = 0, the agent will choose rst best investment bFB = 1 (assuming the agent will choose
what is best for the principal if he is indi¤erent). With no bonus, there is no risk for the agent,
he receives only a at wage, there is no risk premium and there is also no disclosure. This
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alternative becomes attractive when the disclosure cost is high, because a higher amount is
then saved from not disclosing.
I will focus on the cases where   0:30; where interior solutions are optimal, and the
following analysis concerns these cases.
With full disclosure the optimal contract is independent of the level of the disclosure cost.
The disclosure cost in this case only reduces the principals payo¤, but has no e¤ect on incen-
tives. With voluntary disclosure, both e¤ort and investment decreases as the disclosure cost
increases. This is related to the analysis of stock price risk premium RP (u) above. The higher
the disclosure cost, the lower the probability of disclosure. This lowers the e¤ect of stock based
compensation, which has to be increased to maintain a given investment level. Even if stock
price variance decreases, stock price risk premium increases with increased disclosure cost. This
makes it more expensive to induce investment, and optimal investment is lower with higher .
The (total) risk premium RP decreases with higher : Because lower e¤ort requires lower
; cash ow risk premium RP () is lower. This reduction outweighs the incease in RP (u), and
total risk premium is lower with higher disclosure cost.
From the table, it is clear that the principal is better o¤ with full disclosure for some (low)
values of ; and the reverse is true for other (high) values of : For higher values of , there
is more to save by not disclosing (with voluntary disclosure), in addition to lower RP . These
e¤ects dominate the negative cash ow e¤ects from inducing lower e¤ort and investment levels.
For the principal, apart from the obvious e¤ect on E(), changing  is a parallell to changing
the kink-point in a piecewise linear contract. Increasing  moves the kink-point to the right
(higher up), since fCO increases with  (see 2.30) The principal is (still disregarding E()) better
o¤ with a linear contract (F) than a piecewise linear contract (V), since the e¤ect from E() is
what makes the principals payo¤ higher with voluntary disclosure than full disclosure. This is
illustrated in the last two columns of Table 2.5, which show that the principals expected payo¤
disregarding the disclosure cost is always higher with full disclosure than voluntary disclosure
in this example.
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2.7.2 Changes in risk aversion: How does stock bonus depend on risk aver-
sion?
In this section I will analyze how the required stock bonus depends on the agents risk aversion.
The maximum possible value of  given investment b is given by max. This value is where 
1  4uF  in (2.162) is zero:
max =
1
4uF
(2.170)
I can now calculate uV for  = 0 and  = max.
uV ( = 0) = uF  1
(1 ) (2.171)
uV ( = max) = uF
2
(1 ) (2.172)
I know that 11   1. For both  = 0 and  = max, the value of uV is higher than uF .
With  = max , the value of uV is twice as high as the value when  = 0. When  = 0, there
are no risk e¤ects, and the only di¤erence between the voluntary and full disclosure cases is the
probability of disclosure. The value of uV needs to be 1(1 ) times higher than u
F since the
manager will only be rewarded for investing with probability (1  ). When  > 0, the bonus
must be higher to compensate for the marginal increase in risk as well.
I now di¤erentiate (2.162) with respect to the risk aversion parameter .
@u
@
= uF
2
(1 )( 1)

1 +
 
1  4uF  12 2 1
2
 
1  4uF   12 ( 4)uF
= uV

1 +
 
1  4uF  12 1 2  1  4uF   12 uF
= uV  uV (1 )  1  4uF   12
= (uV )2(1 )  1  4uF   12 > 0 (2.173)
The higher the risk aversion, the higher the stock bonus needs to be in order to induce a
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given investment level. Increasing investment increases the agents probability of ending up in
the risky part of the compensation. The more risk averse the manager is, the more this will
cost him. To compensate for an increase in risk aversion, the stock bonus must be increased to
maintain a given investment level. Note, however, that as  increases, the principal may prefer
a corner solution where u = 0, as this reduces the risk that the agent has to bear.
From (2.173) I can calculate @u@ for di¤erent values of . I choose to nd
@u
@ for  = 0 and
for  ! max = 1
4uF 
. For  = max , the value of @u@ is not dened, since the denominator in
(2.173) is then zero.
@u
@
j=0= (uV )2(1 ) > 0 (2.174)
@u
@
j!max=1 (2.175)
Example: To illustrate these results, I use the parameter values from the example, and hold
all variables except u and  constant. The relationship between u and  as given by the agents
FOC for investment is:
uV =
2
(1  0:104)  0:366 62 

1 + (1  4    0:366 62  0:25) 12
 1
(2.176)
I have used the fact that uF = 0:366 62. I rewrite (2.176) and get:
uV = 0:8183

1 + (1  0:366 62  ) 12
 1
(2.177)
Figure 2.12 illustrates uV as a function of : The curve is upward-sloping, showing that a
higher  increases the necessary u: The value of max = 1
4uF 
= 140:366 620:25 = 2: 727 6: This is
the maximum value  can have when it is still possible to induce b = 0:84702:
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Figure 2.12. The relationship between stock bonus and risk aversion in the agents FOC.
2.7.3 Changes in investment risk
How does the stock bonus u depend on investment risk ?
The parameter  indicates how risky the investment is. A higher  means a riskier investment.
An increase in investment risk will change the agents incentives to invest. In this section I
analyze how the agents incentives change when there is an increase in , and I look at how the
principal will have to change the stock bonus u to maintain a given investment level.
I rst look at the disclosure decision. The cut-o¤ value of disclosure fCO is given by:
fCO = m(b^)  + 2 (2.178)
I di¤erentiate with respect to :
@fCO
@
=  1 (2.179)
When uncertainty increases, the treshold value of disclosure decreases. The probability of
disclosure is (1 ) = 1   : I di¤erentiate and nd:
@(1 )
@
=

2
=
1

 > 0 (2.180)
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The probability of disclosure increases with increased uncertainty. Recall that the cuto¤ fCO
is determined by the relative benets and costs of disclosing. The no-disclosure stock price P 0
has a distribution with lower bound

m(b^)  

and upper bound fCO: So when  increases,
the lower bound moves down, and the value of P 0 decreases. When no disclosure becomes
relatively less attractive to the manager, he decreases the cut-o¤ for disclosure and increases
the probability of disclosure. This result is consistent with Verrecchia (1990, Corollary 4) where
disclosure also increases when uncertainty increases.
I next study how the increase in uncertainty and probability of disclosure inuence the
agents investment incentives. I di¤erentiate u from (2.160) with respect to  and use the fact
that  =  :
@u
@
= 2  
m0(b)

 
1 +

1  4
m0(b)
 1
2
! 1

@

1
1 

@
=  2  
m0(b)

 
1 +

1  4
m0(b)
 1
2
! 1



(1 )2



1


(2.181)
< 0
The higher the riskiness of the investment, the lower the necessary stock bonus. With more
underlying risk, there is more disclosure. More disclosure makes each unit of stock bonus more
powerful, and a smaller amount of stock bonus is needed. The result is that riskiness reduces
stock bonus, for a given level of investment.
The smallest value  can have, is  = . For lower values of  than that, the probability
of non-disclosure equals 1. Equation (2.160) shows that  inuences u only through the term
1
(1 ) . The denominator is (1   ); which is the probability of disclosure. I rst nd how the
probability of disclosure is a¤ected as  moves towards its two extreme values:
(1 ) j!+=

1  


j!+= 0 (2.182)
(1 ) j!1=

1  


j!1= 1 (2.183)
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As  moves towards , the probability of disclosure moves toward zero. Similarly, when  moves
towards innity, the probability of disclosure moves towards one.
I nd the value of the stock bonus uV when investment risk moves towards its two extremes:
uV j!+=1 (2.184)
uV j!1= 2  
m0(b)

 
1 +

1  4
m0(b)
 1
2
! 1
(2.185)
When  goes toward its lower boundary, the probability of disclosure moves towards zero, and
the neccesary bonus moves towards intity because the bonus loses all its incentive e¤ects.
When  moves towards innity, the disclosure probability goes towards one, and the stock
bonus moves towards the value in (2.185).
Example. I use the parameter values from the example, and x all variables except u and
. The agents rst order condition for investment is:
uV =
2
(1  0:25 )
 0:366 62 

1 + (1  4  0:366 62  0:5  0:25) 12
 1
(2.186)
In the example, the relationship between u and  is as shown in Figure 2.13. The curve is
always downward-sloping, because the derivative in (2.181) is negative. Here, stock bonus uV
moves towards its limit value of
uV j!1= 2  0:366 62 

1 + (1  4  0:5  0:366 62  0:25) 12
 1
(2.187)
= 0:385 16
when  moves towards innity (the horizontal dottet line in the gure). When  moves
towards  = 0:25 (the vertical dottet line in the gure) from above, the value of u moves
towards innity. When comparing (2.165) to (2.187), it is clear that the stock bonus when
 ! 1 is di¤erent from the full disclosure stock bonus. This is because the last term in the
inner brackets above is di¤erent from zero (it is zero when  = 0). So even when moving
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towards full disclosure when  ! 1, the stock bonus will not be equal to the full disclosure
stock bonus. By the same reasoning, it is also clear that the stock bonus is di¤erent when
 ! 0 (see (2.165)) and when  ! 1, even though the disclosure decision moves towards full
disclosure in both cases. The risk e¤ects are di¤erent in the two cases. These limit cases show
that risk and the disclosure cost inuence the stock bonus di¤erently.
0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0
0
1
2
3
4
mu-bar
u
Figure 2.13. The relationship between stock bonus and investment risk, for a given investment
level.
How does the principals problem depend on the level of investment risk?
I also study the principals optimal solution for di¤erent values of : I nd how the optimal
investment and e¤ort levels change with  . The results are listed in Table 2.7. I start with a
value of  of 1.90 and use intervals of 0.1 up to  = 3:0.
For   2:8, interior solutions are optimal. For values of  higher than this, a corner solution
with u = 0,  = 0, and a = 0 is optimal. With higher risk, there is more to save in terms of
the risk premium by setting the bonuses equal to zero. In the following, my comments concern
the interior solutions.
When risk increases, the principals expected payo¤W V decreases. In contrast, the proba-
bility of disclosure increases. The scale of the companys operations decreases as risk increases,
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since both a and b decrease. Lower e¤ort requires a lower cash bonus . A lower investment
level, combined with a higher probability of disclosure that makes stock bonus more powerful,
reduces the required stock bonus as risk increases. The stock price variance increases with ,
both because the underlying investment risk increases and because the probability of disclosure
increases. The stock bonus risk premium RP (u) increases as risk increases up to  = 2:5,
and then it decreases. RP (u) is the product of stock bonus and stock price variance, and the
rst decreases and the latter increases with . For  = 2:5 and higher, the decrease in bonus
dominates the increase in variance, and the stock price risk premium goes down. The total risk
premium, however, goes down as  increases since e¤ort a and cash bonus  also decrease with
:
2.7.4 Conclusion
Table 2.8 sums up how the managers stock bonus depends on the di¤erent parameters; to
achieve a given investment level b, the necessary stock bonus uV increases when  goes up,
when  goes down, and/or when  goes up. These e¤ects arise because of the kink in the
compensation that voluntary disclosure creates. When there is full disclosure, there is no kink,
and all these e¤ects disappear.
Table 2.8. The table shows how the stock bonus required to induce a given investment level
changes with three parameters
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2.8 Conclusion
In this chapter I show how a managers control of information will change the incentive problems
inside the rm. I do so in a model where the manager exerts costly e¤ort and has incentives to
underinvest in a project. The manager controls information about the future outcome of the
investment, and in the disclosure equilibrium that follows, he will hide bad outcomes and only
reveal good outcomes. This reduces his downside risk, but it will also reduce the e¤ectiveness
of stock bonus. Stock bonus becomes less powerful in inducing investment, compared to the
full disclosure case. This means that to achieve a given level of investment, the stock bonus
needs to be higher with voluntary disclosure than with full disclosure. A higher bonus, on the
other hand, increases the managers risk, and is therefore costly.
The model assumes linear compensation contracts, but the disclosure decision makes the
managers compensation convex and piecewise linear. When increasing investment, the manager
increases the probability of disclosure as well as increasing both the mean and the riskiness of
his compensation. The owners optimal level of e¤ort and investment will typically be di¤erent
in the voluntary disclosure case compared to full disclosure.
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2.A Appendix to Chapter 2
2.A.1 The agents certainty equivalent
(i) In order to nd the agents certainty equivalent, I calculate the unconditional time-0 mean
and variance of the stock price and the disclosure cost: E0(P ) and V ar0(P ):
(ii) I rst look at the stock price, as seen from time 0. Since the agent does not know 
at time 0, he does not know what the exact value of the stock price in the event of disclosure
will be, because this stock price is a function of  (through f), see (2.13). But this stock price
is only realized if f  fCO: The distribution of the stock price, given that f  fCO, is still
uniform, but has a support that is truncated from below by

fCO    :
The mean of the stock price
The agents probability distribution of P 1 with this truncated distribution for f is uniform and
characterized by
P 1(b)  U fCO   ; (m(b) + )   (2.188)
This means that the expected stock price, for a given b, is
E0

P j f  fCO (2.189)
= E0

f j f  fCO  
=
1
2
(m(b) + + fCO)  
=
1
2
(m(b) +m(b^))
The last equation comes from using (2.30).
The variance of the stock price, given f  fCO :
102
CHAPTER 2 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
var(P 1 j f  fCO) (2.190)
= var(f j f  fCO)
=
1
12
(m(b) +   fCO)2
=
1
12
(m(b) m(b^) + 2  2)2
If f < fCO , expected stock price is
E0(P j f < fCO) = 1
2
h
m(b^)  + f^CO
i
(2.191)
= m(b^) +   
and variance is
V ar0(P j f < fCO) = 0 (2.192)
The unconditional time-0 mean of the stock price is given as:
E0(P ) = E [E(P j f)]
= (1 (fCO))  E(P j f  fCO)
+(fCO)  E(P j f < fCO)
= (1 (fCO)) 

1
2
(m(b) +m(b^))

+(fCO) 
h
m(b^) +   
i
(2.193)
The variance of the stock price
The unconditional variance is given by:
V ar0(P ) = E [var(P j f)] + var [E(P j f)] (2.194)
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For a reference on conditional variances, see Mood, Graybill and Boes (1974), p. 159.
To derive the components of this variance, I calculate E [var(P j f)] and var [E(P j f)] :
E [var(P j f)] (2.195)
= (1 (fCO))  V ar(P j f  fCO) + (fCO)  V ar(P j f < fCO) (2.196)
= (1 (fCO))  1
12
(m(b) m(b^) + 2  2)2
V ar [E(P j f)] (2.197)
= (1 (fCO))  E(P j f  fCO)  E0(P )2
+(fCO)  E(P j f < fCO)  E0(P )2
= (1 (fCO)) 
8>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>:
h
1
2(m(b) +m(b^))
i
 
2666664
(1 (fCO)) 
h
1
2((m(b) +m(b^))
i
+(fCO) 
h
m(b^) +   
i
3777775
9>>>>>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>>>>>;
2
+(fCO) 
8>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>:
h
m(b^) +   
i
 
2666664
(1 (fCO)) 
h
1
2(m(b) +m(b^))
i
+(fCO) 
h
m(b^) +   
i
3777775
9>>>>>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>>>>>;
2
(2.198)
=
1
4

(fCO) 2(fCO)  hm(b) m(b^) + 2  2i2
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I can now nd the variance of P :
V ar0(P ) = E [var(P j f)] + var [E(P j f)] (2.199)
= (1 (fCO))  1
12
(m(b) m(b^) + 2  2)2
+
1
4

(fCO) 2(fCO) h
m(b) m(b^) + 2  2
i2
=
1
4
(1 (fCO))(1
3
+ (fCO))  (m(b) m(b^) + 2  2)2
The certainty equivalent
The full certainty equivalent can now be written as:
CE0 = + (a  b)  e(a)  1
2
22 (2.200)
+u
8>><>>:
(1 (fCO)) 
h
1
2(m(b) +m(b^))
i
+(fCO) 
h
m(b^) +   
i
9>>=>>;
 1
2
RP
Where RP is dened as the agents risk premium (2.64) :
RP  u2

1
4
(1 (fCO))(1
3
+ (fCO))  (m(b) m(b^) + 2  2)2

(2.201)
2.A.2 E¤ects of a marginal increase in investment
I want to nd how a marginal increase in investment changes the agents probability of disclo-
sure, the disclosure stock price, and rst period cash bonus.
105
CHAPTER 2 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
I use the expected disclosure stock price from (2.189). I nd the e¤ect on the agents
expected future disclosure stock price, from a marginal increase in investment:
@E0(P
1)
@b
=
1
2
m0(b) > 0 (2.202)
If the agent increases investment, he increases the disclosure stock price.
To nd the e¤ect on the probability of disclosure, I di¤erentiate (2.56):
@(1 (fCO))
@b
=
m0(b)
2
> 0 (2.203)
If the agent increases investment, he increases the probability of disclosure.
I nd the change in the variance of the agents compensation:
@V ar0(P )
@b
= m0(b)
8>>>><>>>>:
1
4
1
2

(13 +(f
CO))  (1 (fCO))  hm(b) m(b^) + 2  2i2
+12(1 (fCO))(13 +(fCO)) 
h
m(b) m(b^) + 2  2
i
9>>>>=>>>>;
= m0(b)
8>>>><>>>>:
1
4
 
(fCO)  13
  h(m(b) m(b^) + 2  2i2
+12(1 (fCO))(13 +(fCO)) 
h
m(b) m(b^) + 2  2
i
9>>>>=>>>>; (2.204)
If the agent increases investment, he changes the variance of his compensation.
The direct e¤ect on the cash ow bonus is given by:
@c1
@b
=  b < 0 (2.205)
If the agent increases investment, his cash-based compensation decreases.
2.A.3 The agents rst order condition for investment
To nd the marginal e¤ect on the agents certainty equivalent of increasing investment I need
to nd @E0(P )@b and
@V ar0(P )
@b : Noting that
@
@b =  m
0(b)
2 ; the marginal e¤ect of an increase in
investment is:
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@E0(P )
@b
=  @(f
CO)
@b


1
2
(m(b) +m(b^))

+(1 (fCO))  1
2
m0(b) +
@(fCO)
@b

h
m(b^) +   
i
=

1
2
 1
2
h
(m(b) m(b^) + 2  2
i
+ (1 (fCO))  1
2

m0(b)
=
 
m(b) m(b^)  2+ 2
2
!
m0(b) (2.206)
This is the sum of the following e¤ects: an increase in the probability of disclosure, an
increase in the disclosure stock price, and a decrease in the probability of the non-disclosure
stock price being realized.
The total derivative of the certainty equivalent is:
@CE0
@b
=   + uZ(b)m0(b) (2.207)
where Z(b) is dened as
Z(b) 
 
m(b) m(b^)  2+ 2
2
!
(2.208)
 1
2
u
8>>>><>>>>:
1
4
 
(fCO)  13
  hm(b) m(b^) + 2  2i2
+12(1 (fCO))(13 +(fCO)) 
h
m(b) m(b^) + 2  2
i
9>>>>=>>>>;
I can now use the fact that in equilibrium, b^ = b and
(fCO) =


(2.209)
107
CHAPTER 2 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Z(b) then reduces to
Z(b) = 1 (fCO)  u 1 (fCO)2(fCO) (2.210)
where (fCO) is the equilibrium value in (2.209).
2.A.4 The function uZ
The function uZ has a maximum at:
@(uZ)
@u
= 0
@
@u
h
u

1   u [1 ]2
i
= 0
1   2u [1 ]2 = 0
u =
1 
2 [1 ]2
umax  1
2 (1 )
The second derivative is:
@
@u

1   2u [1 ]2

=  2 [1 ]2 < 0
This shows that uZ is concave.
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I use the value of umax in uZ and nd
umax  Z(umax)
=
1
2 (1 ) 

1   1
2 (1 )   [1 ]
2)

=
1
2 (1 ) 

1   1
2
 [1 ]

=
1
2 (1 ) 
1
2
(1 )
=
1
4
2.A.5 The agents second-order condition
In order for the rst-order approach to be valid, the agents second-order derivative for invest-
ment has to be negative.
The rst-order derivative was
@CE0
@b
=   +m0(b)uZ(b) (2.211)
where Z(b) was dened as
Z(b) 
 
m(b) m(b^)  2+ 2
2
!
(2.212)
 1
2
u
8>>>><>>>>:
1
4
 
(fCO)  13
  hm(b) m(b^) + 2  2i2
+12(1 (fCO))(13 +(fCO)) 
h
m(b) m(b^) + 2  2
i
9>>>>=>>>>;
The second-order derivative is:
@2CE0
@2b
= u

Z 0(b)m0(b) + Z(b)m00(b)

(2.213)
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where
Z 0(b) =
m0(b)
2
  1
2
um0(b)
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
  1
82
h
m(b) m(b^) + 2  2
i2
+ 1
 
(fCO)  13
 h
m(b) m(b^) + 2  2
i
+12(1 (fCO))(13 +(fCO))
9>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>;
(2.214)
In equilibrium, when b^ = b, Z 0(b) reduces to :
Z 0(b) =
m0(b)
2
  1
2
um0(b)(  1)(1  3) (2.215)
The second derivative can be written as:
@2CE0
@2b
= u
8<:

m0(b)
2   12um0(b)(  1)(1  3)

m0(b)
+

1 (fCO)  u 1 (fCO)2(fCO)m00(b)
9=; (2.216)
This has to be negative in the relevante range b 2 b; b.
2.A.6 Investment with full disclosure and voluntary disclosure
Full disclosure:
  + um0(b) = 0 (2.217)
Rearranging:
m0(b) =

u
(2.218)
Voluntary disclosure:
  + uZ(b)m0(b) = 0 (2.219)
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m0(b) =

uZ(b)
(2.220)
Since Z(b) < 1:
m0(bF ) =

u
<

uZ(bV )
= m0(bV ) (2.221)
Since m0(b) is concave, and m0(bF ) < m0(bV ), it must be the case that
bV < bF (2.222)
2.A.7 The principals rst-order condition
Di¤erentiating the principals expected wealth with respect to b gives.
@W
@b
=  1 +m0(b) (2.223)
 
8>><>>:
1
2(1 )3(13 +)2  2
"
1 
q
1  4
m0(b)
2(1 )
#
  12(1 ) 12

1  4m0(b)
  1
2
( 4)  1
[m0(b)]2
m00(b)
9>>=>>;
= 0
Rearranging this implies
@W
@b
=  1 +m0(b) +
8>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>:
  (1 )3(1
3
+ )2| {z }
<
2
3

241 
q
1  4m0(b)
2(1 )
35
| {z }
>0
 1
(1 )| {z } 
>0

1  4
m0(b)
  1
2
| {z }
>1
 
[m0(b)]2
m00(b)| {z }
<0
9>>>>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>>>>;
(2.224)
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2.A.8 Extensions: How does stock bonus depend on the disclosure cost?
The value of max is dened as
max  1
4u m0(b)
(2.225)
I di¤erentiate this with respect to b :
@max
@b
=
1
4u
@m0(b)
@b
=
1
4u
m00(b) < 0 (2.226)
The higher the investment level, the lower is the value of max.
To nd @b@ I use implicit di¤erentiation on (2:160), given by:
uV =
2
(1 ) 

m0(b)

 
1 +

1  4
m0(b)
 1
2
! 1
(2.227)
Implicit di¤erentiation with respect to  gives:
2
(1 )
0BBB@
  1
(m0(b))2
m00(b) @b@ 

1 +

1  4m0(b)
 1
2
 1
+ 1m0(b)( 1)

1 +

1  4m0(b)
 1
2
 2
1
2

1  4m0(b)
  1
2
( 4) m0(b) m00(b)
@b
@
(m0(b))2
1CCCA(2.228)
= 0
I rearrange
 m00(b) @b
@

 
1 +

1  4
m0(b)
 1
2
! 1
(2.229)
+
1
m0(b)
( 1)
 
1 +

1  4
m0(b)
 1
2
! 2
 1
2

1  4
m0(b)
  1
2
( 4)m0(b)   m00(b) @b
@
= 0
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Rearranging again gives
@b
@
0@ m00(b)  1 + 1  4
m0(b)
 1
2
! 1
   m00(b)
1A (2.230)
+
 
1 +

1  4
m0(b)
 1
2
! 2
1  4
m0(b)
  1
2
2
= 0
I solve for @b@ :
@b
@
=  
 
1 +

1  4
m0(b)
 1
2
! 2
(2.231)


1  4
m0(b)
  1
2
2
0@ m00(b)  1 + 1  4
m0(b)
 1
2
! 1
   m00(b)
1A 1
< 0
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Chapter 3
Voluntary disclosure and investment
incentives when risk increases with
investment
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter I study how a managers voluntary disclosure decision changes his investment
incentives in the case where the investments risk increases with the size of the investment.
As in Chapter 2, the manager has stock-based compensation, and he can decide whether to
disclose his private information or not. I nd that in some cases a lower stock bonus is needed
with voluntary disclosure than with full disclosure. In a numerical analysis, I show that the
principal may be better o¤ with voluntary disclosure than with full disclosure. The reason is
that in some cases it is cheaper to induce investment with voluntary disclosure than with full
disclosure.
The basic setting of the model is the same as in Chapter 2; a manager is hired for one period
and chooses short-term e¤ort and long-term investment. He receives a signal that perfectly
reveals the future cash ows from investment, and he then decides whether or not to disclose
this signal. What is new in this chapter, is the form of the investment risk. In this chapter,
I assume that risk increases with investment. This means that when the amount invested
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increases, the cash ow that the investment creates, has higher variance. So when there is more
at risk, the total risk increases.
I then look at how the managers choice of disclosure inuences his investment incentives
ex ante. It turns out that the form of investment risk I have here, will inuence the managers
investment incentives in a di¤erent way than the constant investment risk in Chapter 2. The
fact that the managers investment decision not only inuences the mean of the investment
payo¤ but also the variance, can in some cases make it easier (cheaper) for the principal to
induce a given investment level. This is due to what I call the option e¤ect (what Ross (2004)
calls the convexity e¤ect in his option setting).
To understand this, recall from Chapter 2 that when the manager receives compensation that
is linear in stock price and when he at the same time can voluntarily disclose his information,
his nal compensation will be piecewise linear and convex, like a call option. The disclosure
equilibrium will show that his compensation will be at for low stock prices (no disclosure) and
increasing in stock price for higher stock prices (the disclosure region)1. This convexity causes
the manager in some cases (when he is not too risk averse) to prefer a higher investment level
because this increases investment risk. With this convex compensation, he will be rewarded
for good outcomes but protected from bad outcomes. Since risk increases with investment, the
manager may in some cases have a preference for higher investment, and it will therefore be
cheaper for the principal to induce the manager to invest.
This is di¤erent from the model in Chapter 2, because there the manager could not inuence
investment risk. A factor that remains the same, is that the at part of the compensation (the
no disclosure region) will reduce the managers investment incentives compared to the full
disclosure case, where there is no at part.
I analyze the required stock bonus needed to achieve a given investment level in two steps:
I rst compare the stock bonus with increasing investment risk (from this chapter) to the stock
bonus with constant investment risk (the setting in Chapter 2). I then compare the stock
bonus with increasing investment risk for voluntary disclosure and full disclosure. I show that
the required stock bonus may be lower when the risk is increasing in investment compared
1This is similar to the disclosure quilibrium in Chapter 2 and also to the disclosure equilibrium in Verreccia
(1983).
118
CHAPTER 3 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
to the constant-risk case. I also show that when risk increases with investment, the required
stock bonus may be lower with voluntary disclosure than with full disclosure. I also show that
the principal can be better o¤ with voluntary disclosure than with full disclosure. I show this
with a numerical example, since the analytical model becomes intractable at this point. The
principal can be better o¤ with voluntary disclosure because this saves on the disclosure cost
(as in Chapter 2) and because the option e¤ect described earlier can make it cheaper to induce
a given investment level with voluntary disclosure compared to full disclosure. This last e¤ect
was not present in the model in Chapter 2, since the manager could not inuence investment
risk there, and consequently there was no option e¤ect. An implication of this is that it may be
e¢ cient to leave the disclosure decision to the agent and not to make full disclosure mandatory.
This chapter contributes to the literature on managerial incentives and the literature on
voluntary disclosure. In the model the manager is compensated based on cash ows and stock
price. Research shows that stock-based incentives are widely used in practice2. I analyze
how the managers control of information can inuence the strength of stock-based incentives.
With voluntary disclosure the manager can hide information, and I show two e¤ects of this;
the no-disclosure choice attens the compensation and reduces incentives, while the resulting
convexity of the compensation can increase the power of stock-based incentives because of the
option e¤ect.
There also exists a lot of research on voluntary disclosure (see for instance Verrecchia (2001)
and Dye (2001) for overviews), but little has been done to analyze voluntary disclosure in an
agency context. Beyer, Cohen, Lys and Walther (2010) point out the need for resarch that takes
incentive issues and real decisions (such as e¤ort and investment) into a voluntary disclosure
setting. This is what I analyse, as I look at the interaction between voluntary disclosure and
e¤ort and investment incentives.
Because of the convexity of the compensation when there is voluntary disclosure, and be-
cause I in this Chapter introduce the assumption that the manager inuences investment risk,
the chapter is also related to the options literature. Some papers argue that options are an
optimal form of compensation when the manager inuences risk3 (Feltham and Wu (2001),
2See Hall and Liebman (1998) and Bünn, Rapp, Schwanecke and Wol¤ (2010) for analyes on US and European
data, respectively.
3Others argue that options are optimal for other reasons, including Oyer (2004) where options are used to
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Flor, Frimor, and Munk (2011) and Dittmann and Yu (2010). One of the main arguments is
that options will make managers more willing to take on risk4. This is familiar from Jensen
and Meckling (1976) who see stock owners as options holders with a strike price of zero and
discuss how owners (as opposed to bond holders) will prefer more risk, even when this comes
at the expense of expected output. The argument for this is found in any nance textbook and
is the same as in my model; the convexity of the options makes the option owner prefer more
volatility in the underlying asset. Empirical studies generally agree with the idea that option
compensation will increase managerial risk-taking (Rajgopal and Shevlin (2002), Coles, David
and Naveen (2006), Low (2009), and Armstrong and Vashishtra (2011).
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents the model. In Section 3.3 I discuss
the agents decision problems; rst the disclosure decision and then the e¤ort and investment
decisions. In Section 3.4 I present the explicit expressions for the required stock bonus to
achieve a given investment level, rst for voluntary disclsoure and then for full disclosure, and
I then compare the two. The principals problem of choosing optimal e¤ort and investment
level is presented in Section 3.5. Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Model
3.2.1 Timing and cash ows
In this section I present the model. The essentials of the model are the same as in Chapter 2,
the only di¤erence is that investment risk now increases with investment. Many of the basic
elements of the model follow from Dutta and Reichelstein (2005), which I also use in Chapter
2. The timing in the model follows the timing in Chapter 2:
retain employees, Dittmann, Armstrong, Larcker and Su (2007) who assume power utility and limited liability,
Kadan and Swinkels (2008) where there is bankruptcy risk, Edmans and Gobaix (2009) with dynamic contracting,
and Dittmann, Maug and Spalt (2010) where the manager has a loss averse utility function,.
4Counterarguments for this can be found in Carpenter (2000), Ross (2004) and Levellen (2006).
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Time 0 Time 2Time 1
Contract signed
Agent chooses:
-effort
-investment level
Agent observessignal
Cash flow from investmentCash flow from effort
Disclosure decision
Market sets stock price
Agent is compensated based on cash
flow and stock price
Figure 3.1. Timeline.
I will discuss only the main aspects of the model here, since much is familiar from Chapter
2.
The agent rst makes e¤ort and investment decisions, at time 0. At time 1, the cash ow
from e¤ort is realized. The agent also privately observes a signal about the (long-term) cash
ow from investment. He can choose whether to disclose this signal to the principal and to
the stock market. The stock market incorporates all available information into the stock price.
The manager is then compensated based on two performance measures; the rst period cash
ow and the stock price. Finally, at time 2, the cash ow from investment is realized and paid
to owners.
First period cash ow is:
c1 = a+ "  b (3.1)
where a is e¤ort, b is investment, and " is uncertainty regarding cash ows from e¤ort. The
uncertainty parameter " is normally distributed with mean zero variance 2
"  N(0; 2) (3.2)
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Both e¤ort and investment (and uncertainty) are unobservable to outsiders (the principal and
the stock market). As in Chapter 2, I assume that this aggregate of investment cost and cash
ow from e¤ort is available for contracting, and not its separate components.
Cash ow in period 2 is
c2 = m(b) +   d   (3.3)
where m(b) is the investment production function, assumed to be increasing and concave
and with the following properties: m0(b) > 1 when b !b and m0(b) ! 0 when b ! b; where
b 2 b; b. The term d 2 f0; 1g reects the managers disclosure decision, where d = 1 describes
disclosure and d = 0 non-disclosure. I assume that the company incurs a cost in the case of
disclosure, and this cost is :
3.2.2 Investment risk
Investment risk is reected in the term . In the previous chapter investment risk was constant.
I now assume that the investment risk depends on the level of investment. Specically, I assume
that higher investment implies higher risk. When more capital is invested, it may be natural
to assume there is both more to lose and more to gain5.
The distribution of  is still uniform, but the support is now a positive function of the
investment level:
  U( (b); (b)) (3.4)
I assume that the relationship between investment and risk takes the following form:
(b) = + b (3.5)
with 0(b) =   0. With  = 0, we are back to the basic model, and with  > 0, an increase
in investment b by b increases the upper and lower boundaries of the distribution by  b.
5 In this and other papers of managerial incentives (e.g. , Feltham and Wu (2001), Lambert and Larcker (last
section) (2004), Flor, Frimor and Munk (2011), and Dittman and Yu (2009)) the manager makes a decision
that simultaneously a¤ects the mean and variance of outcome. Alternatively, the risk decision could be taken
completely separately, as in Hirshleifer and Suh (1992).
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The expected value of  is zero for a given b, as before, and the variance 2 is now equal to
var()  2 =
1
12
(2(b))2 =
1
3
(b)2 =
1
3
(+ b)2 (3.6)
An increase in investment increases the variance by
@var()
@b
=
2
3
(+ b) (3.7)
> 0
The principal and the stock market do not observe  or b, so they do not know the value of
the variance. They use their conjectured value of b; b^; to form beliefs about the variance. They
believe that  is equal to (b^); and their beliefs about the probability distribution are:
(b^)  U( (b^); (b^)) (3.8)
3.2.3 The forward-looking signal and the agents preferences
The signal f that the manager observes at time 1 is a perfect signal about future cash ows
from investment:
f = m(b) +  (3.9)
This has the following distribution:
f  [m(b)  (b);m(b) + (b)] (3.10)
where E(f) = m(b) and V ar(f) = V ar() = 13(+ b)
2. The manager now inuences both the
mean and the variance of the distribution when choosing investment level. The markets belief
about the distribtion of f is
f^ 
h
m(b^)  (b^);m(b^) + (b^)
i
(3.11)
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The managers compensation is assumed to be linear in rst-period cash ow and the stock
price P :
s = + c1 + u^P (3.12)
= + (a+ "  b) + u^P
where  is the xed part of compensation,  is the cash ow bonus, and u^ is the stock price
bonus. Note that in this case when  > 0; I denote the stock bonus u^, and when  = 0 I keep
the notation u. The principal is risk neutral, while the agent has mean-variance preferences.
His certainty equivalent at time 0 is:
CE0 = E(s)  e(a)  1
2
  var(s) (3.13)
Risk aversion is reected in the term . The agents personal cost of e¤ort is e(a), where e()
is monotonically increasing, twice di¤erentiable, and strictly convex, and e(0) = 0.
3.3 The agents decision problems
The agent makes an e¤ort and an investment decision at time 0 and a disclosure decision at time
1 . In this section I use backwards induction and start by describing the disclosure decision
and the disclosure equilibrium. I then nd the agents certainty equivalent at time 0 and solve
for his optimal e¤ort and investment decisions.
3.3.1 The disclosure decision at time 1 
The disclosure equilibrium is similar to the case analyzed in Chapter 26, with some adjustments.
The disclosure decision is una¤ected by actual risk, but is a¤ected by the markets beliefs about
the risk. The markets beliefs about risk will inuence the no-disclosure stock price, since the
market uses its probability distribution with (b^) to form their expectations about rm value.
6The equilibrium is also similar to Verrecchia (1983) in several respects.
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For the agent, risk is resolved at the time of the disclosure decision, so the time 0 variance in
investment returns do not inuence his disclosure decision.
Figure 3.2. The disclosure equilibrium.
More specically, the no-disclosure stock price7 P 0 is the mean of the cumulative distribution
of f^ below the (conjectured) treshold f^CO:
P 0 = E1 
h
f^ j f^ < f^CO
i
(3.14)
=
1
2

m(b^)  (b^) + f^CO

The disclosure stock price is P 1 = f  as before. The agent discloses the signal if P 1 > P 0:
P 1 > P 0 (3.15)
f    > 1
2

m(b^)  (b^) + f^CO

7Cash ows may become negative. To assure a positive stock price, I assume that there exist assets in place
(not modelled here) so that the value of the company is always positive.
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The equilibrium occurs when f^CO = fCO, where the markets conjectured cuto¤ is equal
to the agents chosen cut-o¤:
fCO    = 1
2

m(b^)  (b^) + fCO

fCO = m(b^)  (b^) + 2 (3.16)
The disclosure equilibrium is illustrated in Figure 3.2.
3.3.2 The e¤ort and investment decisions at time 0
The probability of disclosure
At time 0, the agents probability of disclosure (1 ) is given by the cumulative distribution
above the cut-o¤ fCO:
(1 (fCO)) =
Z m(b)+(b)
fCO
1
2(b)
df
=
m(b) + (b) 

m(b^)  (b^) + 2

2(b)
=
m(b) m(b^) + (b) + (b^)  2
2(b)
=
m(b) m(b^) + (+ b) +

+  b^

  2
2 (+ b)
(3.17)
This is the agents probability at time 0 of disclosing the signal at time 1 . This probability
is a¤ected both by the actual risk and the conjectured risk, measured by (b) and (b^).
The agents certainty equivalent is:
CE0 = + c1   e(a) + u^Eo(P )  1
2
(22 + u^2  V aro(P )) (3.18)
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The agents certainty equivalent
I use the explicit expressions for expected stock price and variance and rewrite (calculations
are in Appendix 3.A.1):
CE0 = + (a  b)  e(a)  1
2
22 (3.19)
+ u^

(1 (fCO))  1
2

m(b) +m(b^) + (b)  (b^)

+(fCO) 

m(b^) +   (b^)

  1
2
u^2  1
4
(1 (fCO))(1
3
+ (fCO))  (m(b) m(b^) + (b^) + (b)  2)2
The agents rst order condition
I nd the agents FOCs, then set b^ = b in equilibrium, and I have the rst order conditions for
e¤ort and investment (calculations in Appendix 3.A.2) :
 = e0(a) (3.20)
  + u^ m0(b)Z(b) + u^  Y (b) = 0 (3.21)
where
(b) =

(b)
(3.22)
Z(b) = (1 (b))  u^ [1 (b)]2(b)(b) (3.23)
Y (b) = (1 (b))| {z }
option e¤ect
  u^(1 (b))2

2   1
3
 +
1
3

(b)| {z }
variance e¤ect
(3.24)
With  = 0; the FOC is the same as in the previous section. The factor Z here is the same
as before, with the di¤erence that the variance factor  now depends on b; (b): Since the e¤ect
of Z is the same as in Chapter 2, I will not discuss it further here. The new term is Y (b): This
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factor describes the e¤ects on the managers CE of the marginal increase in investment risk
that comes from increasing investment. I will analyze Y in more detail.
E¤ects of an increase in investment for the agent
I note that an increase in investment now has two e¤ects on the probability distribution of f ,
and on the probability of disclosure. Figure 3.3 illustrates this. Panel A shows the distribution
of f for a given investment level b1. The probability of disclosure is the cumulative distribution
above fCO and is the area called (1   ). Panel B shows the same distribution with b equal
to b2 , where b2 > b1. With a higher investment, the distribution is shifted upwards (to the
right), and it also widens since  > 0. The lower bound for disclosure is still fCO , since this is
independent of b (fCO is xed, since it depends on b^ not b) . The distribution becomes atter.
This reduces the probability for any outcome within the support. So even though there is now
a positive probability of ending up with very high outcomes, the good, but more mediocre
outcomes have lower probabilities. Panel C compares the two distributions. The probability of
disclosure can in some cases decrease when investment increases8.
Option e¤ect The rst term in Y (b) is the e¤ect of increased variance from  on the expected
value of the stock price and agents compensation, and it is positive. When the agent increases
investment, the payo¤ distribution widens, as noted. Figure 3.4 shows the e¤ect of an increase
in b on the distribution (as seen from time 0) of the disclosure stock price P 1 (the stock
price conditional on disclosure). The disclosure stock price P 1 has the uniform distribution
P 1  fCO   ;m(b) + (b)  . When investment increases, the expected disclosure stock
price (a conditional expectation) increases because it reects the mean of a distribution. Since
the support widens only upwards (the lower bound is reected by the value
 
fCO   , which
is una¤ected by an increase in actual investment), the mean increases. Panel A shows the
distribution with investment b1 and panel B the distribution with the higher investment level
b2. In Panel B the distribution is shifted upwards (but with the same lower bound fCO) and
8The probability increases when (shown in the Appendix)
m0(b)

> 1  2
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is atter. So by increasing investment at time 0, the agent not only moves the distribution
upwards, but also widens the (upper) support.
This e¤ect is similar in nature to the change in the value of a stock option when the risk of
the underlying stock increases. As risk increases, the probability of extreme outcomes increases.
The buyer of an option is protected from the downside risk but gains all the upside benets
from the increased probability of having extremely good outcomes. Therefore increased risk
increases the value of an option9. I will later refer to this (how an increase in b increases (b)
and increases P 1) as the stock option e¤ect. The e¤ect of options on managerial e¤ort incentives
when the manager can inuence risk is discussed in Feltham and Wu (2001). As Panel C shows,
the mean of the distribution increases when b increases, which is a result of both the expected
value of the investment increasing, but also because of this option e¤ect.
Variance e¤ect The second term (the variance term) in Y (b) is the e¤ect from  on the
variance of the agents compensation. The term (1   )2  2   13+ 13 is positive. When
 > 0, an increase in investment increases investment risk, and also stock price risk. I call this
the variance e¤ect. Even though the probability of disclosure might decrease with investment
when  > 0, and this leads to less stock price variance, the increase in the investment risk
dominates. Stock price variance increases when the investment increases.
In sum, when the agent increases investment, both the expected stock price and the stock
price risk increases, and they both increase more when  > 0 than when  = 0.
9This result can be found in any standard nance textbook, see for instance Hull (1993), or simply use the
Black-Scholes formulae for an option value and di¤erentiate the value with respect to volatility (risk).
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Figure 3.3. The value of output f and the probability of disclosure (1 ) as a function of
investment b. Investment is higher in Panel B than in Panel A (b2 > b1). In Panel B the
distribution is atter and has moved to the right.
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Figure 3.4. The distribution of the disclosure stock price P 1.
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3.4 The stock bonus
In this section I study the stock bonus with voluntary disclosure and with full disclosure. I
compare the stock bonus with and without the risk e¤ect, and I compare the stock bonus with
voluntary disclosure to the full disclosure stock bonus.
3.4.1 The stock bonus with voluntary disclosure
In this section I will study more closely the e¤ect that stock bonus u^ has on investment incen-
tives. First, I nd the required stock bonus for a given investment level. I then compare the
stock bonus with and without the risk e¤ect ( > 0 vs. = 0).
From the agents rst order condition in (3.21), I nd the necessary stock bonus u^ to induce
a given investment b, see Appendix 3.A.3.
u^V =
2
(1 )

(m0(b) + )
(3.25)

0@1 + 1  4 m0(b)+   2   13+ 13(b)
(m0(b) + )2
! 1
2
1A 1
I will rst analyze this stock bonus (where  > 0) in relation to the stock bonus where
 = 0.
Comparing stock bonus with  = 0 and  > 0
Recall that the stock bonus in Chapter 2 (when  = 0) was
uV =
2
(1 ) 

m0(b)

 
1 +

1  4
m0(b)
 1
2
! 1
(3.26)
If I set  = 0 in (3.25), then the stock bonus becomes the bonus uV from earlier, as in (3.26)
when the manager can not inuence investment risk. I nd that an increase in  may either
increase or decrease the necessary bonus u^V , and this indicates that the required bonus may
be either higher or lower with  > 0 compared to  = 0. As discussed earlier, both expected
132
CHAPTER 3 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
stock price and stock price variance increases with investment when  > 0. The agent has
mean variance preferences, and these two factors move the necessary stock bonus in di¤erent
directions. Which e¤ect will dominate depends on the parameters in the model.
The simplest case is when the agent is risk neutral,  = 0. The only e¤ect from  > 0 will
be the option e¤ect. The stock bonuses are:
u^V j=0= 1
(1 ) 

(m0(b) + )
(3.27)
and
uV j=0= 1
(1 ) 

m0(b)
(3.28)
This implies that when  = 0,  > 0 and  > 0:
u^V j=0< uV j=0 (3.29)
With risk neutral agent, the necessary stock bonus to achieve a given investment, is lower
when  > 0 than when  = 0. When the agent is risk neutral, he cares only about the
expected stock price (not the variance). When  > 0, an increase in investment increases the
expected value of the disclosure stock price through an increase in the variance of the underlying
investment (the option e¤ect). This e¤ect is not present when  = 0 and is an additional benet
by increasing investment when  > 0. This option e¤ect increases expected stock price and the
agents compensation. This makes one unit of stock bonus more powerful when  > 0 than
when  = 0. A lower stock bonus is needed to implement a given investment when  > 0 than
when  = 0.
When  > 0 , the stock bonuses in (3.25) and (3.26) are more complicated to compare. In
the numerical example presented next, I show in Figure 3.5 that u^V < uV holds for small, but
positive, values of .
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3.4.2 Numerical example: presentation
I next introduce a numerical example. It is the example from Chapter 2 with some modications.
I am not able to solve this model analytically, so I will use this example to analyze results when
 > 0 in more detail in the rest of this chapter. The investment production function and cost
of e¤ort function are the same as before:
m(b) = 2b  1
2
b2 (3.30)
e(a) =
2
5
a2 (3.31)
The disclosure cost is still  = 0:25, the rst period cash ow uncertainty is still measured
at 2 = 1:44, but the parameter  which measures the managers risk aversion, is set lower, at
 = 0:2. The investment risk is
(b) = 1 + 1:75  b (3.32)
which means that  = 1 and  = 1:75 (see (3.5)).
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8
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0.5
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0.7
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1.0
1.1
rho
u,h-hat
Figure 3.5. Voluntary disclosure. The relationship between  and the required stock bonus to
achieve an investment of b = 0:75703. The black line is with  = 0, and the red line is with
 = 1:75.
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Using these numerical values and xing investment at b = 0:75703, I nd that the maximum
value that  can have when the principal wants to induce b is (I nd this by requiring that the
term in the "square root" in (3.25) has to be positive):
max =
(m0(b) + )2
4
 
m0(b)+ 
 
2   13+ 13

(b)
 (3.33)
When  = 1:75, this is
max = 0:482 (3.34)
When  = 0, I nd that max = 1:84: The two graphs in Figure 3.5 go towards these two values
asymptotically.
Generally with  > 0, in addition to the option e¤ect, more risk is imposed on the agent,
and this will make him more reluctant to invest. This increases the necessary stock bonus. The
stock bonus with  > 0 will reect the sum of these two e¤ects, and the bonus may be either
higher or lower with  > 0 compared to  = 0.
3.4.3 The stock bonus with full disclosure
I rst nd the stock bonus with full disclosure with  > 0, and I compare the full disclosure
stock bonus with risk e¤ect and without risk e¤ect;  > 0 and  = 0.
I denote by u^F the full disclosure stock bonus when  > 0 and keep the notation uF for
the case when  = 0. The stock bonus with full disclosure is (see Appendix 3.A.5):
u^F = 2  
m0(b)

 
1 +

1  4
3
(b)
(m0(b))2
 1
2
! 1
(3.35)
Comparing the full disclosure stock bonus with  = 0 and  > 0
When  = 0, the full disclosure stock bonus is
uF =

m0(b)
(3.36)
135
CHAPTER 3 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
From comparing (3.35) and (3.36), I nd that
u^F  uF (3.37)
With full disclosure, there is no kink in the compensation as with voluntary disclosure,
and therefore no option e¤ect. But with  > 0, there is the increase in risk from increasing
investment (variance e¤ect), and this makes the risk-averse manager more reluctant to invest.
So when  > 0, the manager will require a higher stock bonus to invest a given amount than
when  = 0.
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6
0.0
0.2
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0.6
0.8
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u-hat
Figure 3.6. Full disclosure: The relationship between  and the required stock bonus to
achieve an investment of b = 0:75703: The black line is with  = 0, and the red line is with
 = 1:75:
I also nd that the required stock bonus is monotonically increasing in  and in : The
relationship between u^F and  is illustrated in Figure 3.6. When  = 0; the required stock
bonus is independent of , but with  > 0, a higher  implies a higher necessary stock bonus.
Figure 3.7 illustrates the relationship between stock bonus and the induced investment level
with full disclosure. In contrast to the earlier case when  was zero, the graph for full disclosure
is now downward-sloping above some point. There is a maximum level of investment that it is
possible to induce: bF max = 1: 052 3, where u^F = 1:39:
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Figure 3.7. The relationship between stock bonus uF and investment b with full disclosure.
 = 0:2: The black line is with  = 0, and the red line is with  = 1:75.
3.4.4 Comparing stock bonus with full disclosure and voluntary disclosure
when  > 0
In this section I use the analysis above and compare the voluntary disclosure stock bonus with
the full disclosure stock bonus.
I start with the simplest case where  = 0. I use (3.27) and (3.35) and nd the stock
bonuses with full disclosure and voluntary disclosure when  = 0,:
u^F j=0= 
m0(b)
(3.38)
u^V j=0= 
(m0(b) + )
1
(1 ) (3.39)
I compare the two bonuses for  = 0 , and nd that:
u^V j=0< u^F j=0 (3.40)
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when
  (1 ) > m0(b) (3.41)
Recall that when  = 0, I found that uV > uF always holds; the required stock bonus is always
higher with voluntary disclosure than with full disclosure (also with  = 0): When  > 0,
however, the required stock bonus may in some cases be lower with voluntary disclosure than
with full disclosure. When  = 0; stock incentives are stronger with voluntary disclosure than
with full disclosure (u^V < u^F ) when the option e¤ect from  > 0 is stronger than the negative
e¤ect from the signal not always being disclosed,  > 0. When  is high, or the probability of
disclosure is high, the condition in (3.41) is easier to satisfy, consistent with this explanation.
When  > 0, the stock bonus may be either higher or lower with voluntary disclosure than
with full disclosure, depending on the parameter values.
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Figure 3.8. The relationship betwen stock bonus u^ and investment b. The black line is full
disclosure and the red line is voluntary disclosure. The parameters are set at  = 1:75,
 = 1;  = 0:2:
Figure 3.8 shows the relationship between stock bonus u^ and investment level b, for full
disclosure (black graph) and voluntary disclosure (red graph). For levels of investment higher
than b > 0:459, a lower stock bonus is required with voluntary disclosure than with full disclo-
sure. Stock bonus with voluntary disclosure is more powerful in inducing investment than with
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full disclosure.
In the example, the maximum value that it is possible for the principal to induce with
voluntary disclosure, is given by bV max :
bV max = 1: 14 (3.42)
This level of investment is induced with u^V = 1:44, which is the maximum of the red graph
in Figure 3.8. Recall that bF max from page 136 is bF max = 1: 052 3. In this example it is
possible to achieve a higher investment with voluntary disclosure than with full disclosure:
bV max > bF max. The maximum investment is the level where the agents marginal increase in
expected income cannot dominate the marginal increase in the agents risk premium.
With constant investment risk ( = 0), the agent did not inuence his risk premium through
investment in the full disclosure case. Now, however, an increase in investment increases in-
vestment risk, because  > 0 (see (3.5)), and @V arP
F
@b > 0 when  > 0 (see Appendix 3.A.5).
An increase in investment also increases future investment payo¤ (m0(b) > 0). But above some
level, the increase in risk premium dominates the increase in expected income for the agent.
Using the same numerical values as in Figure 3.8, I show in Figure 3.9 how the necessary
stock bonus to achieve a given investment (set at b = 0:757) varies with  , for both voluntary
and full disclosure. For values of  higher than  = 1:3799 the necessary stock bonus is lower
with voluntary disclosure than with full disclosure.
To sum up, in this section I study how the agents incentives work when risk increases with
investment,  > 0. I nd that a marginal increase in investment increases both the expected
stock price (the option e¤ect) and the stock price risk (the variance e¤ect) , and they both
increase more when  > 0 than when  = 0. I nd that the stock bonus may be more e¤ective
with voluntary disclosure compared to full disclosure, which is in contrast to the result when
 = 0.
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Figure 3.9. The relationship between  and the required stock bonus to induce an investment
of b = 0:757033. The black line is full disclosure and the red line is voluntary disclosure.
3.5 The principals problem
In this section I show how the principals maximization problem looks with voluntary and full
disclosure. I start with the analytical model, but because of the complexity of the problem, I
am not able to nd the principals optimal solution analytically. I will instead do a numerical
analysis to illustrate some results. Numerically I compare the optimal solution for voluntary
disclosure with the one for full disclosure.
3.5.1 The analytical setup
Voluntary disclosure
The principals problem is to maximize his payo¤ from investment and e¤ort, net of the expected
disclosure cost and the managers compensation, subject to the managers participation and
incentive constraints. This can be reduced to an unconstrained optimization problem where
the principal maximizes net cash ows from investment and e¤ort, minus of the agents cost of
e¤ort, the companys disclosure cost, and the managers risk premium.
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The principal chooses a and b to maximize W V :
W V  a  b+m(b)  e(a)  E()  1
2
22  RP (u^V ) (3.43)
= a  b+m(b)  e(a)  (1 (b))
  1
2


22 + u^V 2(1 (b))3(1
3
+ (b))(b)2

where RP (u^V ) = 12
 
u^V
2
V arP V ; and u^V is given by (3.25), and V arP V is calculated in
Appendix 3.A.1 and 3.A.6.
Ideally, I would nd the solution by di¤erentiating W V with respect to a and b and setting
equal to zero. Generally, the rst order condition for investment is:
@W V
@b
=  1 +m0(b)  @(1 (b))
@b
  @RP (u^
V )
@b
= 0 (3.44)
How will a marginal increase in investment b inuence the principals payo¤? First, there
is the e¤ect on cash ows, which gives a net increase of ( 1 +m0(b)). But in contrast to the
case with constant risk, a higher investment level now increases the probability of disclosure:
@(1 (b))
@b
=  @(b)
@b
=  
@ (b)
@b
=
  
(b)2
> 0 (3.45)
where (b) is taken from the equilibrium value in (3.22): (b) = (b) . Higher investment
means higher investment risk, and higher investment risk (relative to the disclosure cost) means
a higher probability of disclosure. Because the probability of disclosure increases with invest-
ment, the principals expected disclosure cost, (1 (b)), also increases with investment:
@(1 (b))
@b
=  @(b)
@b
=  
@ (b)
@b
=
2
(b)2
> 0 (3.46)
If the principal wants to induce the manager to invest more, this has the cost of increasing
the expected disclosure cost. This reduces the optimal investment level.
The term @RP (u^
V )
@b would be calculated as:
@RP V (u^V )
@b
=
1
2


2  u^V  @u^
V
@b
 V arP V +  u^V 2  @V arP V
@b

(3.47)
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In general, it is too complicated to nd @RP (u^
V )
@b . When  > 0 ; the calculations for
@u^V
@b and
@V arPV
@b get more complicated than when  = 0. I therefore study the principals problem in a
numerical analysis later.
Full disclosure
With full disclosure, the principal maximizes WF , given by:
WF = a  b+m(b)  e(a)    1
2
22  RP (u^F )
= a  b+m(b)  e(a)    1
2

0@22 +
0@2  
m0(b)

 
1 +

1  4
3
(b)
(m0(b))2
 1
2
! 11A2  1
3
(+ b)2
1A
(3.48)
I have used u^F from (3.35) and V arPF = V ar() from (3.6).
Generally, the rst order condition for investment is:
@WF
@b
=  1 +m0(b)  @RP
F (u^F )
@b
= 0 (3.49)
which gives
 1 +m0(b)  1
2


2  u^F  @u^
F
@b
 V arPF +  u^F 2  @V arPF
@b

= 0 (3.50)
I will study the principals problem further, for both voluntary and full disclosure, in the
numerical example.
3.5.2 Numerical analysis
I use the example in the numerical analysis to study the optimal solution. I use Solver in Excel
to nd the optimal parameters. I will rst characterize the rst best solution and the two
possible corner solutions.
The rst best level of investment and e¤ort are the levels that maximize
a  b+m(b)  e(a) (3.51)
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When I substitue for the functions, I get
a  b+

2b  1
2
b2

  2
5
a2 (3.52)
The rst best solution is characterized by:
aFB = 1:25 (3.53)
bFB = 1 (3.54)
WFB = 1:125 (3.55)
There are two possible corner solutions (see Case 1 and 2 in Chapter 2). One possible corner
solution (Case 1) is to set b = 0; a > 0; u^V = 0;  > 0, where the e¤ort level is the one that
maximizes:
a  2
5
a2   1
2
22 (3.56)
s.t.
 = e0(a) (3.57)
The unconstrained problem in the example is to maximize:
a  2
5
a2   1
2
 0:2 

4
5
a

1:44 (3.58)
The solution is to set a = 1:02 and  = 0:81: This gives an expected payo¤ of W = 0:508.
The other corner solution (Case 2) is characterized by b = bFB; u^V = 0; a = 0;  = 0: The
principals expected payo¤ is:
W =  bFB +

2bFB   1
2
 
bFB
2
= 0:5 (3.59)
This is lower than the rst corner solution and the principal will therefore prefer the rst
of the two corner solutions, Case 1. However, an interior solution gives even higher expected
payo¤s.
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Results
Table 3.1 presents the optimal solution to the principals problem for both voluntary and full
disclosure. The xed component of compensation is  =  0:25029 with voluntary disclosure
and the optimal contract looks like this
s =  0:25029 + 0:67729  c1 + 0:60088  P (3.60)
With this contract, the agents certainty equivalent as a function of investment b is shown
in Figure 3.10. It is concave and reaches its maximum value of zero at b = 0:75703.
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Figure 3.10. The agents certainty equivalent CE as a function of investment level b.
I will now compare the optimal solution with full disclosure and voluntary disclosure in
Table 3.1. With voluntary disclosure the probability of disclosure is 89%. In this example, both
the optimal e¤ort level and investment level are higher with voluntary disclosure than with full
disclosure. A higher e¤ort level with voluntary disclosure requires a higher stock bonus, but a
higher investment level requires a lower stock bonus with voluntary disclosure (u^V = 0:60088
compared to u^F = 0:60653). Going back to Figure 3.8, it is clear that with an investment level
of b = 0:75703, the necessary stock bonus is lower with voluntary disclosure than full disclosure.
Table 3.1 shows that even when bF is lower than bV , a lower stock bonus is needed to induce a
higher investment level in the voluntary disclosure case than with full disclosure.
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Table 3.1. Voluntary (V) and Full (F) disclosure. Optimal solution and optimal parameters.
The principals expected wealth is higher with voluntary disclosure than with full disclosure,
and the stock price variance is lower with voluntary disclosure. I decompose the elements in
the principals expected wealth in Table 3.2.
Table 3.2. The principals expected wealth, and the components of expected wealth with
voluntary (V) and full (F) disclosure.
Since e¤ort and investment are higher with voluntary disclosure than full disclosure, the
cash ows from these are also higher. The expected disclosure cost is of course lower with
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voluntary disclosure.
The risk premium is lower with voluntary disclosure than with full disclosure. In Table 3.3 I
decompose the risk premium into two parts, risk premium from cash ow bonus (which induces
e¤ort), RP (); and from stock bonus (which induces investment), RP (u^). Since optimal e¤ort
is higher with voluntary disclosure, the resulting RP () is also higher. However, since a lower
stock bonus is needed to induce investment, the risk premium from stock bonus is lower. This
means that it is cheaper for the principal to induce investment with voluntary disclosure than
full disclosure. So even if I disregard the savings in the disclosure cost, the principal is better
o¤ with voluntary disclosure than with full disclosure.
Comparing results for di¤erent levels of 
The term  is a measure of investment risk. When  increases, the boundaries of the uniform
distribution widens, and variance increases. I show the results for di¤erent values of  in Table
3.4. I start with  = 0, which is the constant risk case. I then set  = 0:5. From  = 0:75 to
 = 1, I use increments of 0.05, while for  = 1 to 2.5, I use increments of 0.25. Generally, when
 increases, the principals expected payo¤ is decreasing. An increase in  means an increase in
investment risk, and the agents risk premium increases. This is also why optimal investment
decreases in  . Even though investment decreases, the stock price variance V arP increases.
This is because V ar() increases when  increases, and for voluntary disclosure also because
the probability of disclosure increases. The stock bonus u decreases for both full and voluntary
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disclosure. One reason is the decline in induced investment, which requires a lower stock bonus.
In addition, with voluntary disclosure there is the increase in the probability of disclosure and
the option e¤ect discussed earlier, which make the stock bonus more powerful and reduce the
required stock bonus further. The stock price risk premium RP (u^V ) is determined by risk
aversion, stock bonus and V arP . While stock bonus goes down, stock price variance increases
and the e¤ect of this increase dominates, so the stock price risk premium increases with  . I also
calculate the principals net payo¤ disregarding the disclosure cost, W V + E() and WF + .
These also decrease with  because of the increased risk.
I will now compare the optimal solutions for full disclosure and voluntary disclosure for
di¤erent values of  . For all the  -values in the table, the principals payo¤ is higher with
voluntary disclosure than with full disclosure. The table also shows that for values of  weakly
higher than  = 1:25 the optimal investment level is higher with voluntary disclosure than with
full disclosure. This occurs when the sum
 @(1 (b))
@b
  @RP
V (u^V )
@b
(3.61)
from (3.44) has higher value (smaller absolute value) than
 @RP
F (u^F )
@b
(3.62)
from (3.49) and (3.50). This means that
@RP V (u^V )
@b
<
@RPF (u^F )
@b
(3.63)
must hold when the optimal bV > bF , as is the case when   1:25.
I show in Appendix 3.A.6 that V arP V  V arPF , but this only holds when keeping invest-
ment b constant. Table 4 shows that V arP V  V arPF for optimal b for values of   2:25. For
 = 2:5 stock price variance is higher with voluntary disclosure than with full disclosure. One
reason is that the probability of disclosure increases as  increases, so the reduction in stock
price variance coming from the no-disclosure states, diminishes. The second reason is that for
high  , the investment is higher with voluntary disclosure than full disclosure, and with higher
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investment, the investment risk is higher.
The optimal stock bonus is lower with voluntary disclosure than with full disclosure when
  1:75. This happens even though investment is higher with voluntary disclosure in these
cases. Recall from Figure 3.9 that for some values of  , a lower stock bonus is needed with
voluntary disclosure than full disclosure, and the values where u^V < u^F in Table 4 is within
this range (even if the investment level varies in Table 4, but is constant at b = 0:7570 in Figure
3.9).
Lastly, I note that the principals expected wealth gross of the disclosure cost, is higher with
voluntary disclosure than with full disclosure when   1 in Table 3.4.
The graphs in Figure 3.11 show how the investment b and the gross payo¤ decline as 
increases, for both voluntary and full disclosure. Initially, for small  ; investment and gross
payo¤ are lower with voluntary disclosure. For higher values of  ; gross payo¤ and investment
are higher with voluntary disclosure than with full disclosure. The values of  where the two
lines cross, however, are di¤erent for b and W . Optimal investment b is determined by the
derivatives @(1 (b))@b and
@RPV (u^V )
@b , but the principals expected payo¤ depends on the values
of RP V (u^V ) and (1 (b)). But these are of course closely related.
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Figure 3.11. Optimal investment (Panel A) and the principals expected payo¤, disregarding
the disclosure cost (Panel B), as functions of  : Red graphs are voluntary disclosure and black
graphs are full disclosure.
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3.5.3 Discussion
The results of this chapter can be compared to the results in Feltham and Wu (2001). Feltham
and Wu (FW) study the e¤ectiveness of options vs stock as incentives to induce managerial
e¤ort. The second part of their paper focuses on the case where the managers e¤ort increases
rm risk, which is analogous to this chapter where investment increases risk. With options,
the managers compensation is piecewise linear, just as the case is in my model with voluntary
disclosure. In FW, there is limited liability, so when the manager is rewarded in stock, there
is a limit (= 0) to how low the value of the stock can be. Even with stock compensation, the
managers compensation in their case is piecewise linear, but with a lower strike price (= 0)
than with options (where the strike price is larger than zero). I do not consider limited liability
in my model, so with full disclosure, the managers compensation is linear. I still nd it useful
to compare my voluntary disclosure model to the option model in FW.
FW study how the principal optimally chooses the strike price. That means that if the opti-
mal strike price is zero, stock compensation is optimal, and when optimal strike price is higher
than zero, option compensation is optimal. When the manager inuences risk, solving their
model becomes analytically intractable, so they compare the special cases of stock compensation
and at-the-money options (based on expected payo¤ with conjectured e¤ort level).
FW nd that a high risk parameter (parallell to  in my model) makes at-the-money options
more e¤ective than stock in inducing e¤ort. Going back to my model and the example, optimal
investment is higher with voluntary disclosure than with full disclosure if the risk parameter 
is above a cut-o¤, see Panel A of Figure 3.11. Similar to this, in FW there is a cut-o¤ of the risk
parameter where optimal e¤ort is higher with at-the-money options than with stock when the
risk parameter is above the cut-o¤. In Panel B in Figure 3.11, the graphs show the principal
in my model is better o¤ with voluntary disclosure than with full disclosure when  is above a
(di¤erent) cut-o¤. In FW, the principal is better of with (at-the-money) option compensation
than with stock compensation when the risk parameter is above a given value.
With options the kink in compensation is given by the strike price, which is directly set by
the principal. In my model, however, the kink is given by the cut-o¤ fCO, see (3.16): This value
is set in an equilibrium, and is not set by the principal. Instead, it depends on the disclosure
cost, uncertainty, and conjectured investment level (which is indirectly inuenced by the stock
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bonus u^V , which is chosen by the principal). So while the cut-o¤ is directly set in FW, it
is not in my model. Another di¤erence between the models, is that in my model, there is a
(dead-weight) cost of ending up in the risky (kinked) part of the compensation; the disclosure
cost. The manager inuences the probability of ending up in the disclosure region when he
chooses investment, as higher investment increases the probability of disclosure and therefore
the expected disclosure cost. The principal must bear this cost in case of disclosure, and this
reduces her net payo¤s from increased investment. This reduces optimal investment. There is
no parallell to this in the FW model, since there is no such cost with options.
The chapter is also related to Lambert and Larcker (2004) and Flor et al.(2011). Lambert
and Larker (2004) show that when limited liability is a binding constraint, options or convex
piece-wise linear contracts are optimal. This holds when the manager only inuences the mean
of output distribution. Allowing for the manager to also inuence variance gives an additional
reason for convexity in the contract. Flor et al. (2011) derive optimal contracts when the
manager inuences both the mean and variance of output. When restricting the contract to be
non-decreasing in output (if for instance the agent can destroy ouput), the optimal contract is
closely related to an option contract. Restricting the contract further, to be piece-wise linear,
does not cost much in their model. All these three papers give theoretical arguments for using
options in contracting. These are piece-wise linear and convex, as the voluntary disclosure
compensation is in my model.
Armstrong, Larcker and Su (2007) and Dittmann and Yu (2009) use calibrations with real
compensation data to analyze the optimality of options. In their models, the managers actions
inuence both the mean and the variance of the stock price. When restricting the compensation
to be a linear combination of xed salary, stock and options, both papers nd that their data
support the optimality of options. Their models predict that managers should receive relatively
large amounts of options. Therefore, convexity is part of the optimal contracts.
3.6 Conclusion
In this chapter I study how a managers voluntary disclosure decision changes his investment
incentives when he can inuence investment risk. I nd that in some cases the necessary stock
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bonus is lower in this case compared to the case where investment risk is constant. In some
cases, the necessary stock bonus is also lower with voluntary disclosure than with full disclosure.
I nd that the principal in some settings are better o¤ with voluntary disclosure than with full
disclosure, and that the optimal investment level can be higher with voluntary disclosure than
with full disclosure. The policy implication of this is that it can be better to leave the disclosure
decision to the manager instead of imposing full disclosure regulation.
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3.A Appendix to Chapter 3
3.A.1 The agents certainty equivalent
In order to nd the agents certainty equivalent when  > 0; I use the calculations from  = 0
and replace  with (b) when  reects the agents decision, and with (b^) when it reects the
markets expectations. The main di¤erences are shown below:
 The conditional stock price variance
var(P 1 j f  fCO) (3.64)
= var(f j f  fCO)
=
1
12
(m(b) + (b)  fCO)2
=
1
12

m(b) + (b) m(b^) + (b^)  2

(3.65)
=
1
12
(m(b) m(b^) + (b) + (b^)  2)2
 The unconditional mean of the stock price is:
E0(P ) = E [E(P j f)]
= (1 (fCO))  E(P j f  fCO)
+(fCO)  E(P j f < fCO)
= (1 (fCO)) 

1
2
(m(b) +m(b^) + (b)  (b^))

+(fCO) 

m(b^)  (b^) + 

(3.66)
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 The unconditional variance:
V ar0(P ) = E [var(P j f)] + var [E(P j f)] (3.67)
= (1 (fCO))  1
12
(m(b) m(b^) + (b) + (b^)  2)2
1
4

(fCO) 2(fCO)  m(b) m(b^) + (b) + (b^)  22
=
1
4
(1 (fCO))(1
3
+ (fCO))  (m(b) m(b^) + (b) + (b^)  2)2
 The agents certainty equivalent is:
CE0 = + (a  b)  e(a)  1
2
22 (3.68)
+ u^ 
0BB@ (1 (f
CO)) 

1
2(m(b) +m(b^) + (b)  (b^))

+(fCO) 

m(b^)  (b^) + 

1CCA
  1
2
u^2  1
4
(1 (fCO))(1
3
+ (fCO))  (m(b) m(b^) + (b) + (b^)  2)2
3.A.2 The agents rst order condition:
I nd the agents rst order condition for investment by di¤erentiating the components of the
certainty equivalent with respect to b.
@
@b
=
( m0(b) + )  2(b) 

m(b^) m(b)  (b^) + (b) + 2

 2
(2(b))2
(3.69)
=
 2(b) m0(b) +

2(b)  2

m(b^) m(b)  (b^) + (b) + 2

 
(2(b))2
=  m
0(b)
2(b)
  m(b^) m(b)  (b^) + 2
22(b)
 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@E0(P )
@b
=  @
@b
 1
2

m(b) +m(b^) + (b)  (b^)

+ (1 (fCO))  1
2
 
m0(b) + 

(3.70)
+
@
@b

m(b^) +   (b^)

@V ar0(P )
@b
=

1
4

 @
@b

(
1
3
+ (fCO)) +
1
4
(1 (fCO))@
@b

 (m(b) m(b^) + (b^) + (b)  2)2
(3.71)
+
1
4
(1 (fCO))(1
3
+ (fCO))  2(m(b) m(b^) + (b^) + (b)  2)  m0(b) + 
In equilibrium, with b^ = b these expressions simplify to:
(fCO) =

(b)
(3.72)
@
@b
=  m
0(b)
2(b)
   (b^) + 2
2(b)
 
(b)
=  

m0(b)
2(b)
+

  1
2

 
(b)

(3.73)
@E0(P )
@b
= (1 )  1
2
 
m0(b) + 

(3.74)
+

m0(b)
2(b)
+

  1
2

 
(b)

1
2
 
m0(b) + 

(b)  )

= (1 )
+

m0(b)
2(b)
+

  1
2

 
(b)

(b)(1 )
= (1 )  1
2
 
m0(b) + 

+

m0(b)
2
+

  1
2

 

(1 )
= (1 )m0(b) + (1 )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@V ar0(P )
@b
=
1
4

 @
@b

(
1
3
+ )  (1 )

(2(b)  2)2 (3.75)
+
1
2
(1 )(1
3
+ ) (2(b)  2)  m0(b) + 
=  @
@b

2  2
3

2(b)(1 )2
+ (1 )(1
3
+ )(1 )  m0(b) + (b)
=

m0(b)
2(b)
+

  1
2

 
(b)

2  2
3

2(b)(1 )2
+ (1 )(1
3
+ )(1 )  m0(b) + (b)
= m0(b)

1
2(b)
2

  1
3

2(b)(1 )2 + (1 )(1
3
+ )(1 )(b)

+ 

  1
2

 1
(b)
2

  1
3

2(b)(1 )2 + (1 )(1
3
+ )(1 )(b)

= m0(b)(1 )2(b)

  1
3

+ (
1
3
+ )

+ (1 )2(b)

2

  1
2

  1
3

+ (
1
3
+ )

= m0(b)(b)2(1 )2 + 2(b)(1 )2

2   1
3
 +
1
3

= m0(b)(b)2(1 )2 + 2
3
(b)

(1 )2

1
3
2  + 1

| {z }
2[0;1]
> 0
When  > 0, this adds a positive term to both @E0(P )@b and
@V ar0(P )
@b .
In sum, the derivative of the agents certainty equivalent with respect to investment is:
@CE0
@b
=   + u^   (1 (b))m0(b) + (1 (b))(b) (3.76)
  1
2
u^2

m0(b)(1 (b))2(b)2(b) + (1 (b))2(b)

2(b)2   2
3
(b) +
2
3

(3.77)
To get the rst order condition I set this equal to zero and rearrange:
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   + u^   (1 (b))m0(b) + (1 (b))(b) (3.78)
  u^2  (1 (b))2

m0(b)(b)(b) + 

2   1
3
 +
1
3

(b)

(3.79)
= 0 (3.80)
I rearrange:
   + u^ m0(b) (1 (b))  u^  (1 (b))2(b)(b) (3.81)
+ u^  

(1 (b))(b)  u^  (1 (b))2

2   1
3
 +
1
3

(b)

(3.82)
Rewriting gives equation (3.21).
 The marginal e¤ect on the probability of disclosure:
@(1 )
@b
=
m0(b)
2(b)
+

  1
2

 
(b)
(3.83)
This is positive when
m0(b)
2(b)
+

  1
2

 
(b)
> 0 (3.84)
  1
2

 
(b)
>  m
0(b)
2(b)
  
(b)
>
1
2
 
(b)
  m
0(b)
2(b)
 >
1
2

1  m
0(b)


or
m0(b)

> 1  2 (3.85)
3.A.3 The stock bonus
I rearrange (3.78) .
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 +u^(1 (b))  m0(b) + (b) u^2 (1 (b))2m0(b)(b) +  2   1
3
 +
1
3

(b)

= 0
(3.86)
 I solve this as a quadratic equation wrt u:
u^V =
1 
r
1  4(m0(b)+(2 
1
3
+ 1
3)(b))
(m0(b)+)2
2(1 (b))(m0(b)+(2  13+ 13)(b))
(m0(b)+)
(3.87)
=
 
1 

1  4(m
0(b)+(2  13+ 13)(b))
(m0(b)+)2
 1
2
!
2(1 (b))(m0(b)+(2  13+ 13)(b))
(m0(b)+)

 
1 +

1  4(m
0(b)+(2  13+ 13)(b))
(m0(b)+)2
 1
2
!
 
1 +

1  4(m0(b)+(2 
1
3
+ 1
3)(b))
(m0(b)+)2
 1
2
!
=
 
1 
 
1  4
 
m0(b)+ 
 
2   13+ 13

(b)


(m0(b) + )2
!!

0@ 1
2(1 (b))(m0(b)+(2  13+ 13)(b))
(m0(b)+)
1A

0@1 + 1  4  m0(b)+   2   13+ 13(b)
(m0(b) + )2
! 1
2
1A 1
= 4
 
m0(b)+ 
 
2   13+ 13

(b)

(m0(b) + )
 1
2(1 (b))  m0(b)+   2   13+ 13(b)

0@1 + 1  4  m0(b)+   2   13+ 13(b)
(m0(b) + )2
! 1
2
1A 1
=

(m0(b) + )
2
(1 ) 
0@1 + 1  4 m0(b)+   2   13+ 13(b)
(m0(b) + )2
! 1
2
1A 1 (3.88)
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 bmax is the value of b where the square root above is equal to zero:
s
1  4
 
m0(b)+ 
 
2   13+ 13

(b)


(m0(b) + )2
= 0 (3.89)
I use the numerical values from the example:
vuuuuut1  4  0:2

(2  b)0:25 + 1:75

0:25
(1+1:75b)
2   13  0:25(1+1:75b) + 13 (1 + 1:75  b) 0:67729
(2  b) + 0:25(1+1:75b)  1:75
2 = 0
(3.90)
1 
4  0:2

(2  b)0:25 + 1:75

0:25
(1+1:75b)
2   13  0:25(1+1:75b) + 13 (1 + 1:75  b) 0:67729
(2  b) + 0:25(1+1:75b)  1:75
2 = 0
I use this value of b in the expression for u^V and nd the necessary stock bonus:
u^V =
1 
vuut1  40:2

(2 b)0:25+1:75

0:25
(1+1:75b)
2  1
3
 0:25
(1+1:75b)+
1
3

(1+1:75b)

0:67729
(2 b)+ 0:25
(1+1:75b) 1:75
2
20:2(1 

0:25
(1+1:75b)

)

(2 b)0:25+1:75

0:25
(1+1:75b)
2  1
3

0:25
(1+1:75b)

+ 1
3

(1+1:75b)


(2 b)+

0:25
(1+1:75b)

1:75

(3.91)
bmax = 1: 143 2
u^V = 1: 440 1
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3.A.4 The e¤ect of 
To nd max I note that the term

1  4(m
0(b)+(2  13+ 13)(b))
(m0(b)+)2

in (3.25) must be  0,
since this is in a square root:
1  4
 
m0(b)+ 
 
2   13+ 13

(b)


(m0(b) + )2
> 0 (3.92)
4
 
m0(b)+ 
 
2   13+ 13

(b)


(m0(b) + )2
< 1
4

m0(b)+ 

2   1
3
 +
1
3

(b)

 <
 
m0(b) + 
2
 <
(m0(b) + )2
4
 
m0(b)+ 
 
2   13+ 13

(b)

This denes max :
max =
(m0(b) + )2
4
 
m0(b)+ 
 
2   13+ 13

(b)
 (3.93)
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I di¤erentiate u^V with respect to :
@u^V
@
=
2
(m0(b) + )
1
(1 ) (3.94)
 ( 1)
0@1 + 1  4 m0(b)+   2   13+ 13(b)
(m0(b) + )2
! 1
2
1A 2
 1
2
 
1  4
 
m0(b)+ 
 
2   13+ 13

(b)

(m0(b) + )2
!  1
2
 ( 4)
 
m0(b)+ 
 
2   13+ 13

(b)

(m0(b) + )2
= u^V 2
1
(m0(b) + )2

m0(b)+ 

2   1
3
 +
1
3

(b)


0@1 + 1  4 m0(b)+   2   13+ 13(b)
(m0(b) + )2
! 1
2
1A 1

 
1  4
 
m0(b)+ 
 
2   13+ 13

(b)

(m0(b) + )2
!  1
2
=
 
u^V
2
(1 )
 
m0(b)+ 
 
2   13+ 13

(b)

(m0(b) + )

 
1  4
 
m0(b)+ 
 
2   13+ 13

(b)

(m0(b) + )2
!  1
2
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This is positive when:
@u^V
@
> 0 (3.95)
when
m0(b)+ 

2   1
3
 +
1
3

(b) > 0 (3.96)


2   1
3
 +
1
3

(b) >  m0(b)
2   1
3
 +
1
3
>  m
0(b)
(b)
2   1
3
 +
1
3
>  m
0(b)


2   13+ 13

>  m
0(b)

This always holds, since the RHS is negative,and the LHS is positive.
3.A.5 Full disclosure bonus
 The agents rst order condition:
@CE0
@b
=   + u^Fm0(b)  1
3

 
u^F
2
(b)0(b) = 0 (3.97)
I solve this with respect to u^F :
u^F =
 m0(b)
q
(m0(b))2   413(b)
2
  13(b) (3.98)
u^F =
1 
q
1  43 (b)(m0(b))2
2
3
(b)
m0(b)
 I rewrite:
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u^F =
1 

1  43 (b)(m0(b))2
 1
2
2
3
(b)
m0(b)

1 +

1  43 (b)(m0(b))2
 1
2
1 +

1  43 (b)(m0(b))2
 1
2
(3.99)
=
1 

1  43 (b)(m0(b))2

2
3
(b)
m0(b)

 
1 +

1  4
3
(b)
(m0(b))2
 1
2
! 1
=
4
3
(b)
(m0(b))2
2
3
(b)
m0(b)

 
1 +

1  4
3
(b)
(m0(b))2
 1
2
! 1
= 2  
m0(b)

 
1 +

1  4
3
(b)
(m0(b))2
 1
2
! 1
(3.100)
 The stock price variance with full disclosure
var(PF )  2 =
1
12
(2(b))2 =
1
3
(b)2 =
1
3
(+ b)2 (3.101)
 The derivative of V ar0(PF ) with respect to b is:
@V ar0(P
F )
@b
=
2
3
(+ b) (3.102)
=
2
3
(b) > 0
When  > 0, @V ar0(P
F )
@b is positive, but when  = 0, it is zero.
 I nd bF max by setting the square root in u^F above equal to zero.
s
1  4
3
(bF max)
(m0(bF max))2
= 0 (3.103)
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When I use this in the example, I nd:
s
1  4
3
0:2  (1 + 1:75  bF max)  1:75  0:67729
((2  bF max))2 = 0 (3.104)
bF max = 1: 052 (3.105)
The corresponding value of u^F is u^F = 1: 388 7.
 The derivative of u^F with respect to  .
@u^F
@
= 2  
m0(b)
 ( 1) 
 
1 +

1  4
3
(b)
(m0(b))2
 1
2
! 2
 1
2

1  4
3
(b)
(m0(b))2
  1
2


 4
3
(b)
(m0(b))2

(3.106)
= 2  
m0(b)

 
1 +

1  4
3
(b)
(m0(b))2
 1
2
! 1

 
1 +

1  4
3
(b)
(m0(b))2
 1
2
! 1


1  4
3
(b)
(m0(b))2
  1
2
 2
3
(b)
(m0(b))2
= u^F  2 
m0(b)
 
1 +

1  4
3
(b)
(m0(b))2
 1
2
! 1


1  4
3
(b)
(m0(b))2
  1
2
 1
3
(b)
m0(b)
=
 
u^F
2  1  4
3
(b)
(m0(b))2
  1
2
 1
3
(b)
m0(b)
> 0 (3.107)
3.A.6 Voluntary versus full disclosure in equilbrium:
 Stock price variance: When b^ = b in equilibrium, I can simplify the expression for the
stock price variance in (3.67) to:
V ar0(P ) (3.108)
=
1
4
(1 (fCO))(1
3
+ (fCO))  (2(b)  2)2
= (1 (fCO))3(1
3
+ (fCO))| {z }
2[0; 13 ]
 (b)2 (3.109)
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var(PF ) =
1
3
(b)2 (3.110)
The stock price variance is lower with voluntary disclosure than with full disclosure.
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Chapter 4
Discussion and conclusion
4.1 Summary and main contributions
4.1.1 Setting
In this thesis, I analyze a setting where a manager makes a short-term operating decision, a long-
term investment decision, and a reporting decision. I study how the reporting decision might
inuence the managers investment choice. The reporting decision is voluntary: the manager can
choose whether to disclose his information, but the manager must report truthfully if he chooses
to disclose. I analyze how the managers investment incentives and the ownersexpected payo¤
di¤er when the manager can control the disclosure decision (voluntary disclosure) compared to
the base case of mandatory (or full) disclosure.
4.1.2 Model
The model I use to study these issues is based on Dutta and Reichelstein (2005), with some
modications, and adding a voluntary disclosure decision. The model in my thesis has two
periods. The manager is hired at time zero, for one period, but the payo¤s from investment
are not realized until period 2, after the manager has left the company. The manager initially
makes two decisions; e¤ort (describing short term operating decisions) and how much to invest
(how much money to spend on a long term investment project). At the end of the rst period,
cash ows from e¤ort are realized. Both investment cost and cash ow from e¤ort appear in
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period one. I assume that the accounting system cannot distinguish between the two. This
means that the owners and the manager cannot contract on the specic parts of the rst-period
cash ows. This creates an interaction between e¤ort and investment incentives.
At the end of period one, the agent privately observes a signal about future investment
payo¤s. I assume that this signal is a perfect prediction of future investment payo¤s. The agent
can choose whether to disclose this signal to the owners of the company and to the outside stock
market. This is the managers voluntary disclosure decision. If he does disclose, the company
incurs a disclosure cost. The stock market incorporates all available information, including the
agents disclosure or no disclosure, into the stock price. The agent is then compensated based
on two performance measures; this stock price and total cash ows (from the investment cost
and e¤ort payo¤s) in period 1. Compensation is assumed to be linear in these two performance
measures. In the last period, the cash ows from investment are realized and paid to owners.
4.1.3 Analysis
The "unraveling" result ((Grossman and Hart (1980), Grossman (1981), Milgrom (1981)) states
that under certain conditions the company (or its manager) will always disclose all their private
information to the stock market. If the rm does not disclose, the market will interpret this as
low rm value (bad news). With no disclosure, the market will revise their valuation downwards,
eventually down to the lowest possible rm value. Every rm with value higher than the lowest
possible will then have an incentive to reveal their information, to separate themselves from
the lowest-value type, and there will be full disclosure (except for the rms with lowest possible
value). One of the conditions for this unraveling to occur (see for instance Beyer et al. (2010)), is
that disclosure is not costly1. In Verrecchia (1983) there is costly disclosure, and in equilibrium
in this model the company will disclose only good news. The same is the case in my model,
which also has costly disclosure. When the manager chooses not to disclose bad news, the stock
price will not reveal the exact value of the news (the signal) since the market only observes
non-disclosure. However, non-disclosure in itself is bad news, so the stock price will be revised
downwards and will reect a general low value.
1Other reasons are: It is public knowledge that the company has private information; all market participants
interpret the rms disclosure in the same way; the rms disclosure is credible; it is not possible to commit ex
ante to a certain disclosure policy (Beyer et al. (2010)).
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I analyze how voluntary disclosure inuences the managers investment incentives for the two
cases where risk is constant in investment (Chapter 2) and when risk is increasing in investment
(Chapter 3). I show that for a given stock bonus, the managers incentives for investing can be
lower or higher with voluntary disclosure than with full disclosure, depending on the disclosure
setting and the parameters of the model. The reason that incentives are di¤erent with voluntary
disclosure is that the manager can choose not to disclose, and in this case his compensation
will be constant relative to the stock price, since the stock price in these cases does not contain
information about the investment. With linear compensation, as I assume, the compensation
will then be at (constant) for low payo¤s which the manager will not disclose, and increasing
in stock price for higher outcomes (as shown in Figure 2.2). This protects the manager from
the downside risk of investing, but the resulting piecewise linear compensation in payo¤s alters
the managers investment incentives.
In the models I assume that the investment level that the manager chooses is not observable
or contractible. Only the aggregate cash ow from operations and the investment expenditure
is contractible. There may be many cases where it is di¢ cult to separate operating from
investment cash ows. Examples include R&D investment and human resources investment. For
R&D, the capitalization vs expensing of R&D expenditures depends on how the company views
the future prospects of the R&D project2. These are to a certain extent based on subjective
factors and the managers discretion. This can also make it di¢ cult to separate the operating
and investment cash ows. If, on the other hand, the investment expenditure is perfectly
observable and contractible, there would be a full separation of operating and investment cash
ows, and this would solve the investment incentive problem.
In my model, where investment expenditures are not separately observable, the stock price
is used to create investment incentives. The stock price, however, contains uncertainty and
consequently imposes risk on the manager. As a result of this, the stock price is an imperfect
tool in the matching process, but it is nevertheless useful in contracting.
The aggregation assumption creates a trade-o¤ between e¤ort and investment incentives.
2Literature on R&D accounting that has focused on the arguments for and against expensing vs capitalization
include Chambers, Jennings and Thompson (2003) and Lev, Nissim and Thomas (2005). Others have tried to
explain empirically why some rms choose one strategy over the other if there is accounting exibility (Landry
and Callimaci (2003), Oswald (2008), and Cazavan-Jeny, Jeanjean and Joos (2010)). Accounting standards that
deal with R&D include SFAS No. 2 and IAS No 38.
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E¤ort is personally costly to the manager, but investment is not. In order to create e¤ort
incentives, the principal has to make the managers compensation depend on the aggregate
period-1 cash ow, since this is the only performance measure that can be used to induce e¤ort.
This, however, creates disincentives for the manager to invest, since investment reduces period-1
cash ow. The result is an induced incentive problem which is an underinvestment problem.
4.1.4 Results
In Chapters 2 and 3 I compare the voluntary and full disclosure settings. I nd that the
principal in some cases are better o¤ letting the manager control the disclosure decision instead
of having full disclosure. First, the principal saves on the expected disclosure cost with voluntary
disclosure. Second, the risk imposed on the agent is smaller with voluntary disclosure, holding
everything else constant. This is because the manager can choose not to disclose his information,
and in these cases the stock price will not depend on the pay-o¤ from the risky investment.
This reduces the overall variance of both the stock price and the managers compensation. The
manager will choose not to disclose when payo¤s are low. This protects him from the downside
risk of investing. However, this also makes the manager invest less for a given linear contract,
when the risk is independent of investment (Chapter 2). On the other hand, when risk increases
with investment (Chapter 3), this convexity in the managers payo¤ may increase investment
incentives with voluntary disclosure compared to full disclosure.
The di¤erence in the incentive e¤ect of stock price with voluntary and full disclosure suggests
that the disclosure setting must be taken into account by the principal when deciding on the
contract that she will o¤er the agent. I show that the principal can strictly prefer to let
the manager decide whether to disclose or not (voluntary disclosure), compared to full (or
mandatory) disclosure. The policy implication of this is that it may be socially optimal to
have voluntary disclosure instead of full, mandatory disclosure, and that managerial discretion
in reporting decisions may be the optimal policy. The models also illustrate the interaction
between reporting and real decisions; between disclosure and investment.
The models extend the voluntary disclosure literature by including real investment decisions
into the model. Verrecchia (1983) and other voluntary disclosure models describe pure exchange
economies. By including real production decisions, I can study the interaction between reporting
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decisions and real decisions.
The models contribute to the literature on incentives and performance evaluation by ex-
tending the model in Dutta and Reichelstein (2005) to include a reporting decision by the
manager. When the manager controls the information that the stock market receives, he can
hide information about bad news. This reduces the downside risk for the agent, but it also
changes the e¤ectiveness of the stock bonus in incentive contracting.
4.1.5 Limitations
One limitation of my study is that I assume that the compensation contract is linear in the two
performance measures. I do not claim that this linear contract is optimal. I study the optimal
contract, under the restriction that it is linear. I do this to make the model tractable and to
be able to study how the exogenous factors inuence the optimal contract. Holmström and
Milgrom (1987), Christensen and Feltham (2005, Chapter 19) and Edmans and Gabaix (2011)
all study settings where the optimal contract is linear. The contract is optimally linear only
under very certain conditions in these models, conditions for instance on preferences, production
uncertainty, and information. I do not claim that these restrictions are met in my model, and
the linearity assumption is therefore an exogenous assumption restricting the applicability of
the model. My aim, however, is to study what insight a model with linear compensation and
voluntary disclosure provides.
In Chapter 3, I show that voluntary disclosure can be more e¢ cient for the principal than
full disclosure (this also holds for the model in Chapter 2, but here the result is driven by the
savings in expected disclosure cost. In Chapter 3 the result holds more generally). Voluntary
disclosure implies that the managers compensation becomes piece-wise linear and convex in the
signal, while full disclosure compensation is linear. Others have studied how piece-wise linear
contracts can be optimal compared to linear contracts, for instance the optimality of stock
options versus stock compensation (Feltham and Wu (2001), Kadan and Swinkels (2008), Flor,
Frimor and Munk (2011), and Wu (2011)). With options or my models voluntary disclosure
setting, the manager is protected from downside risk but rewarded for high outcomes. Both
situations can reduce the risk premium the principal has to pay, and it can give the manager
incentives to invest in risky projects. I have shown that voluntary disclosure can be more
174
CHAPTER 4 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
e¢ cient in incentives than full disclosure. However, it is likely that the same result that I prove
for voluntary disclosure can be achieved by giving the manager a piece-wise linear compensation
directly.
Another assumption I use in the model is that the investment uncertainty is uniformly
distributed. This means that the noise has a nite support, and that each outcome within the
support has equal probability. It also means that the distribution is completely characterized
by its mean and variance (no third moment). The normal distribution is a relevant alternative.
However, the uniform distribution has the advantage of simplicity and tractability in my model.
Also, the managers preferences are dened in terms of mean and variance, so that higher
moments are not part of the agents preferences.
4.2 Accruals, voluntary disclosure and earnings management
The models in chapters 2 and 3 showed how the manager could withhold information to the
stock market, and how this voluntary disclosure decision inuenced the managers investment
incentives. In chapter 1 I discussed the role of accruals in nancial accounting, and how the
manager could use accruals to manage earnings. I also discussed how the models in Chapter 2
and 3 are closely related to accrual accounting.
The signal that the manager receives in the model is a perfect prediction of future cash
ow from the investment. This signal can be used to induce investment, and in the model it is
the only way to give the manager investment incentives. The manager is in the company only
in period 1, and the cash ows from investment are not realized until period 2. The signal
about future cash ows can be used to create investment incentives by rewarding the manager
in period 1 for cash ows that do not occur until period 2. I can relate this to the discussion
about accruals in Chapter 1. Using the signal in incentives in period 1 works like a fair value
accrual. A fair value accrual would in this case match the revenue received in period 2 to the
cost in period 1 when the cost occurs. Other models of accruals, such as in Reichelstein (1997)
and Rogerson (1997), instead match costs to the relevant revenue in the period the revenue
occurs.
In Chapter 1 I also discussed how the manager can have some discretion over accruals
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reporting, and that this discretion can be used for signalling or opportunistic purposes. In
my model, the managers reporting discretion lies in his disclosure decision. The manager can
withhold information by not disclosing, and this is his way of managing information. This is
closely related to the earnings management decisions that the manager can take with regard to
accruals. In both cases the manager controls the information that the market receives.
4.3 Possible extensions and suggestions for further research
4.3.1 Alternative signals
Investment cost
In the original model, the signal is a perfect prediction of future cash ows from investment.
I have discussed how this resembles a fair value accrual. A possible extension to the model,
could be to consider alternative signals. For instance, an interesting case is when the signal is a
perfect or noisy measure of the investment cost. Consider rst a perfect signal about investment
cost. For each possible choice of investment level, the manager knows with certainty what
the disclosure stock price will be (the expected value of the investment, given the observed
investment level). For the principal, rst best investment can be achieved by setting the stock
bonus equal to the cash ow bonus; the two will then cancel each other out in the managers
compensation. The manager will then be indi¤erent with respect to investment level and will
(by assumption) invest the rst best level. The cash bonus could be set to solve the e¤ort
problem separately3.
This type of accrual would create a perfect separation of the e¤ort and investment problems.
It is interesting to note that a perfect signal about investment cost in this model creates perfect
disaggregation and consequently rst best investment, while a perfect signal about future cash
ows from investment does not.
However, the model would be more complicated if the signal contains noise; when the signal
3This holds as long as the benet of going from the lowest possible investment level b, to the rst best
investment bFB , is su¢ ciently high to cover the disclosure cost. The choice is then between b and no disclosure
and bFB and disclosure. Assuming the disclosure cost is relatively low compared to the di¤erence in payo¤
between investing b and investing bFB , rst best investment and disclosure will be the result.
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is a noisy measure of investment cost. The market would not use the signal for valuation but
base the stock price on its own conjectures about investment. The stock price will in turn not
reect the actual investment level. Consequently, the stock price is not valuable for incentive
purposes. The agent will not have any investment incentives and will only invest the lowest
possible amount. However, consider a third scenario, where the incentive contract can be written
directly on the noisy signal of investment cost, and not on the stock price. A simple preliminary
analysis suggests that the signal is valuable for incentives. Investment can be induced by having
a positive incentive weight on the signal. In this case, the signal creates a separation, though
imperfect, between investment and e¤ort cash ows. This creates investment incentives. This
scenario is related to accruals as described in Paton and Littleton (1940), where (most) accruals
are based on transactions and historical cost, and investment costs are distributed to the assets
operating periods.
The noisy signal of investment cost is not valuable for valuation but it is valuable for
incentives. The result that information has di¤erent value for valuation and incentives is not
new and is consistent with for instance Gjesdal (1981) and Paul (1992). It would be interesting
to study these issues in more detail and analyze the results in relation to the current model.
Other signals
Another possibility is to see what changes if the signal is an imperfect measure of future cash
ows. In Chapters 2 and 3 I looked at a setting where the signal is a perfect measure of cash
ows. There could also be di¤erent signals, as described in the section above, and di¤erent
signals could have di¤erent disclosure costs.
Accounting choices
There is a considerable empirical literature that tries to explain how and why rms choose the
accounting methods that they do (see Fields et al. (2001) for an overview of the empirical
accounting choice literature, and Quagli and Avallone (2010) for a recent empirical study).
Watts and Zimmermans (1986, 1990) positive accounting theory emphasizes the managers self
interest as one determinant of accounting choice; the manager will have incentive to choose
the accounting method that for instance maximizes his earnings-based compensation. From
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the earnings management literature, there is some evidence that managers do manage earnings
(see Chapter 1 for a further discussion). But these studies mostly take the managers incentive
contract as given. A managers incentive contract can inuence both real decisions such as
investment and accounting method choices. However, the accounting method in place can
also inuence the managers real decisions. For instance, Rogerson (1997) and Reichelstein
(1997) show in theoretical models how depreciation rules inuence the managers investment
incentives, and Baldenius and Reichelstein (2005) study the accounting methods inuence on
the managers production and inventory decisions. Jackson et al (2010), Jackson (2008) and
Seybert (2010) provide empirical and experimental studies on how accounting methods inuence
the rms investment decisions. It would be interesting to study in more detail how accounting
choices and real decisions inuence each other, and what the role of the managers incentives
is in these decisions.
The model I present in this thesis, deals with the managers choice of whether to disclose
his information or not. It could possibly be extended (or changed) to deal with accounting
choice. For instance, what happens if the manager has the discretion whether to choose fair
value or historical cost to report on an investment project? Would this inuence his incentives
to invest in the rst place? Another accounting choice could be between expensing and capital-
ization (which would be closely related to the current model in this thesis). Holthausen (1990)
suggests three motivations for accounting choice: opportunistic behavior, e¢ cient contracting,
and information perspectives (signalling). It could also be interesting to see whether and how
other aspects than opportunism, such as signalling, could be included in such a model.
4.3.2 Other extensions
The model is a one-shot-model with two periods. A possible extension is to include more periods.
Discounting could be introduced in the model, as well as the possibility that the manager and
owners have di¤erent discount rates. This would create investment incentive problems as in the
models by Dutta and Reichelstein discussed in Chapter 1. An interesting question is then how
voluntary disclosure (in each period) would inuence investment incentives.
In the model I have developed, the manager can withhold information, but he has to report
truthfully, if he makes a disclosure. Another interesting extension could be to allow the manager
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to misreport the signals. Einhorn and Ziv (2011) analyze misreporting in voluntary disclosures,
and Wu (2011) analyze misreporting in connection with stock option compensation. This would
move the model even closer to the earnings management literature.
In the current model, the managers investment incentives are deteremined by the explicit
incentive contract and the disclosure setting. Other incentives that could inuence the manager
could come from career concerns (as in Holmstrom (1982), Demers and Wang (2010)). This is
not covered in my model and would require a multi-period model. A topic for future research
could be to explore this issue further and see how career concerns would inuence the voluntary
disclosure decision and investment incentives.
The managers reputation for disclosure might also be included in such a model. Recent
research has shown that a managers individual or manager-specic characteristics and reputa-
tion inuence his disclosure decisions and the markets response to his disclosures (Bamber et
al. (2010), Brochet et al. (2011), Baik et al. (2011), Yang (2011)). What are the managers
incentives for building a reporting reputation?
The stock market plays a passive role in the model; it only creates a stock price at time 1,
based on available information. There are several ways to make this setting more realistic, for
instance by having trade in the stock at time 1, where some owners have to sell at this time.
This could create preferences for the principal at time 0 with regard to disclosure at time 1. I
could also introduce risk aversion for stock market participants, and see how this would change
the role of disclosure.
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